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Q. I'd like to refer your attention to Exhibit AF, please. 
Is that your letter of January 3, 2007, to attorney 
Patrick Moran, attorney for your brother Reed? 
A. Yes, it is. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit the exhibit, 
Exhibit AF. 
evidence.) 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit AF is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit AF was admitted into 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. And in the letter you refer to negotiations with 
Mr. Reed Taylor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you indicate that --
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the record -- the 
letter speaks for itself, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Okay. Well, I'd like to ask 
counsel, your Honor, what question I was going to ask because I 
don't think the question is objectionable. 
THE COURT: Go ahead with your question, 
Mr. Cressman. Ask the question. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 



























if the negotiations eventually fail, I fully recognize that 1 
Mr. Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate including 2 
calling a special shareholder's meeting. And my question to 3 
you is -- 4 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object if counsel is 5 
making an argument in the middle of the examination, I would 6 
object to that. 7 
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead, Mr. Cressman. 8 
MR. CRESSMAN: Let me start again because I think 9 
this is a completely proper question. 10 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I think it's an improper question. 11 
THE COURT: Stop it, stop it. Ask the question, 12 
Mr. Cressman. 13 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 14 
Q. Mr. Taylor, the last sentence of your letter Exhibit AF 15 
states, "If the negotiations eventually fail, I fully recognize 16 
that Mr. Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate including 17 
calling a special shareholder's meeting." And my question, 18 
sir, is if you and Mr. Taylor had an arrangement such that his 19 
note was not in default, why was it necessary to negotiate with 20 
him or his counselor persons on his behalf in 2007 or 2006? 21 
A. Well, I did so because of my long term personal 22 
relationship and respect for my brother. If he wants to 23 
negotiate the speeding up the payments of his note, of course 24 
I'll talk to him about that. 25 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND 
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Q. So it was you that -- it was Reed Taylor that wanted to 
negotiate, not yourself? 
A. I think I have stated that frequently today, yes. 
Q. Okay. So it's your testimony that you were not a 
moving party in terms of attempting to negotiate with your 
brother? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, moving party is vague 
and ambiguous. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Is it -- I'll rephrase. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Is it your testimony, Mr. Taylor, that you were not the 
instigating individual with regard to negotiations with your 
brother over restructuring his indebtedness? 
A. From March of 2003, no, I was fine. 
Q. From March of 2003 -- I didn't hear you? 
A. I did not initiate any of the restructuring. 
Q. Okay. So if the documents state otherwise, they would 
be in error? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, argumentative. Doesn't 
identify the documents. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Now, I'd like to refer you to Exhibit AG, please, and I 
will tell you that your brother did not keep a conformed copy 
103 
of this document, but it is the notice of special meeting of 
shareholders that your office responded to, and we will get to 
those pieces of correspondence. And my question to you is did 
you receive a document that is identical to this but signed by 
your brother and dated? 
A. I believe I did, yes. 
Q. Scheduling a shareholder's meeting for February 5? 
A. That's what it says. 
MR. CRESSMAN: We'd move for the admission of 
ExhibitAG. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I guess I'm a little concerned, 
your Honor, that not scheduling, scheduling could be a word of 
art. I would agree that it says "demanding." 
MR. CRESSMAN: I'll accept -- Counsel can mOdify 
my question so he can insert the word "demand." 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I modified the question so that it 
comports with the words of the exhibit to which I do not 
object. 
THE COURT: Exhibit AG is admitted. And it also 
speaks for itself and I can read. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit AG was admitted into 
eVidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. NOW, I'd like you to take a look at Exhibit H, please. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: H or AH? 



















































MR. CRESSMAN: H. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Is that letter your company's response to the notice of 
special shareholder's meeting received exhibit -- the previous 
exhibit we discussed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you approve this -- we'd move for the admission 
of Exhibit H, your Honor. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit H is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit H was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Did you prepare this letter? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you review it before it went out? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. Did a lawyer prepare it? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you recognize the legend in the lower left-hand 
corner? 
A. No. 
Q. Is there a James Gatziolis that's worked for you as a 
lawyer? 
A. James Gatziolis is an attorney for Crop USA, yes. 
Q. And is his firm -- what is the name of his firm in 
Chicago? Quarles and Brady? 
A. That's it. 
Q. LlP? 
A. Yes, Quarles and Brady. 
Q. . And he works for Crop USA? 
A. Yes. 
105 
Q. Has he been assisting you in responding to the 
correspondence from your brother and your brother's attorney? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance and about to 
invade the attorney-client privilege. 
. MR. CRESSMAN: I haven't. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to let him answer that 
question, and I'm going to overrule your objection for that 
question, Mr. McNichols. You can answer that, Mr. Taylor. 
A. Yes, he has. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Has he been paid by Crop USA to do so? 
A. Yes. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, irrelevant. 
MR. CRESSMAN: The answer was yes for the record. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Move to strike on the grounds that 
the question asks for irrelevant information. 
THE COURT: Overruled, I'm going to let that 
answer stand. 
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BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. And did Mr. Quarles prepare ExhibH: H, Mr. Taylor? 
A. I think I said I don't know. 
Q. And did I understand you correctly that you did not 
review the letter before it went out? 
A. I don't think I did. 
Q. Did Miss Duclos operate on her own with regard to this 
particular response? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance. 
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain that relevance 
objection. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Who was the -- who was the person in authority that 
authorized this letter to go out? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, argumentative. Assumes 
something other than Miss Duclos. 
THE COURT: Overruled, Mr. Taylor, you can answer 
that. 
A. What was the question? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Could you read the question back 
for the witness, please. 
(Thereupon, the requested question was read back 
by the court reporter.) 
A. JoLee Duclos. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
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Q. Let me ask you to go back to Exhibit F, Mr. Moran's 
letter to you of December 12th, and look at the second page of 
the letter. And in there in the paragraph that's numbered 2, 
oh, about half way through it says, "Attached hereto is the 
notice as provided in IC 30-1-02" referring to the notice 
that's Exhibit G. Did you look at that statutory section, sir? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You don't know whether you did or not? 
A. (Witness shakes head.) 
Q. Do you know that that section provides that holders of 
20 percent of the votes of the stock may call a special 
meeting? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object on the grounds 
that it asks the witness about his knowledge of a statute which 
is pretty clearly, I think, a question of law. 
THE COURT: Well, his knowledge isn't, overruled. 
A. What was the question? Excuse me. 
MR. CRESSMAN: I'll restate the question. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Did you know, sir, that that statute authorized the 
holders of at least 20 percent of all the votes entitled to be 
cast on any issue proposed to be conSidered at the proposed 
meeting, signed, date and deliver the corporation one or more 
demands for the meeting describing the purpose or purposes for 





















































Q. Had you known that, would that have made a difference 
to you in terms of allowing your brother to call the special 
shareholders meeting. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance and 
speculation. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Shortly after Miss Duclos transmitted her letter to 
your brother, Exhibit I, did you review -- excuse me, Exhibit 
H, did you review a copy of it, Exhibit H? 
A. I can't say that I did. 
Q. Take a look at Exhibit r. Is that a letter that your 
company received dated February 1, 2007, from your brother? 
A. I think so. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit Exhibit I. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit I is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit I is admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. And, Mr. Taylor, did you -- in Miss Duclos' letter 
Exhibit H, she asks your brother to provide evidence of his 
authority for calling the meeting. Did you consider his letter 
Exhibit I to be providing that evidence of authority? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object to the 
109 
question, your Honor. I think it's quite ambiguous, it asks 
whether he thought the letter was providing that authority, and 
I guess it's -- first of all it's subjective, but it's 
impossible to tell whose subjective mind he's being asked 
about, Mr. Reed Taylor's or his own. 
THE COURT: Yeah, could you -- I'm going to 
sustain that objection, Mr. Cressman. If you want to go back 
-- if you want to try to do that again, go ahead. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Alright. You are the President and CEO of AlA 
Insurance, correct, sir? 
A. Uh-huh, yes. 
Q. You are also -- presently right now are there any other 
board members in your mind other than yourself? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection. What does "in your 
mind" mean? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, it's our position that the 
only board member now is Mr. Reed Taylor. I assume that 
Mr. John Taylor may have a different view. That's why I asked 
the question that way trying to be completely accurate. 
Let me go back. I'll start again. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. In addition to being the sole shareholder -- or excuse 
me, the Chief Executive Officer and President of AlA Insurance 
in February of 2007, you were also Chairman of the Board of AlA 
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Insurance, Inc., correct? 
A. Uh-huh, yes. 
Q. And as a person in such authority, did you have 
occasion to review Exhibit I? 
A. I have seen Exhibit I, yes. 
110 
Q. And did you consider when you reviewed Exhibit I that 
it was responsive to Miss Duclos' request in Exhibit H that 
your brother provide evidence of his authority for his 
propOSition? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the relevance of this 
witness' consideration of whether Exhibit I is responsive to 
Exhibit H is irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. CRESSMAN: You may answer. 
A. I really have no weight to this letter because this 
just repeats all the other allegations that you are making and 
he has no right to call a board meeting. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to strike as nonresponsive. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Taylor, the question 
was whether you considered it a response to Miss Duclos' letter 
to set forth the basis for his claim. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Authority to call the special 
meeting, the second -- last sentence of the -- second to the 
last paragraph. 
THE COURT: Did you consider that letter 
111 
responsive? 
A. No, I did not. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. In what way did you not consider your brother's letter 
responsive? 
A. Because it's all based upon a default. 
Q. That's the only reason you found it was not responsive 
that in your mind there was not a default. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. In other words, if there had been a default, your 
brother would have had a right to call the special meeting? 
A. No, I don't think that's true. 
Q. Why do you disagree with that statement by me? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Your Honor, I'm going to object. 
These are questions of law again, not questions of fact for the 
witness. 
THE COURT: I agree. I think we have crossed over 
into that inclusive area, Mr. Cressman. I'm going to sustain 
that objection. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Let me ask you to take a look at Exhibit J please. 
That is your brother's letter of February 2, 2007, to the Board 
of Directors of AlA Insurance, Inc. Is that a letter that the 
Board received. 
A. Yes. 



















































MR. CRESSMAN: Move for the admission of 
Exhibit J. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit] is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit J was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Has an annual meeting of AlA Insurance been taken this 
year? 
A. No. 
Q. And held? 
A. No. 
Q. When was the last annual meeting held for AlA 
Insurance? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that, 
Mr. Taylor. 
A. I don't know that. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Was there a meeting held in 2006? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, asked and answered. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. I don't think so. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Was a meeting held in 2005? 
A. Don't know that. 
Q. Do you know why a meeting was not held in 2006. 
A. No. 
Q. When is the annual meeting scheduled for 20077 
113 
A. I don't know what date it is. May, I believe, usually 
May. 
Q. Now, I'd like you to take a look at Exhibits K and L 
being consents in lieu of special meeting of shareholders of 
AlA Insurance signed by your brother February 22, and a consent 
in lieu of meeting of the board of directors of AlA Insurance 
signed the same date by your brother. And those have been 
presented to you; correct? 
A. They have been. 
Q. Yes? 
A. Yes, they were presented to me. 
Q. And you saw them on February 25; correct? 
A. Is that Sunday? 
Q. Yes. 
A. That's when I would have seen them. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move for the admissions of Exhibits 
K and L. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit K and L are admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit K & L were admitted into 
evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
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Q. Let's keep going in order. Exhibit M, Mr. Taylor, 
those are bylaws of --
A. Yes, sir. 
114 
Q. AlA, the company now known as AlA Insurance, Inc? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move for the admission of 
exhibits -- Exhibit M. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Exhibit M is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit M was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Exhibit N, is that a letter dated February 25, 2007, 
from your brother to your attorney which you also saw a copy on 
February 25, 20077 
A. Yes. 
Exhibit N. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move for the admission of 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit N's admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit N was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Exhibit P, is that the lease signed by you on behalf of 
AlA Insurance dated December 3D, 1993, for the premises it 




MR. CRESSMAN: Move for the admission of 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I guess -- may I ask a qUestion in 
aid of what I'm doing because I don't know, your Honor. And I 
guess, Mr. Taylor, has this lease been modified in any way 
since it was originally signed? 
A. I don't think it has. AlA is master lessee of the 
whole building and we do subleases. 
MR. CRESSMAN: There's an amendment attached, your 
Honor, but I do object to Counsel. He will have his 
opportunity to examine the witness. The witness answered the 
question. 
THE COURT: Well, I allowed Mr. McNichols to go 
ahead and ask his question. 
Any objection to Exhibit P, Mr. McNichols? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I guess does Exhibit P include the 
amendments? That's why I'm in doubt. There is a IS-page lease 
it looks like, 16, and then there are these amendments. Are 
they all part of Exhibit P. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, they are. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Okay. I have no objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit P is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit P was admitted into evidence.) 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I'm confused whether I 




















































the partial tax return. I thought I had but maybe I didn't. 
THE COURT: No, you had not. 
MR. CRESSMAN: So moved. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I have no objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit T is admitted. 
116 
(Thereupon, Exhibit T was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Let me refer to you to Exhibit W, Mr. Taylor. Are 
those the consolidated financial statements for AlA Services 
Corporation and subsidiaries for year-end -- for year-end 
December 31, 2005? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Exhibit W is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit W was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Refer you to Exhibit X. Is Exhibit X the consolidated 
financial statements unaudited for AlA Services Corporation and 
subsidiaries for the years ending December 31, 2002, and 
December 31, 2001? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit Exhibit X. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Exhibit X is admitted. 
117 
(Thereupon, Exhibit X was admitted into eVidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, was five hundred thousand dollars borrowed 
from AlA Services 401(k) plan and loaned to Crop USA? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Take a look at Exhibit V. 
THE COURT: V as in Victor? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Vas in Victor. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Is Exhibit V a document which you provided to Mr. Bond? 
A. I believe so, yes. 
Q. Does that show that five hundred thousand dollars is 
owing to AlA Services 401(k) plan? 
A. No. 
Q. It does not. What does it show? 
A. On the books I think it refers to a duly related 
parties on the financial statements provided to Mr. Bond during 
the negotiations, and what this -- on the books of Crop USA are 
mortgages of Houston properties which were assigned to Crop 
USA. And that relates to the Houston and Minneapolis 
properties that Crop services bought. And when that money 
comes in, that goes -- gets passed into Crop USA because -- or 
AlA because they have an assignment out of it. 
Q. Who has an assignment out of it? 
A. AlA Services. 
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Q. And who is it owned by, Crop USA? 
A. No. 
Q. Why does AlA Services have an assignment of it? 
118 
A. AlA Services purchased the mortgage -- oh, I think the 
part we are missing is that these mortgages were contributed to 
Crop USA in 2004 and then purchased by the shareholders of AlA 
and of -- of, excuse me, of Crop USA and including AlA Services 
401(k). 
Q. The mortgages were purchased when, 2004? 
A. They were contributed to Crop USA in 2004. 
Q. By who? 
A. Adrian Johnson -- well, a partnership controlled by 
Adrian Johnson. 
Q. What were the total amounts of those mortgages, a 
million eighty-seven? 
A. Two million. 
Q. Okay. They were contributed to Crop USA. How were 
they assigned to AlA? 
A. They weren't. 
Q. Can you explain to the Court why AlA Services 401(k) 
plan is listed on Exhibit V? 
A. Yes, because AlA Services 401(k) plan purchased 
one-fourth interest in those mortgages for three hundred and 
seventy-five thousand dollars. And when those mortgages are 
paid, they get the five hundred thousand. 
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Q. Have they been paid? 
A. One of them has been paid. The other one will be paid 
this month or next month. 
Q. Exhibit Y please, could you look at that. Are those 
copies of the articles of incorporation of the company now 
known as AlA Insurance, Inc? 
A. Yes, I believe so. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit Exhibit Y. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit Y is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit Y was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Exhibit AH is a letter of February 6, 2007, to you from 
your brother Reed. 
A. Excuse me, which exhibit? 
Q. Exhibit AH. 
A. Okay. Yes. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit Exhibit AH. 
evidence.) 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit AH is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit AH was admitted into 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Isn't it correct, Mr. Taylor, that you did not respond 
to this letter? 5Lfl> 




















































A. I doubt if I did. 
Q. Let me ask you to look at Exhibit AJ please. Are these 
accountings for various year-ends for Reed Taylor's note? 
A. Yes, from the records of AlA Services. 
evidence.) 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit Exhibit Al. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I have no objection. 
THE COURT: AJ is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit AJ was admitted into 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Now, if J understood your testimony earlier, you 
indicated that you agreed to pay in 2003 your brother fifteen 
thousand dollars in interest a month; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Exhibit AJ shows that that did not occur; correct? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: First of all, AJ is how many 
pages, Counsel? 
MR. CRESSMAN: I'm looking at the first page. You 
can look at each one if you like. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Well, if the Court please, I 
object because the first page I don't think says anything about 
2003. 
MR. CRESSMAN: That was not the question. 
THE COURT: Well, review the entire exhibit, 



























BY MR. CRESSMAN: 1 
Q. My question is, am I correct, Mr. Taylor, that AlA 2 
Services did not pay Mr. Reed Taylor fifteen thousand each 3 
month on his promissory note in 2006? 4 
A. The records show we paid him $274,729 last year. 5 
Q. Well, let me go back and make sure I understand your 6 
agreement. I thought you Indicated that your two -- your March 7 
2003 agreement with Mr. Reed Taylor was that he would receive 8 
fifteen thousand dollars cash each month plus payment of his 9 
employees; correct? 10 
A. Yes. 11 
Q. Was that what you testified to? 12 
A. Yes. 13 
Q. And is It correct that you did not pay in 2006 the 14 
fifteen thousand dollars cash per month? 15 
A. You know the records indicate that we paid fifteen 16 
thousand dollars in cash payments to Reed each month plus these 17 
other benefits, and I think there was one month where we didn't 18 
pay -- I didn't pay. 19 
Q. There was one month that you didn't pay the fifteen 20 
thousand? 21 
A. I think so and I -- well, yeah, in fact I remember it 22 
was in March -- around March of last year, and I told Reed I'd 23 
catch up with him this year. 24 
Q. And you haven't caught it up, have you? 25 
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A. Not yet, no. 
Q. And take a look at the fourth page of the exhibit. You 
didn't pay him fifteen thousand dollars a month in 2003, did 
you? 
A. Well, no, because we didn't start the deal until after 
the first of the year. 
Q. I thought you said the deal was made in March? 
A. It is. We began paying him fifteen thousand a month it 
appears in right at the end of March, first of April. In fact, 
it was the first of April. 
Q. Well, my account -- my numbers or math would indicate 
forty-five thousand would have been due the end of June for 
April, May and June? 
A. Except we paid in advance at the end of March of six 
thousand of that forty-five. So it looks like six thousand got 
caught in the end of March and the rest -- the balance was paid 
the next three months as agreed. 
Q. I'd ask you to take a look at the second volume of the 
exhibits, please. 
Maybe I can short cut this which I'd love to do, 
Exhibits AL through AV are financial statements for various 
years for AlA Services Corporation subsidiaries. We would move 
that they all be admitted. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court please, I'm totally 
unfamiliar with them. If counsel will represent that they are 
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accurate copies of the records, I will stipulate they may be 
admitted so long as I can have some reasonable period of time 
to review them and double check. Is that fair enough? 
MR. CRESSMAN: These are accurate copies of what 
was provided to Mr. Bond by Mr. Taylor we will so represent. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Okay. So I will not object 
subject to a rlght within a reasonable time to review them for 
error. Thank you. 
THE COURT: I'll grant that. Thank you, 
Mr. McNichols. Exhibit AL through AV, as in Victor, 
Mr. Cressman? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Exhibit AL, AM, AN, AO, AP, AQ, AR, 
AS, AT, AU, and AV are admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibits AL through AV were admitted 
Into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Now, Mr. Taylor, is AlA Services insolvent? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object to the form of the question 
-- object to the question on the grounds that It calls for a 
legal and an accounting conclusion. 
THE COURT: Well, I think Mr. Taylor's probably 
qualified to give an opinion in both of those things. 
Overruled. 




















































MR. CRESSMAN: Is AlA Services insolvent? 
A. No. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Is AlA -- are the assets of AlA Services less than its 
liabilities? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Is AlA Services able to pay its bills on time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Assuming that the obligation owing to Reed Taylor is 
due and owing, is AlA Services able to pay that obligation? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, calls for speculation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. AlA does not have the cash to pay to Reed Taylor at 
this point in time, no. 
















Q. And it also doesn't have assets to pay that; correct? 16 
A. No -- excuse me, my answer to that question should have 17 
been no, you are wrong. The value of AlA, Inc., far exceeds 18 
its book value as far as accounting statements are concerned. 19 
AlA Services Corporation has a negative net worth only because 20 
the mandatory accounting transactions that were required at the 21 
time of purchase of Reed's stock. Had AlA -- had Reed and I 22 
not been related, AlA Services Corp would have on its books the 23 
value of the purchase of Reed's interest, ten point some 24 
million dollars of asset. However, since we were related by 25 
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blood, IRS rules and all this new accounting rules, which are 1 
now called Sarbanes and Oxley, etc., required that be there be 2 
a direct charge to retained earnings. Had it not -- had we not 3 
been blood brothers, the assets would exceed the liabilities 4 
and, No.2, the assets and the liabilities of the company do 5 
not fully reflect the value of the subsidiary AlA, Inc. 6 
Q. Let me ask you to take a look at Exhibit AT, and that's 7 
the last most recent set of financial statements that were 8 
provided for the period ending September 30, 2006? 9 
A. Yes. 10 
Q. These were prepared by an accounting firm; correct? 11 
A. These are internally generated documents. 12 
Q. Now, when I look at that document on the second page on 13 
the balance sheet, the consolidated balance sheet, I see totals 14 
of stockholders deficit which would be assets minus liabilities 15 
of a negative $8,724,855; is that correct? 16 
A. That is correct. 17 
Q. So these financial statements prepared in-house reflect 18 
that the assets of AlA Services are less than their 19 
liabilities? 20 
A. These assets -- these statements are prepared according 21 
to GAAP Financial Accounting Standards which require us to take 22 
the amount paid or payable to Reed Taylor as a direct charge to 23 
stockholders equity. If they were prepared according to the -- 24 
what I \'IIould call normal business, but for our personal 25 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND 
Page 124 to 127 of 211 
126 
relationship, the stockholder deficit would be a positive or 
the stockholder equity would be a positive two million plus. 
Q. Okay. Now you say GAAP, and that harkens me back to 
the years when I was an accounting student in college and 
actually got a degree in accounting, and would you tell the 
Court what GAAP, stands for? 
THE COURT: The court knows what GAAP stands for. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Generally Accepted Accounting PrinCiples, correct, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what your testimony is is that these statements, 
Exhibit AT are prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the obligation owing to your brother by AlA 
Services, Inc., is shown as a liability listed on these 
statements as obligation of former stockholder. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then when that obligation is taken into account, 
the stockholder deficit is $8,724,855; correct? 
A. Yes, I need to turn that page, but yes. 
Q. Okay. And even if we deducted the obligation to your 
brother --
A. No, you are confused. It's not a deduction of 
obligation. At the initial onset we had to charge about ten 
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point some million dollars directly to retained earnings. So 
if you add the ten million dollars back, it's a positive one 
and a half to two million. 
Q. Well, if I add up the assets and the liabilities which 
include your brother's obligation on September's statement 
listed as seven point eight million and take the assets and 
subtract the liabilities, and I remove your brother's 
obligation of seven point eight million, I still end up with a 
negative number. Is my math wrong? 
A. It is. Perhaps the easiest way for you to look at that 
would be to take a net asset of one point three million, add 
ten million dollars to that number, and then deduct from that 
stockholder deficit of -- or total obligations of, what, eight 
million, eight and a half, and then your net would be about a 
million. 
Q. Well, I disagree with you. I don't know, let me ask it 
this way. The assets are shown and the liabilities are shown 
including the obligation of the company to your brother, and 
when that math is done, it results in a negative eight million 
seven hundred twenty-four thousand stockhOlder deficit. And if 
I remove the obligation of your brother identified above as 
obligation of former stockholder, it would only reduce that 
obligation down to about nine hundred thousand negative? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I object to Counsel's statement on 
the grounds that. it's a description apparently of a document 
542. 



















































that's in evidence which speaks for itself, and has been asked 
and answered. 
THE COURT: Well, sustained. I can do that math 
too, Mr. Cressman, so --
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. I think the document does speak for itself, there is an 
issue of accounting here which I think I understand, but in any 
event, I do think the Court can do the math. 
And am I correct, sir, that if I went back the last 
three years or so, we would show at each of the financial 
statements for PJA Services, the consolidated financial 
statements would show a negative stockholders deficit or a 
stockholders deficit? 
A. Based on GAAP accounting rules, yes. 
Q. Now, Mr. Taylor, let me refer you to Exhibit N again, 
and I believe I referred to this letter earlier and it was 
admitted, and since you received this letter on February 25, 
and I'll let you get it there in front of you, have you refused 
to comply with the directions from your brother? 
A. Certainly, that's the basis of the lawsuit. 
Q. And you are continuing to transact business on behalf 
of PJA Insurance? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Counsel, this is N? 
MR. CRESSMAN: N. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Which is a letter to me. 
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MR. CRESSMAN: Well, he testified earlier that he 
received it. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Okay. No more, your Honor, I just 
wanted to make sure we were talking about the same letter. 
THE COURT: Alright. Go ahead, Mr. Cressman. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. You continue to transact business personally on behalf 
of AlA Insurance? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, I don't understand what 
"personally on behalf of AlA Insurance" means. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Let me rephrase the question, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Taylor, that you continue to act on 
behalf of PJA Insurance since receipt of this letter? 
A. I continue to act as CEO and Chief Executive Officer 
and President of the companies, yes. 
Q. And despite the fact that your brother's letter 
indicated you were terminated along with the corresponding 
consents, you continued to act on behalf of PJA Insurance as an 
employee? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, asked and answered. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
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Q. Have Miss Duclos and Mr. Freeman resigned from the 
board of PJA Insurance? 
A. They have tendered their resignation. I have not 
accepted them yet. 
Q. Have they resigned from the board of AlA Services? 
A. They have tendered their resignation, but I have not 
accepted them yet. 
Q. Have they resigned from the board of Crop USA? 
A. Bryan Freeman's not a member of the board of Crop USA; 
JoLee is, and, no, she has not tendered a resignation. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, did you ask what that was 
tendered, their resignations as board members? 
MR. CRESSMAN: I asked had those individuals 
resigned as board members. 
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you. 
MR. CRESSMAN: And his answer was they had 
tendered their resignations, but he had not accepted them. 
THE COURT: I understand that. I just didn't get 
the first part -- I wanted to make sure I got the first part of 
your question, Mr. Cressman. Thank you. 
MR. CRESSMAN: We have nothing further of this 
witness, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. McNichols, any questions for 
Mr. Taylor? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Yes, your Honor. 
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CROSS-EXAMINA 11 ON 
BY MR. MCNICHOLS: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, this -- these balance sheets that 
Mr. Cressman was just asking you about in a negative -- is it a 
negative net worth, is that the proper term? 
A. Negative, yes. 
Q. When did that first exist? 
A. Consistent with the transaction when we purchased 
Reed's -- when AlA Services Corporation purchased Reed's stock 
in 1995. 
Q. And can you tell us why that purchase of the stock 
created this negative net worth? 
A. Well, it was found by the auditors -- when the auditors 
came in at that time they were -- I think it was BOO Seidman, 
which was a national, we found that after we had completed the 
transaction that there is a rule that required because the 
relationship between I and Reed was on some code section, 
basically we were brothers, therefore we could not book the 
value of the assets in excess -- the value that we purchased 
the assets for in excess of the hard money value. So we had to 
take a charge to retained earnings in 1995 of about ten million 
dollars. And had we not done that, then it would be positive. 
And, of course, that's not inconsistent with GAAP -- sometimes 
GAAP rules are like that. 





















































Space to Fox or three billion dollars, and I think it has a 
negative net worth too. So negative net worth for GAAP 
purposes is not necessarily the same thing as negative net 
worth for valuation or insolvency purposes. 
Q. How long has Mr. Reed Taylor known about this 
situation? 
A. He's been delivered financial statements every year 
since 1995. 
Q. So he knew at least as early as 1996? 
A. Oh, yeah. 
0. Has he ever complained to you about it? 
A. No. 
0. Now if you could look at Exhibits 5 and T for me, 
please. Exhibit S is the October 1st letter from 
Mrs. Donna Taylor to you -- excuse me, from you to 
Mrs. Donna Taylor in which you said that you were not taking a 
salary, and Exhibit T is the tax return which seems to say that 
you did draw a salary. And Mr. Cressman for some reason didn't 
ask you to explain that, so now I ask you to explain it. 
A. In 2001 and most of -- I think it was all of 2002 and 
most of 2001 I did not draw a salary. Normally I take ten 
thousand dollars a month salary from AlA as a salary. But 
during that period I waived my salary to conserve cash for the 
corporation. However, I did have other transactions during the 
year that are considered compensation. For example, if -- use 
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of my car or other items like that, and I have to take that in 
compensation regardless. And even though it wasn't salary, 
it's still considered for the tax return. 
Q. Now, Mr. Cressman asked you about this adjustment of 
three hundred seven thousand dollars, do you remember that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that -- can you explain that to the court, what 
happened and why it occurred? 
A. I can and I'm embarrassed because of it. What exhibit 
- if I could show you on that exhibit. 
0. I'm not sure which exhibit -- well T is the tax return. 
I'm not sure where the three hundred seven thousand dollars is. 
A. Well, there's a schedule of four pages of payments. 
0. Maybe you can look, there's an index In the front, 
Mr. Taylor, and maybe that would help you find it. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Let me see if--
MR. MCNICHOLS: Maybe you could help us, Counsel, 
that would be appreCiated. 
MR. CRESSMAN: How about AJ. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm not sure that that has the 
three hundred seven thousand. That's the --
MR. CRESSMAN: The deduction's made there because 
it doesn't equal six thousand. 
THE COURT: Are you speaking of the adjustment in 
December of 2006, Mr. McNichols? 
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MR. MCNICHOLS: Yes, I think it was December of 
2006. It's a $307,721 number. 
A. Yeah. And that's come up and that's what I said, in 
2000 -- either 2001 or mid 2002 we -- Reed and I had -- excuse 
me, Mr. Reed Taylor and I had entered into negotiations because 
for a couple reasons. One is we were no longer able to sell 
any insurance for Trustmark because the new rules, small group 
reform laws, and so we went through -- and some other reasons. 
We went very through a very long and complicated process to 
restructure the company so that he and I would be equal 
partners. He would own half of Crop USA, I would own half of 
the note, the six million dollar note, and there was a bunch of 
other things that were involved in that including I would write 
off -- I would give to Reed from the company three hundred and 
seven thousand dollar note that lowed the company, and then we 
would write off a hundred and thirty or forty thousand that 
Reed owed the company. 
And I thought that transaction was done. We had sent 
it down to Hawley Troxell in Boise, a law firm down there, to 
do all the documents. And that was done during the -- I 
believe the end of 2002 -- sometime in 2002. And it was --
there was about ten or twelve other points involved that I 
don't recall. And we couldn't ever get Reed to sign the 
papers. And so in March of 2003, he decided that, I just want 
to keep my note, you guys figure out how to pay me, and that's 
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when we did the other program. 
I had reversed most of those transactions but I failed 
to reverse the long term note transaction. But under the books 
and records as you see here, we still credited him interest 
each and every month based upon the six million total, not the 
six million minus the 307. And I'm embarrassed about it 
because when I -- when Pat Moran pointed this out that the 
interest was on six million but the number wasn't, I had Aimee 
correct it as a year-end adjusting entry for 2007 -- 2006. 
BY MR. MCNICHOLS: 
Q. To the benefit of Mr. Reed Taylor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Thank you. Now, Mr. Cressman asked you about whether 
you provided monthly statements of commissions to 
Mr. Reed Taylor. Does AlA Services Corporation generate 
monthly statements of commissions? 
A. Not in the same way we did back in the mid '90s. 
Everything is electronic now and you have to look it up on the 
-- actually monthly statements of new sales I think is what he 
was asking about, and that's all automated now through an 
internet based reporting system that you can look that up on 
the system daily if you want. 
Q. How long has it been since you generated these 
documents? 
A. Probably five years, four or five years. 5Lfl-f 




















































Q. Has Mr. Reed Taylor ever complained about not receiving 
those monthly statement of sales before? 
A. Oh, he comes to my office all the time and asks what 
were the sales this week, what was last month, what was last 
week, and I look them up for him. 
Q. And tell him what the sales were? 
A. Oh, yeah. 
Q. Does he ever get documents, print-offs or that kind of 
thing? 
A. Sometimes I print them off for him. It's kind of like 
an e-mail system, just print the document if you want it. 
Q. And he also asked you about monthly financial 
statements of PJA Services. Does AlA Services generate monthly 
financial statements? 
A. No, it doesn't. It's generally quarterly financial 
statements for Services and has been forever. 
Q. And do you provide Mr. Reed Taylor with copies of the 
quarterly financial statements? 
A. I believe we do. 
Q. How long has it been since you had -- did you ever have 
monthly statements? 
A. For Services, I don't think we ever have had. 
Q. Generally has Mr. Reed Taylor been provided with the 
financial statements of both PJA Services Corporation and PJA 



























are prepared? 1 
~ Y~ 2 
Q. For how long? 3 
~ Since 1995. 4 
Q. Okay. You testified about the lock box. Can you tell 5 
the Court why the lock box was originally established? 6 
A. In 1994 our friends at the Idaho Insurance Department 7 
came in and told us we were getting too big and we needed to 8 
get rid of our business. So we had to transfer large portion 9 
of our health insurance business from lewiston to Kansas City 10 
to a company called Centennial life Insurance Company. And at 11 
that time point in time a large portion of all of our premiums 12 
went through Kansas City, and so a lock box was set up in 13 
Kansas City so that -- because Reed did not know who Centennial 14 
was or why they were there or what was involved other than -- 15 
didn't know those people personally, and so he requested and we 16 
granted him a lock box procedure. So the premiums that we 17 
collected from farmers would be deposited in Kansas City lock 
box, and there was a period of time before the money actually 
got transferred either to us or to Centennial. 
In December of -- September of '97 we discontinued that 
lock box procedure totally in conjunction with the Idaho 
Department of Insurance, and we worked out a new deal to 
transfer all the business including the Universe and Centennial 
business to a new company, a third company in Chicago named 
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Trustmark. And instead of having a lock box, they just said 
you guys in lewiston collect all the money. So all the money 
came here. So that -- so lock box is a very expensive 
procedure, and it was -- it was irrelevant after that time. 
And so we quit that in September or October of 1997, ten years 
ago. 
Q. Did Mr. Reed Taylor participate in the decision to 
terminate the lock box arrangement? 
A. He was involved with the Department of Insurance 
discussion extensively. 
Q. Has he ever complained about that between 1997 and 
December of 2006? 
A. No. 
Q. Did Mr. Taylor complain about the amounts of money you 
were paying to him and the expenses you were paying for him 
between March of 2007 and December of 2006? 
A. Occasionally he'd come in and ask me to make a special 
payment, for example, to pay the insurance on his airplane or 
something like that, and I -- sometimes I was able to 
accommodate that request and sometimes I wasn't. But, no, he 
-- I resisted all attempts for him to raise the fifteen 
thousand a month. 
Q. And so except for his request, he has accepted the 
amounts that you have paid him? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Objection. I have allowed Counsel 
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wide latitude to put words in this witness' mouth. He should 
not use the words such as "accepted." He should testify as to 
what happened or did not. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer that, 
Mr. Taylor. 
A. Yes. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I have an exhibit and I'm not sure 
what number to call it, your Honor. I had some exhibits 
earlier, maybe you can mark it and then tell me what number you 
have used. 
THE COURT: How about one. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I think I already used one. 
THE COURT: You used one. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Or maybe even two. 
THE COURT: You just used letters on all yours, 
didn't you, Mr. Cressman? 
MR. CRESSMAN: I did. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I have a bench copy also. 
THE COURT: Okay. I think we have marked it as 
Exhibit 2 then. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Okay. Thank you. May the witness 
be shown Exhibit 2. 
THE COURT: As soon as we mark it. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you. 




















































BY MR. MCNICHOLS: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, Exhibit No.2 is entitled Series A 
Preferred Shareholder Agreement, are you familiar with that 
document? 
A. I am. 
Q. And are you a party to that document? 
A. AlA Services is, yes; I am not. 
Q. And can you tell me how that document came to be 
executed? 
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A. In 19 - mid 19805 we issued as part of a divorce 
settlement to Mrs. Taylor a substantial amount of what we 
referred to as Series A - what do they call it, Series A 
Preferred Stock that had certain call and put features in it. 
And when we did the reorganization in 199 - or one of the--
changed the documents in 1996, we changed the terms of these 
agreements, I think basically the interest rate for the 
redemption of Mrs. Taylor's stock. And that's what this 
agreement was, that 1996 restatement of what her rights were. 
Q. Does this agreement include any agreement concerning 
payments of interest to Mr. Reed Taylor by AlA Services 
Corporation? I direct your attention to paragraph 3 on page 4, 
and I direct the Court's attention to paragraph 3 on page 4. 
A. Yes. Actually not interest payments but prinCiple 
payments. 
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to say prinCiple. 2 
A. We agreed at the time that no payments would be made on 3 
the six million dollar note until all the Series A had been 4 
redeemed by the company. 5 
Q. And the Series A redeemed is payable to 6 
Mrs. Donna Taylor? 7 
A. ~~ 8 
Q. How much is still owed to Mrs. Donna Taylor? 9 
A. It's right at five hundred thousand plus or minus. 10 
Q. And are you making monthly payments to her? 11 
A. Yes, we have actually increased the monthly payments to 12 
her in the last year to, I think, ten thousand a month, and 13 
then we will increase those again this August. 14 
Q. Has Mr. Donna Taylor made any complaint or claim that 15 
you are in default of the provisions of Exhibit 2? 
A. No, I'm not aware of any. 
Q. Now, Mr. Cressman started his questions of you with 
questions about borrowing from a trust account. Do you 
remember that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you the trustee of any of these trusts? Are you a 
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Q. Are these transactions arms-length transactions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are they evidenced by written documents? 
A. Sometimes; sometimes just by memo, yes. 
Q. And who are these trusts, can you give us -- how many 
of these trusts are there that you have had financial 
transactions with? 
A. Oh, we have financial transactions with them almost 
daily or weekly, sweeps back and forth. There are five trusts. 
They are in the nature of - they are a business entity, not in 
the nature of a trust like an insurance trust account that you 
have in the agency level. But these trusts are controlled and 
owned by various commodity associations and they have 
independent board of directors on them. 
Q. Do they independently negotiate these agreements with 
AlA Insurance? 
A. We meet with them -- used to be quarterly. Now we meet 
-- in fact, I'm missing a meeting tomorrow in Tampa, Florida, 
now because we meet periodically or with them. The trust have 
-- the two major trusts, one of them has seven directors and 
the other one has sixteen directors, and they represent farmers 
from each state where we do business. 
Q. Are they totally independent from AlA Services 
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc? 
A. Yes. 
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MR. MCNICHOLS: I have no more questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Any questions in light of those, 
Mr. Cressman? 
MR. CRESSMAN: I do, your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. With regard to Exhibit 2, do you have that in front of 
you, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I call your attention to the second -- or excuse me, 
third page of the exhibit. Am I correct by reading 
Paragraph 1A that Mrs. Taylor was required to be paid off on 
the -- as a Series A preferred Shareholder within ten years of 
the date of the agreement which was July 1, 1996? 
A. Yes, that was what it originally called for. 
Q. And it has not been amended in writing, has it, sir? 
A. Yes, it has. 
Q. In what way has it been amended in writing, sir? 
A. There is an agreement between -- a four-party agreement 
including myself that changes the terms of this. 
Q. How does it change the terms? 
A. Extends the pay-off time. 
Q. Until when? 
A. Until under the same terms and conditions -- generally 
5'Lft.P 




















































the same terms and conditions that we had with Reed, and that 
is as we become -- hit different goals, we will be able to pay 
her off. 
Q. Now, I understood you to say this was a written 
agreement, that was what your testimony was; correct? 
A. No, you asked me if there were any written agreements 
amending this. 
Q. Yes, and you said there was? 
A. Yes, there is. 
Q. Do you have them with you? 
A. I filed it as part of my affidavit. 
Q. Okay. Other than what is attached to your affidavit, 
are there any written amendments to this subordination 
agreement Exhibit 2? 
A. I don't know that. 
Q. I beg your pardon? 
A. There may be, I don't know. I haven't --
Q. You don't know of any; is that correct? 
A. Well, I'm trying to think. I would have to look in our 
file to see if there is anything else. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Counsel, do you have a copy of 
that? I have got one here but I have written on it. Do you 
have one, Rod, that I could pull out? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: A copy of what? 
MR. CRESSMAN: The Exhibit 2, his dedaration. 
You are referring to the February 27, 2001, letter, correct, 
sir? 
A. Uh-huh. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Exhibit A to one of your 
declarations. Next would be AY. 
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I'm trying to find one that you and the witness, your 
Honor, can both have a copy. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'll show him a copy of mine if 
you want. 
THE COURT: Well, I have the affidavit so -- I'm 
looking at the letter of February 27 --
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Is that the agreement that you were -- Exhibit AY, is 
that the written agreement that you referred to just a moment 
ago? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that agreement was February 27, 2001? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And It requested -- AlA requested that payments the 
next five months be deferred; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If the obligation -- if the payments were deferred for 
five months and they were otherwise due to be fully paid by 
July 1, 2005, the due date would be sometime at the very end of 
2005; correct? 
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MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, it's an argument, your 
Honor, rather than a question. 
MR. CRESSMAN: It's a leading question, and it's 
proper. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer, 
Mr. Taylor. 
A. Had we reinstated the payments the same as what had 
been called for, yes, It would have been paid in 2005, but that 
wasn't the case. We came back to her and I think we began 
paying her four thousand a month and then she asked to raise 
that and we raised. And that's been acceptable to her. 
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BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. You have no further written amendment to the 
arrangement with Mrs. Taylor other than Exhibit AY; correct? 
A. I don't know that. I have said that before, I don't 
know that. 
Q. To the best of your knowledge I'm correct; is that not 
true, sir? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No, that's a double question there 
and It's also been asked and answered. Both of them have been 
asked and answered. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Now I want to make sure I understand at the end of 2002 
papers were prepared by lawyers to amend Mr. Reed Taylor's 
arrangement with the company; correct? 
A. No. 
Q. Alright. So you were negotiating with Reed but you 
didn't consummate a deal; is that correct? 
A. We had -- I prepared -- Ernie Oantlni and I prepared 
numerous memorandum, memorandum to the attorneys on what we 
wanted them to prepare. We could never get Reed to actually 
sign an agreement, so we never did end up getting it done. 
Q. That was at the end of 2002? 
A. It was in 2002, I'm not sure about the end. 




















































interested in the very first page which is the accounting as of 
year-end 2006, 12-31-06. Do you have the exhibit there? 
A. I do. 
Q. And I note that although this document is dated as of 
12-31-06 but the deduction or the adjustment for the $307,000 
to bring the principal back up to six million has not been 
made? 
A. Not at this time. 
Q. So that adjustment is made sometime --
THE COURT: You lost me, Mr. Cressman, which page 
are you talking about? 
MR. CRESSMAN: First page of AJ. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry, go ahead. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Let me back up for -- make sure the Court's following 
us. This Exhibit was prepared by AlA Services to show the 
status of Mr. Reed Taylor's note as of the year-end 2006; 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at this time it does not reflect the $307,000 
deduction which you inappropriately took some years before, 
correct, or it does reflect that? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Now there's an impossible set of 
questions to answer. It either does or it doesn't. 



























THE COURT: Rephrase. 1 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 2 
Q. It continues to show on this document as of year-end 3 
2006 an improper $307,000 deduction from the principle amount 4 
owing to Mr. Reed Taylor by AlA Services; does it not? 5 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I object to the question because 6 
first of all it asks for a positive answer and then followed by 7 
a negative, and also it uses the word "improper." 8 
THE COURT: Let's just rephrase it and ask him if 9 
it evidences that deduction or not, Mr. Cressman. 10 
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, let me ask a bunch of 11 
questions. 12 
THE COURT: Alright, go ahead. 13 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 14 
Q. You determined in some time in 2007 that a $307,000 15 
deduction from principle of Mr. Reed Taylor's note was 16 
inappropriately taken earlier; correct? 17 
A. No. I discovered that these subsidiary ledgers did not 1 B 
reflect the reversal of the 307,000. And I found that out 19 
because we gave these subsidiary ledgers to a guy named 20 
Pat Moran during our negotiation periods when we were trying to 21 
get this thing negotiated. And I noticed it wasn't done and so 22 
when I got back to the office, I told Aimee to make sure that 23 
is done as a year-end adjusting entry, and it will be done when 24 
the auditors do the year-end adjusting entries. 25 
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Q. Is it your testimony that at this point the adjustment 
has made been made sometime in 20077 
A. No, I just said it was going to be done as a year-end 
adjusting entry and I have instructed her to do that. 
Q. In 2007 you have instructed her to do that? 
A. Yes, but it will be reflected on the year-end 2006 
statements. So the next time we give you this, it will be 
reflective of this. I also might want to point out that the 
interest calculation here is based on the full six million on 
the column 2. 
Q. Do you have a copy of Mrs. Miran's -- excuse me, 
Mrs. Aimee Gordon's declaration, paragraph 5? 
A. I do not. 
Q. Let me -- I have got a copy here. 
I'm referring to paragraph 5 of Miss Gordon's 
declaration. And in there she states that you told her to make 
the adjustment in 2006. She's in error then, is she not? 
A. Yeah, I'm sure that it was when Pat Moran was here the 
first part of January. 
Q. Okay. Thank you. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Nothing further, your Honor. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Your Honor, I have one thing that 
I've simply overlooked to ask Mr. Taylor and it was about the 
consent order that I tendered to the Court in very beginning. 
May I ask him a question or two about that? 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. McNichols. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCNICHOLS: 
Q. You have seen the consent order that I prepared 
earlier, Mr. Taylor? 
A. Yes, I have. 
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Q. If the judge enters the preliminary injunction, are you 
willing that he enter this consent order? 
A. As well --
MR. CRESSMAN: If, your Honor -- go ahead. 
BY MR. MCNICHOLS: 
Q. And if he enters the consent order, will you abide by 
it? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Objection, your Honor. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you. That's all I have, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: What's your objection, Mr. Cressman? 
MR. CRESSMAN: I don't understand this consent 
order that is some kind of proposed settlement position that's 
being tendered to the Court. I mean if we are going to ask 
what terms -- if the Court was giving a restraining order or a 
preliminary injunction, what terms, that's a different story, 
but to tender a document that was handed to us in settlement I 
think is inappropriate. 54 g 



















































THE COURT: Well, I didn't necessarily take it as 
a settlement, I took it as some additional order that 
Mr. McNichols was requesting or consenting to be entered as 





I didn't take it as a settlement discussion. 5 
Do you have any questions for Mr. Taylor on that, 6 
Mr. Cressman? The fact that he's willing to abide by a consent 7 
order doesn't mean a great deal to me. I would think he would 8 
be willing to abide by any order. 9 
MR. MCNICHOLS: He is, your Honor, I assure you of 10 
ilial 11 
MR. CRESSMAN: We have nothing further of this 12 
witness. It is our understanding, however, that the affidavits 13 
that were tendered by Mr. Reed Taylor will not be utilized in 14 
these proceedings, John Taylor will not be utilized in these 15 
proceedings. He is here, he's available to be examined by his 16 
counsel, and I think that's the proper way to proceed. 17 
MR. MCNICHOLS: If it's necessary to say I totally 18 
disagree with counsel, then I say so for the record, but I have 19 
no more questions for Mr. Taylor unless does your Honor have 20 
questions for him? 21 
THE COURT: I do not. 22 
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, I had made a motion early 23 
this morning to strike the declaration or affidavits of 24 
Mr. Taylor with the understanding -- that were delivered to us 25 
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late yesterday with the understanding that the Court set a 1 
hearing for live testimony and -- for testimony. And those 2 
affidavits are fraught with inappropriate comments not quite to 3 
the same extent as the other declarations, but rather than 4 
having something as one-sided and we are not able to 5 
cross-examine him, I believe it's appropriate for counsel to 6 
inquire and present any material that he believes is relevant 7 
and pertinent rather than presenting us with a one-sided 8 
affidavit that I'm required to pick and choose from. 9 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to conSider the 10 
affidavits to the extent that I find them to be relevant and 11 
admissible. Certainly I did provide this hearing for the 12 
opportunity to present evidence. Mr. McNichols chose to submit 13 
evidence by way of affidavits, so I'm not -- I cannot provide 14 
you with any assurance, Mr. Cressman, I'm not gOing to consider 15 
the affidavits of -- submitted by John Taylor to the extent 16 
that I find them to be relevant and contain admissible 17 
evidence. I will be considering them along with the other 18 
relevant and admissible information contained in the 19 
affidavits. 20 
MR. CRESSMAN: May I have a minute, your Honor, to 21 
review those affidavits? 22 
THE COURT: Well, we are going to go ahead and 23 
take an afternoon recess right now anyway, so you can certainly 24 
have that time, Mr. Cressman. Let's just plan on being back in 25 
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session at 3:30. Thank you. We will be back in session in 
about 20 minutes. 
(Thereupon, a recess was taken from 3: 10 p.m. to 
3:30 p.m.) 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, we would call 
Mr. Reed Taylor, please. 
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you. Mr. Taylor, if 
you would come forward. 
REED TAYLOR, 
Having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, relating to said cause, 
testifies and says: 
THE COURT: Have a seat, Mr. Taylor. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, with regard to the two 
affidavits of Mr. John Taylor dated yesterday, we would make 
the same objection and leave it to his Honor to review those 
for lack of foundation, hearsay, conclusionary statements 
without foundation, non evidentiary facts, not personal 
knowledge, and the other objections we made to the earlier 
declarations. I will examine Mr. Reed Taylor on several of the 
statements that are in those declarations, but unless the Court 
would like me to, I won't go painstakingly through this 
paragraph by paragraph. 
THE COURT: No, I'd prefer not. And I have looked 
through the affidavits and I also agree that I think they, 
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along with some of the others we talked about previously, do 
have some impermissible information contained in them, so I 
appreCiate your relying on me to make those appropriate 
decisions. Go ahead, Mr. Cressman. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Would you state your name and address for the record, 
please. 
A. Reed l. Taylor, 7498 Lapwai Road, Lewiston, Idaho. 
Q. And are you the founder of what is now AlA Services and 
AlA Insurance? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And can you tell the Court how you came to found those 
two companies? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object, your Honor, 
on the grounds that the evidence would not be relevant to any 
issue before your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cressman. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, this man was the reason why 
these companies came to be, they have challenged his ability to 
run these companies, it's our position that this man when he 
ran those companies they ran well, they were profitable, and 
they would remain profitable should they continue to be run by 
him. 





















































few questions along this line, I'm going to let you do it. I'm 1 
going to overrule your objection for now, Mr. McNichols. 2 
MR. CRESSMAN: If the other Defendants want to 3 
stipulate to that, then we will move on. 4 
THE COURT: Well, just go ahead and I'm going to 5 
let you pursue this line of questioning. Go ahead. 6 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 7 
Q. How was it that you came to found these companies, sir? 8 
A. I went in the insurance business in 1966 with my uncle 9 
and he had been in the business life long and he at one time 1 0 
had licensed me. But I wasn't interested -- I was licensed as 11 
a courtesy to - when I was 19, and I was actually going to 12 
college and working full time. And I was selling encyclopedias 13 
and I really was making more money and I wasn't interested in 14 
insurance and so I didn't. 15 
Seven years later after I went to four years of 16 
college, I did not graduate, but I was in the encyclopedia 17 
business for four or five years here and back in the Midwest. 18 
And I came back and my uncle approached me again and I went out 19 
and he had a program that was set up to go through dairies, to 20 
the dairyman's and selling them a group type program. He asked 21 
me to go out with him and I did, and I could see where it had 22 
tremendous possibilities with the training and what I had been 23 
doing. Actually made it look really easy which it was, and so 24 
I moved back from st. Louis and went to work for him. 25 
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During that next year, 18 months, I put together 16 
salesmen for him for various dairies. One of them which was my 
brother which was the second one which also had been in the 
encyclopedia business. 
Q. This Is another brother besides John? 
A. Right, in Boise. And that year - that year that 
agency 23 out of the 24 awards for the monthly awards were won 
by either myself or my brother. They had the biggest volume 
they had ever had with that particular product. 
My uncle eventually -- he actually made more money than 
he had ever made before but he didn't keep ahead of us. And 
the broker, the insurance broker in Boise had gone into 
business, and he was in several states with the Cattlemen's 
associations and on a bigger scale, and the Pacific Supply 
Co-ops. So I transferred to him and within four months I was 
made a manager and moved to Lewiston in the late '60s. 
And I worked the Circle P stores that were at that time 
the Lewiston Grain Growers from Grangeville to all across 
Washington. At that time they had a company person that was 
doing the. work, and we were the biggest agency the company had. 
That year we wrote more than all of the rest of his agents put 
together, and yet we had a relatively small agency. And they 
had a company representative that wouldn't take care of the 
co-ops, so I'd end up doing that, took away from my other time. 
We had SOme disagreements over it, so I reSigned and decided to 
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start my own agency. That I did in January of '69, basically 
the same farmers, I went into direct competition through the 
wheat grower associations. 
Then I had an idea of collecting dues for them where it 
helped them out and made the money along with the insurance 
policy. In Latah County, two of us when we started, my agency 
sold 2S6 policies. And then we went to two more counties here 
and duplicated it, went to Montana, and we just got kept 
growing because it was good for the associations and good for 
us. And we were high producing, high producing volume agency. 
Q. At this time were you operating under AlA, Inc? 
A. Initially we called it -- I think the first month it 
was Reed Taylor Insurance Agency and then we started collecting 
dues so we called it Agricultural Insurance Trust. And we did 
that for a few years, and then we found that was an illegal 
name, had to be a bank to use that, bank or stock so we changed 
to Agriculture Insurance Administrators. That was several 
years later. That was after we had formed a trust and put 
several states into one individual trust. 
Q. And so AlA stands for Agricultural Insurance 
Administrators? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you were the founding founder of that company? 
A. I was. 




Q. And what was the status of the company's business at 
that time? 
A. I think at that time we had the most successful health 
insurance agency in the United States. Nine full time and they 
all sold one product. 
Q. Was it finanCially successful? 
A. Very financially successful. 
Q. How many employees did the company have? 
A. At that time we did claims, service -- which we 
gradually had gotten into that to provide the service, so I 
wasn't at home office much, but I think there was over 125, 
150, maybe more. 
Q. Do you know how many employees AlA Insurance has now? 
A. Not for sure the way they are keeping records now. 
It's four or five, I think. 
a. NOw, your brother has testified that there were 
modifications to your agreements to redeem your stock, and he's 
testified as to events that you would not sign documents at the 
end of 2002 and that you and he together alone met in his 
offices in March of 2003 and made a verbal agreement modifying 
your agreement? 
A. That is not correct. 
Q. It is not correct. Did that meeting take place? 
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A. John tends to have a tendency if you have a meeting, 
you write something up and say you got an agreement which he 
did that recently in these negotiations we are just doing right 
now in the last three weeks. 
Q. But did you ever sign any documents? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you ever agree to modify your original transaction? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Now you have in front of you -- your Honor, may I 
approach the witness? 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Cressman. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Make sure he's got the right 
exhibit because I don't -- I want to inquire about Exhibit AY 
which is -- Exhibit AY is Exhibit A to one of the John Taylor 
declarations which is the February 27, 2001, letter Signed by 
John, Reed and Donna Taylor. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, did this letter modify your agreement in 
any way? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object to the form of the 
question. The documents speaks for itself and is calling for a 
legal conclusion. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I'm not quite sure 
because it wasn't explained what the Defendants feel this 
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agreement means, and I -- you know, if it was completely clear 
I could understand the objection, but I can tell you that I 
don't understand how this agreement amends Mr. Reed Taylor's 






























Miss Donna Taylor for five months. But I understand the 5 
objection and I understand the Court's ruling and I'll move on. 6 
THE COURT: I don't have any problem with you 7 
asking him what his understanding of -- I mean I guess it's 8 
entirely appropriate for you, I guess, to ask him what he was 9 
ag reeing to but -- 10 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 11 
Q. Mr. Taylor, what did you understand you were agreeing 12 
to when you signed Exhibit AY? 13 
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court please, and I 14 
recognize your Honor just said that he could do that, but I 15 
object on the grounds that his understanding is not relevant. 16 
THE COURT: Thank you. Overruled. Go ahead, 17 
Mr. Taylor. 18 
A. This was a time when I became involved back and they 19 
were unable to pay me or short of money, and I become first 20 
aware of this crop program they had been working on, and that 21 
looked like a real opportunity, and they needed the money. And 22 
so I thought that Donna would also take less, my ex-wife, 23 
because this looked like the type of program that could 24 
actually duplicate and put AlA back where it was before. And I 25 
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was very excited about it, but this -- she would not do that 
agreement because of her feelings about John unless he 
personally signed it and I signed it too because it didn't 
affect me because I'm still liable for the full amount in my 
divorce decree but --
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Who drafted this document? 
A. Pardon? 
Q. Who drafted it? 
A. John. 
Q. What was your understanding as to the meaning of this 
document and what it meant for your wife? 
A. She was going to delay her payments for a few months, 
and I didn't know they had been delayed as long as they were, 
and I thought they had been resumed. 
Q. Was that the full extent of your --
MR. MCNICHOLS: We'd ask the answer be stricken, 
your Honor, on the grounds it was not responsive to the 
question. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Was that your extent -- is that the extent of your 
understanding of this document, the agreement? 
A. Exactly, that's all. It had nothing to do with my 
agreement whatsoever. 
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Q. Did your brother ever tell you that this document was 
modifying or amending your agreement? 
A. Never. 
Q. Now, you should have in front of you, I believe it's 
the other John Taylor affidavit, the last word on the first 
page is "been," b-e-e-n. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: That's the same one in mine. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Is it the same one? 
A. That's the same one. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Well, I had Exhibit AY attached to an affidavit of 
R. John Taylor and the last word was "issues, government 
issues" on page 1. Let me -- if I can approach the witness, 
your Honor --
A. I got that one. I have that one also. 
Q. This is the one I want you to have in front of you 
right now. Do you have that one? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: They are both -- they are exhibits 
to both affidavits. 
THE COURT: Which--
MR. CRESSMAN: It's the one where the last word on 
the first page is "been," b-e-e-n. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 





















































statement there, paragraph 9, "AlA Services corporation is 
indebted to the Plaintiff under the terms of written agreement 
which has been amended and modified by written and oral 
agreements." Do you agree with that? 
A. No. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object -- object to the question 
on the grounds it's repetitious, your Honor. It's asked and 
answered. 
THE COURT: Well, it was at least part asked and 
answered, but I'm going to let Mr. Taylor go ahead just tn the 
interest of moving this along. So I'm going to overrule the 
objection. Mr. Taylor, you can answer that. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, he did answer it. 
THE COURT: He did. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, take a look at paragraph 11 on page 3 of 
the affidavit, and I'm referring you to -- are you there on 
page 3? 
A. Got it. 
Q. Paragraph 11, the sentence that begins on the 5th line 
referring to you, "f-je has had a standing offer to rejoin the 
board as a member or observer which was reiterated late last 
year." Do you agree with that? 
A. There was never a standing offer. In fact, my 



























and we were -- my wife and I were both supposed to be on the 1 
board, and I assumed they just weren't having them for shortage 2 
of money or whatever. By last year an offer, he could have 3 
made it during sometime when we were negotiating with Ernie but 4 
I don't recall it specifically, no. 5 
Q. But other than negotiations over modifications of your 6 
deal, did your brother ever give you a standing offer to rejOin 7 
the board? 8 
A. Never came up period. 9 
Q. Paragraph 13, your brother states, "During these 10 
times: apparently this is '95 through '97 as indicated in the 11 
previous paragraph, "many of the agents and agencies that 12 
traditionally represented AlA left the company. The Plaintiff 13 
exasperated the sales force decline by forming a competing 14 
company which further caused the decimation of the company's 15 
sales force and independent AGC system." Do you have a comment 16 
on that, sir? 17 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object to the form of that 18 
question. It's not a commenting contest here, he's supposed to 19 
ask a question and then I can object to it. 20 
THE COURT: Sustained. 21 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 22 
Q. Let me continue and then I'll ask the question again. 23 
"Plaintiff actually induced AlA agents to leave the company and 24 
work for Plaintiff." Is that statement true or false? 25 
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THE COURT: Overruled. 
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A. Question, okay, I got it, that's false. I mean I have 
encouraged people to stay with AlA, and I don't know how I 
could name one. I mean I made special arrangements for Some of 
them to stay when I left so I don't have that reputation of 
stealing agents. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. "He references forming a competing company." Do you 
know what he was referring to? 
A. I don't know anything about competing. When I left and 
I think we were doing some college advantage work which Ernie 
my accountant, and I took that company, weren't doing business 
yet if I recall or very little, and they didn't want it, I 
think we actually paid money for it, but we had an office 
downstairs which we paid rent to AlA and we developed that. 
They started selling a similar product, the same ideas, same 
general ideas with a broker that came in, and I understood they 
sold about a hundred policies. But I didn't run across one of 
their agents, I never talked to any of them because --
Q. But did you buy this business from AlA? 
A. I can't remember exactly, we either bought it or it was 
included in the package that we took, but it was -- that's as I 
recall it. 
Q. Did anyone complain to you about your actions? 
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A. No, we volunteered. And I took the one girl went with 
us also under the agreement that was working with the program. 
And they sold about a hundred and we sold 25 or 30 thousand. 
Q. On page 4 of your brother's declaration, paragraph 14, 
he testifies in his affidavit that you agreed to accept partial 
interest payments of fifteen thousand per month? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: 15, Counsel. 
THE COURT: I think you are at paragraph 15. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, 15. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Not only do I have trouble with 
names, I have trouble with numbers. 
A. When I come back and I initiated going to Billings to 
get the -- I was very excited about the co-op program, I put a 
lot of time into it, and it wasn't so much the money, it was 
the fact of putting AlA back on the map where it was because it 
was going down close to zero which it is now virtually. And I 
took different amounts of money but no specific figure was ever 
set on -- I mean I took no money and paid my own expenses in 
most cases. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Did you ever agree with your brother to limit the 
payments to be made to you under your redemption agreement to 
fifteen thousand dollars per month? 
A. No, I did not agree and even after they were at 
552-



















































fifteen, they didn't even uphold those. I mean there was never 1 
no set amount. Used to be zero, different amounts sometimes up 2 
to twenty-five, and it was kind of what I needed but most of it 3 
was used for expenses. 4 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Your Honor, I'm having difficulty 5 
pOSing objections because the witness talks immediately after 6 
the question is open. Is there -- and my reason that I wanted 7 
to object was on the grounds that the question had been asked 8 
and answered, I believe, twice. 9 
THE COURT: Well, overruled. 10 
MR. CRESSMAN: I won't ask it again if I have 11 
asked it twice. I'm sorry. 12 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 13 
Q. Paragraph 16, your brother testifies that additionally 14 
you agreed to defer -- well, Counsel, if I ask about this 15 
paragraph, I assume, your Honor, he will object, so I -- is 16 
that -- can I ask you if he's gOing to object because I just as 17 
woo- 18 
THE COURT: Just ask your question. 19 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 20 
Q. Mr. Taylor, the paragraph 16 your brother testifies 
that additionally you agreed to defer the receipt of principle 
and interest on your note until the companies were financially 
able to be restructured and redeem your note. "He was provided 
written business plans and budgets outlining the plans and he 
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status at about thirty-five million dollars in new business 2 
placement, the companies could begin catching up on accrued 3 
interest payments. When the companies aChieved 60 million in 4 
new business placements, the companies would then be able to 5 
retire his note and redeem all outstanding preferred shares of 6 
AlA Services." Did you agree as your brother indicated in that 7 
~~~ 8 
A. No, and I don't think the amount of fifteen thousand or 9 
twenty-five thousand a month or Donna's note ever come up in 1 0 
the same subject -- same subject time. 11 
Q. Okay. Paragraph 17. "The companies had hoped to 12 
achieve the goals by this time but Plaintiffs interference 13 
with various agents and insurers delayed full implementation of 14 
the agreed plan for at least three years." Did you ever 15 
interfere with agents and insurers such as a plan was delayed? 16 
A. Well, I'd like them to introduce me to the agent 17 
because I was the only one out there working. We worked 18 
several different programs to find what would work and we were 19 
working full time at not -- only business they got was directly 20 
from me. 21 
Q. And the next paragraph your brother testifies that in 
March of 2006, "I ordered the Plaintiff not to interfere with 
or contact the agents, employees or sales managers of the 
companies and not to contact any commodity association 
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directors. I further isolated all sales managers from the 
Plaintiffs demands, directives and sales tactics." Is that 
true or false? 
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A. Shortly before Christmas I contacted Minnesota Soy Bean 
Association, Andy Anderson and myself, to look at this crop 
program. Fortunately we had a very sophisticated association 
manager and assistant and several workers or secretaries and et 
cetera, saw the value of it, and they instigated it. In 90 
days we put on over a million of premium. 
And coming back we were set to go to Kansas, we had 
already contacted every director twice to set the same program 
up with what we had learned there to turn into a volume 
situation. And when we got back they decided that they were --
they had already had a changed program to go on salaried only, 
and these five people, including myself, they would not let go 
to Kansas. 
So at that time we had been talking about who owned 
what, and Crop USA as far as I was concerned was part of AlA, 
that's why I was there, and I said to hell with it, and I had 
witnessed that I told the agents they are going to do a bond 
deal, John said you will be paid off in August, and I said all 
right, I'll take my money and leave, forget about Crop. And I 
did nothing that summer. That year they sold three or four 
policies. This year I think they sold one or two maybe. 
Q. Did you ever get paid for your time? 
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A. No, or expense -- well, some expenses. 
Q. Let me ask you to refer to paragraph 21 on page 5. 
"Plaintiff now alleges as an egregious event of default that 
the company failed to provide a lock box that diminished his 
security. In fact, Plaintiff consented to and was intricately 
involved in the termination of the lock box agreement by his 
efforts and consent to assist in the transfer of the AlA 
Insurance block of health insurance business in 1997 from 
Universal Life and Centennial Life insurance companies to 
Trustmark Insurance." Do you agree with that? 
A. No, other than when it was initially set up, I have no 
recollection of anything about a lock box. And, frankly, I 
don't" understand his previous discussion of why we didn't need 
it with a different company because we always use the same 
system. Frankly, I wasn't too concerned, we had so much money 
coming in, mine was of small amount of the total. 
Q. Paragraph 24 on page 6, "After 2005, Plaintiff ran out 
of money and demanded additional payments from the company 
which I repeatedly resisted." Is that a true statement? 
A. No, in fact, I had a good year that day -- or that 
year. My other brother and I, we bought a farm for five 
hundred and we sold it for three million, so I didn't run out 
of money that year. 
Q. Paragraph 25, "During 2006, the companies arranged a 





















































The previous line of credit with Zions Bank was not adequate to 
enable the company to grow as fast as outlined by the company 
business plan. The amount of the loan able to be drawn is 
dependent on the commissions receivable by Crop USA and the 
amount of certificates of deposits posted by shareholders. 
Beginning this year, the borrowing capacity will enable AIA 
Insurance to begin carrying its plans to reintroduce a new 
medical product to association members. Plaintiff knew of the 
terms of this agreement, received drafts of the agreement and 
eagerly antiCipated the new line because it so increased his 
prospects of being paid off." Is that true, sir? 
A. John was continually working on loans in which I did 
not know where they were or who with. I occasionally heard 
Zions Bank, I heard Minnesota, I knew nothing about what they 
were doing. He was changing and he was always trying to get 
money. And he was going to pay me off when he got it and it 
just kept getting delayed and delayed and delayed. And I had 
no idea who he was working with, I had no contact with him 
period. 
Q. let me ask you to go to the next affidavit of your 
brother. Do you have the other one up there, Mr. Taylor. let 
me refer you to page -- or paragraph 9. This paragraph reads, 
"The current management staff of AIA Insurance have a long and 
personal relationship with the clients and insurers of the AlA 
programs. The Plaintiff is unknown to the current insurance 
carriers and Is disliked and disrespected by the company's 
association clients." Is that true or not? 
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A. let me read this. I have not dealt personally with the 
current carrier and I didn't deal personally with all of them 































But that's -- I mean that's not unusual, Some change every 6 
year. I was always able enough to get business, so we outgrew 7 
several small companies and had to go to the big ones, so we 8 
didn't have a company problem. So I don't know what management 9 
- my management got the business, I mean that was evident. 10 
Q. What about the sentence, "The Plaintiff is unknown and 11 
is disliked and disrespected by the company's association 12 
dients," is that true? 13 
A. Some of them don't know me because I haven't been there 14 
for ten years and they have changed. And as far as my 15 
association with them, I never lost an association. And I 16 
spent summers fishing and fall hunting and on the ranches, and 
I mean they were all my best friends. I had no problem with 
any of them period, and that's how one way I developed them. 
And so John has left me on the outside, I do know that, 
because a couple of them didn't know who I was when I was in 
the Crop program, the computer program which I designed with 
help. And they didn't know who I was, not the last financial 
advisor but someone told me that - or CFO, chief financial 
officer, resigned and went to Moscow, didn't even know that I 
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had started the company, thought I was an employee. That was 
when I was on the payroll. So what they know about me is what 
John has told them, not what I have done. 
Q. let me ask you to take a look at paragraph 10. "The 
Plaintiff is known to have a disrespectful notoriously impolite 
and brutish attitude towards the employees of AlA Insurance, 
and many of the current employees would not work for him. Some 
employees actually fear him and our receptionist suffers 
anxiety attacks when I leave town." 
A. Well, I can't imagine that. If they have a problem, 
I'd be glad to talk to them or apologize if I have offended 
them. I don't know if I have a problem like that but --
Q. And take a look at paragraph on the next page. 
"Plaintiff lacks the management ability, temperament and skills 
to rationally operate AlA Insurance in the best interest of all 
of its stakeholders. He suffers from short term memory loss, 
excessive uncontrollable anger, and an abusive and abrupt 
personality." Is that true, sir? 
A. Sounds bad. 
Q. That's what your brother is saying a bout you. 
A. The only one I recognize is that my CPA when I was in 
Bellevue two months ago or three, we're having dinner, just 
before I left, and he says --
MR. MCNICHOLS: This is going to be pretty rank 
hearsay, your Honor. 
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A. I'll leave that word out, but he said that to tell John 
your short term memory is all right. 
THE COURT: Hang on. Mr. Taylor, why don't you 
just --
MR. CRESSMAN: Without referring to Mr. Dantini's 
comments --
THE COURT: Don't refer to anything that anybody 
else has said to you, Mr. Taylor, just respond --
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Can you give your own comment on whether that statement 
is true or not in providing any commentary that you like as to 
that answer? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Excuse me, your honor. 
Instructing the witness to provide commentary is totally 
improper. He can ask him a question to which he's entitled to 
have an answer. 
THE COURT: I agree. 
A. Well, I'm 70 so I'll take credit for a little. How's 
that. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Mr. Taylor, just wait until his 
Honor rules. 
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection to 
that question. Mr. Taylor, again if you could just directly 
respond to Mr. Cressman's question to the extent that's 
necessary. I don't know that comment is appropriate, but if 
55'1 



















































you can just respond directly to that question without 
referring to anything that you may have been told by anyone 
else, please. 
A. Your question then? 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. With regard to the testimony of your brother in 
. paragraph 15, is any of that true? 
A. No. 
Q. Has anyone told you that you have an uncontrollable 
anger? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. We are through with that exhibit, Mr. Taylor. 
Now, you are familiar with Mr. Patrick Moran's letter 
of December 12th to your brother? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you care to take a look at it for reference, it's 
Exhibit F. And my question is since that letter was sent, has 
AIA Services paid you the accrued interest on the six million 
dollars principle amount? 
A. No. 
Q. Have they paid you any part of the six million dollar 
principle? 
A. I may have gotten some interest, all interest or part 
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interest. 
Q. How much interest have you received since then, 
apprOXimately? 
A. I know I got my last deposit of seventy-five hundred. 
Q. So you may have gotten seventy-five hundred dollars? 
A. A week or ten days ago. No principle. 
Q. Right. Since that letter was sent, to your knowledge 
had AlA Services -- well, strike that. We have already had 
testimony to that fact. 
Were you regularly provided with audited financial 
statements of AlA Services? 
A. No. 
Q. You did not receive annual statements from AlA 
Services, finanCial statements? 
A. Not on a regular basis, no. 
Q. Did you receive month Iy income statements? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you receive weekly summaries --
A. Never. 
Q. -- of the business? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you received any of those things since Mr. Moran 
sent the letter December 12th? 
A. Since when? 
Q. December 12th of '06. 
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A. Not except what we have got through the attorney's 
office. 
Q. Now, you endeavored to set up two shareholders 
meetings; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And were you allowed to have those meetings? 
A. No, we were not • 
Q. And on -- let me ask you to take a look at Exhibits K 
and L. Are these the consents you signed on February 22, 2007, 
in lieu of a special meeting of shareholders of AlA Insurance 
and in lieu of a meeting of the board of directors of AlA 
Insurance? 
A. They are. 
Q. Can you tell the Court why you executed these 
instruments? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object, your Honor, on grounds of 
motivation of the witness' state of mind is irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may go ahead and 
answer that, Mr. Taylor. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Why did you execute these consents, Mr. Taylor? 
A. Because we felt it was legally a way to have the board 
meetings and we had - we had attempted to -- been turned down 
twice to have them. And so we did it in this manner to replace 
the directors and officers and put myself in as officers and 
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directors. 
Q. Now, in the morning, early morning of Sunday, 
February 25, you were at the offices of AlA to change the locks 
in accordance with Exhibit L; were you not? 
Sustained. 
Sustained. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object, leading, your Honor. 
THE COURT: It is leading, Mr. Cressman. 
MR. CRESSMAN: I beg your pardon. 
THE COURT: It is leading, Mr. Cressman. 
MR. CRESSMAN: I didn't think it was denied that 
he was there that evening but --
THE COURT: It isn·t. 
MR. CRESSMAN: This is preliminary, your Honor, I 
mean holy smokes. Alright, I'll rephrase. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Were you or were you not, Mr. Taylor, at the offices of 
AlA Insurance In the early morning of Sunday, last Sunday? 
A. Yes, I was there accompanied by a locksmith and 
security people. 
Q. And were you there in response to -- or pursuant to the 
consent of the boand that you had signed earlier? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And why did you elect to proceed at that hour and time? 





















































to. do. it without a IDt of pUblicity and controversy. 1 
Q. Now, when the police arrived, did you put up any 2 
disturbance? 3 
A. No, sir. They arrived with Brian -- or Shane, and 4 
Shane evidently gave him my cell phone. We were upstairs 5 
changing the locks so we came down, and they were outside. And 6 
1 -- and Shane called me by name and asked me what we were 7 
doing there and I told him. And they wanted to. come in so 1 8 
let them in, and then they wanted to go upstairs, so. 1 took 9 
them upstairs. 10 
Q. Were you asked to leave? 11 
A. No, they didn't know what to. do.. They said it was a 12 
civil matter, and we said we were the owners, and they said 13 
they were. And so we didn't want to. get arrested for so.mething 14 
Dr Dther, but we decided that we wDuld leave if we could leave 15 
a person there, and they could also leave someone there. So. 16 
that's what we did and we left. 17 
Q. Was there any breach of the peace? 18 
A. No. 19 
Q. Was everything peacefully done? 20 
A. Yes. 21 
Q. You left voluntarily? 22 
A. That's correct. With the understanding that we CDuid 23 
both have someone there. So. we took Dur regular people, sent 24 
them back to Coeur d'Alene and called a IDcal Dne. 25 
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Q. Local security people? 
A. Right, with -- they were supposed to. call the police if 
someone would come and they didn't do. that so --
Q. Now, take a look at Exhibit N. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: M or N? 
MR. CRESSMAN: N, please. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. That's a letter that you Signed, Mr. Taylor; correct? 
A. CDrrect. 
Q. And in this letter did YDU advise Mr. McNichols that he 
was not authorized to represent AlA Insurance in this case or 
expend any funds of AlA Insurance for the representation of any 
of the defendants? 
A. 1 did. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the document speaks for 
itself. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
a. Mr. Taylor, do you have a security interest pursuant to 
the redemption agreement in AlA Insurance's commissions? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, legal conclusion. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, do you have an understanding as to whether 
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or not you do have a secured interest in AlA Insurance's 
commissions? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, calls for a legal 
conclusion, and his understanding is irrelevant. 
182 
THE COURT: I'm going to let Mr. Taylor answer 
that. Overruled, you can answer that, Mr. Taylor. 
A. As far as I'm concerned, the only security I have is in 
the commissions. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Taylor in the event that you are not 
allowed to proceed pursuant to the votes of the shareholders, 
the sole share -- or the sole person entitled to vote the 
shares yourself, and the meeting of the board of directors, in 
other words, if you are not able to proceed in accordance with 
the consents Exhibits K and L, are you concerned as to what 
will happen to your securities, sir? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, his concern is 
irrelevant and also calls for speculation. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, can you tell the Court why it is that you 
are determined to go forward with the consents that are 
Exhibits K and L? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, your Honor. The same 
objection where he's trying to get around it that his 
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intentions, his state of mind is not relevant. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, what I'm trying to get 
out is not his state of mind, but what losses and damages and 
potentially irreparable damages that cannot be recovered 
monetarily in the event he's not allowed to proceed. That was 
the intent of my question. I don't know how It's state of mind 
after I had asked the question two or three times without 
leading the witness. I can keep trying. 
THE COURT: Well, no, I'm just going to move this 
along. Overruled, you can answer that, Mr. Taylor. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Go ahead, Mr. Taylor. 
A. I didn't hear the questiDn. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Okay. In the event you cannot proceed pursuant to the 
consents, do you have concerns as to what will happen to your 
security? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: That's not the question. That was 
the question to which your Honor sustained my objection. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Let me ask the court reporter to 
read back the question before my last question. 
(Thereupon, the requested question was read back 
by the cou rt reporter.) 
THE COURT: Ask another question, Mr. Cressman. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, why is it that you felt necessary to 
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proceed in accordance with Exhibits K and L? 1 
A. I have repeatedly tried to get access to what -- you 2 
know, the real records and what's happening. I worked the last 3 
four years on a crop program with no income with the idea it 4 
would make AIA a way to grow, get back where it was and have 5 
th.e commissions that it did have. Now, as I understand it, I'm 6 
in the position that Crop's shown separately and I have nothing 7 
left but what's in the -- possibly in AlA. That money's being 8 
used and that money is going down continually every month, I 9 
know that. That's my immediate source to correct my debt -- or 10 
my debt over eight million. 11 
Q. In the event that you are not able to run AlA and your 12 
brother remains running it, do you have concerns over what will 13 
happen to your ability to collect your debt? 14 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, your Honor, it's 15 
irrelevant and calls for the state of mind of the witness, his 16 
concerns. 17 
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that, 18 
Mr. Taylor. 19 
A. The way it's been going downhill, I question if there's 20 
enough left there to pay it now. So I am concerned, yes. 21 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 22 
Q. And assuming you are going to be allowed to comply with 23 




MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, totally speculative, 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Has your brother told you recently, your brother John, 
that AlA is worth only approximately a million dollars today? 
A. Yes. I have seen other figures as low as six hundred 
thousand that we have got from them. 
Q. And do you have an opinion as to where this company's 
going? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, calls for speculation. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, is there enough collateral or assets in AlA 
today to pay your debt? 
A. I serious doubt it, but I can't answer that until I 
have access. 
Q. Access to what, sir? 
A. The books, books and the premium and the assets. 
MR. CRESSMAN: That's all we have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cressman. 
Cross-examination, Mr. McNichols. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you, your Honor. I have 
just a few questions. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
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BY MR. MCNICHOLS: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, you have said -- I think you said that you 
had some security people at the offices Sunday morning from 
Coeur d'Alene; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. How many security people came from Coeur d'Alene? 
A. Three. 
Q. Only three. Who else went there with you besides the 
security people then? 
A. A third party observer, so we had a third party 
observer unbiased. 
Q. And the locksmith? 
A. Oh, and the locksmith, yeah. 
Q. So there were only six of you all together? 
A. Right. 
Q. And you had three security people because you thought 
there would be no kind of a disturbance if you went in at 3: 00 
o'clock in the morning, is that why you had three security 
people from Coeur d'Alene come down? 
A. No. They told us they only worked eight-hour shifts, 
so they were set to go twenty-four hours a day. 
Q. So they were not all three there at the same time? 
A. There was one inside and I don't know where the other 
two were if they were outside or where they were. 
Q. Weren't there two inside and two out in the car and one 
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upstairs with you, five of them? 
A. No, there was one downstairs and there was nobody 
upstairs with us. 
Q. Did you testify earlier that all of the interest you 
have received since your lawyer'S letter of December 12th was 
seventy-five hundred dollars, that's all you have received? 
A. I said I don't know how much I received, but I'd check 
with my secretary. And my last deposit was seventy-five 
hundred on the first -- or I mean on the 15th, so whenever it 
goes in. 
Q. Your testimony is then you just don't remember if you 
have received any other interest since the 12th of December 
other than the seventy-five hundred? 
A. I assume the rest were in there or she would have told 
me, but I know the last one was put in there because I asked 
her. 
Q. Well, you either got the paid the interest fifteen 
thousand dollars a month or you didn't or you don't know; which 
is it? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You don't remember how much interest you got in the 
month of February, for example? 
A. No, I didn't check. 
Q. You don't know how much you got in January? 




















































Q. Oh, okay. You've been getting fifteen for pretty much 
four years, haven't you? 
A. I don't know how long it's been -- no, I don't think 
it's been that -- I don't know, 
Q. You don't know. Alright. Now, do you remember the 
lock box? 
A. What do you mean, do I remember it? 
Q. Do you remember the lock box program? 
A. Yes, 
Q. And when did the lock box program cease? 
A. I have no idea, 
Q. You have no idea? 
A. No. 
Q. Was it ten years ago? 
A. No, it was set up ten years ago. 
Q. But do you know between now and ten years, sometime in 
the last ten years it was discontinued; is that correct? 
A. That's the way I understand it. 
Q. But you don't know whether it would be last month or 
ten years ago? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. No idea. Didn't you receive money from the bank when 
the lock box program was active? 
A. Well, I got a check. I don't know where it came from. 
Q. You don't know where it came from. You just got a 
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check and it didn't say who it came from on the check? 
A. No, I didn't really -- no, I didn't see a check. It 
goes in my account. 
Q. I thought you said you got a check? 
A. I received checks. 
Q. But you don't know who they came from? 
A. No, I don't come to think of it. 
Q. You don't. So you get checks and you don't know 
whether you get them or not? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Objection, your Honor, that's not 
what he said. 






































BY MR. MCNICHOLS: 13 
Q. So I guess if you don't know you got money from the 14 
lock box, how do you know you haven't been paid more by AlA 15 
Service Corporation? 16 
MR. CRESSMAN: Objection, argumentive. 17 
A. It has nothing to do with the lock box. I know I have 18 
got so much a month I got coming in. My accountant keeps track 19 
of~ W 
MR. MCNICHOLS: So now you know -- 21 
THE COURT: Excuse me, I'm going to overrule your 22 
objection, Mr. Cressman. 23 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Excuse me, you Honor. 24 
BY MR. MCNICHOLS: 25 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND 
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Q. So now you know that you have been getting the fifteen 
thousand dollars a month, don't you? 
A. I know some months I have got fifteen thousand, and I 
know some months I didn't. 
Q. Which months didn't you? 
A. I don't know that off the top of my head. 
Q. Did you tell the Lewiston Police Department that you 
were John Taylor? 
A. I definitely did not and I had a witness by me at all 
times. And he called me by name when he was downstairs, so I 
don't know why -- there was no way I would do that. 
Q. Have you seen the police report? 
A. I saw what you turned in here, yeah, I --
Q. You saw that they reported that you identified yourself 
as John Taylor? 
A. That's what they told me, I didn't read it. But I did 
not report myself as John Taylor. 
Q. Now, Mr. Cressman had you look at Exhibit F, that's the 
December 12th, 2006, letter from Mr. Moran to your brother, 
F as in Frank. My question is, Mr. Taylor, isn't it true that 
that's the first time you ever claimed that your brother or AlA 
Services Corporation was in default? The first written --
that's the first written claim of default you ever made, isn't 
it? 
A. I think so. 
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MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you. That's all the questions I 
have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cressman, any questions in light of 
those? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, with regard to the last question, did you 
send a letter of default to AlA Services -- did your lawyer 
send a letter of default to AlA Services in 1995 or early 1996 
contending that the agreement reached in July of 1995 was in 
default? 
A. Oh, in the down payment note, you mean? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I suppose there was on that. I don't recall exactly. 
Q. Did your brother respond to that letter and claim that 
there was no default? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Are we talking about written 
documents, your Honor, because I'm unaware of these documents, 
and it seems to me if that they have documents, they should be 
showing them to the witness and providing a copy to me. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, we don't have the 
documents with us today. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that if you 
can, Mr. Taylor. 
A. Now you are going back to '95 you say? 
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MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, prior to the restructure in 1 
July of '96. 2 
A. That was all being accounted by the accountants and 3 
attorneys so I assume there were letters on that, but I can't 4 
recall specifically. 5 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 6 
Q. Why did the agreement get restructured in July of 1996? 7 
A. They didn't have the money to pay me. 8 
Q. And 50 at that point in time there was a formal 9 
restructu re 7 1 0 
A. Correct. 11 
Q. With lawyers involved for both sides? 12 
A. Right. 13 
Q. And draftee of new documents? 14 
A. Right. 15 
Q. And who paid your attorney's fees? 16 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object that that's 17 
repetitious and vastly outside the scope of the 18 
cross-examination. 19 
THE COURT: Sustained. 20 
MR. CRESSMAN: That's all we have, your Honor. 21 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I have no re-cross, your Honor. 22 
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you. Mr. Taylor, you 23 
may step down. 24 
Mr. Cressman. 25 
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MR. CRESSMAN: We have no other witnesses, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. McNichols, any 
argument you'd like to present? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Unless your Honor is concerned 
about pOints, I would suggest we neither argue -- I'm reluctant 
not to argue and then have my worthy colleague make an 
argument. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I would like to argue. 
I think it's significant in light of this situation that 
argument -- at least from my client's standpoint be made. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Well, then let me -- I guess I'm 
the moving party, I should begin at least, your Honor, and I 
will be brief. But we have presented both in written and oral 
testimony evidence that the Plaintiff has taken this self-help 
action in the middle of the night with security guards present 
to change the locks, take over the control of the business and 
which is not disputed. 
We have also made a showing that we will suffer 
irreparable, that both the -- the three defendants that I 
represent and other innocent non parties will suffer irreparable 
injury unless there is an injunction preserving the status quo. 
All we are asking your Honor to do is to enjoin the Plaintiff 
from the same behavior that you issued the temporary 
restraining order and order to -- order to prevent irreparable 


























S 1 of SS sheets Page 192 to 19S of 211 
194 
injury. 
And we have put up a bond and we are happy to have 
the bond continue to protect in the event of any damages or 
expenses as a result of the issuing of the temporary 
restraining order and the preliminary injunction. 
So we believe that while the evidence is 
controverted, there's no question there's issues of fact. 
guess anybody who ever thought there was an appropriate motion 
for summary judgment was certainly incorrect. Again, the 
evidence I think overwhelmingly and clearly establishes that 
we -- that status quo is that Mr. John Taylor and the current 
directors continue to manage the corporation, and the current 
officers continue to manage the business of the corporations 
and to preserve the status quo and to prevent irreparable 
injury. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I want to start out 
with the grounds for a preliminary injunction. And I want to 
call the Court's attention to the burden on the person seeking 
or entities seeking that injunction. A party is entitled to 
such an injunction if he demonstrates substantial likelihood of 
success at trial. The Harris case that both Mr. McNichols and 
I have cited in our materials. "Substantial likelihood of 
success necessary to demonstrate that the moving parties are 
entitled to relief they demanded cannot exist where complex 
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issues of law or fact exist which are not free from doubt." In 
my view -- in our view, your Honor, in the view of Mr. Reed 
Taylor, he's been completely justified in the actions he is 
taken. And because of that, there is no doubt and I believe 
summary judgment would be appropriate here, and I'll go through 
that in a second. 
In terms of the operative facts and operative 
issues which, as I indicated earlier this morning, is there a 
default, and assuming there is a default, was Mr. Taylor, 
Reed Taylor authorized in taking the action he did. And the 
answers to both of those questions is yes. 
I think it's also appropriate to consider with 
regard to the injunction portion the comment, the case of Cory 
-- or excuse me, Cooper versus Milam where the Court held that 
after a vote of shares has been taken, the vote can not be 
enjoined because the vote has already taken place. And that's 
exactly the situation here. That's cited on page 3 of our 
materials. 
The status quo is the current situation which 
occurred after the votes have taken place, not sometime prior 
to that. And because those votes have taken place, the Court 
has presently entered a restraining order enjoining 
Mr. Reed Taylor from acting in accordance with those votes, and 
that is inappropriate and improper. 





















































about this on Monday, but the stock pledge agreement, Exhibit 
C, Section 7, addresses this, and there are several significant 
defaults. No.1 default is the money. The principle of six 
million dollars has not been paid. It was supposed to have 
been paid August 1, 2005. No.2, the interest has not been 
paid. The interest according to Aimee Gordon, the accounting 
manager, is approximately two million one hundred thousand 
dollars as set forth in Paragraph 5 of her affidavit. It has 
not been paid. So the money hasn't been paid, that's default 
No. 1. 
No.2 default, the company's insolvent. The Court 
can look at the balance sheets, the testimony was they were 
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles. They clearly reflect, which I would maintain is 
the operative standard, the company is insolvent because its 
liabilities exceed its assets. No.2, the company's insolvent 
on the other normally accepted test of insolvency that the 
company cannot pay its bills, cannot pay Mr. Reed Taylor's 
debt. 
There are other defaults, the failure to provide 
financial statements, the failure to guarantee -- this is a 
significant default, not the failure to guarantee, the 
guarantee of an unrelated company's fifteen million dollar debt 
which presently is at five million dollars which is presently 



























inability of AlA Insurance to pay its debts and AlA Insurance's 1 
insolvency. So that is a significant default. 2 
NOW, we have also heard testimony today of the 3 
commingling of affairs. We have heard testimony that the 4 
chairman and -- excuse me, Chief Executive Officer and 5 
President of AlA gets paid by AlA, doesn't get paid for 6 
Crop USA and he owns 40 percent and is the largest single 7 
shareholder of Crop USA. The employees of AlA also work for 8 
Crop USA. Improper. 9 
Now, what I would submit is occurring is that 10 
Mr. John Taylor is attempting to shift the business of AlA 11 
Insurance to Crop USA to get out from under the debt of his 12 
brother, and he's done a very good job of that because of the 13 
present situation of this company today versus what it was more 14 
than ten years ago when Mr. Reed Taylor was the majority 15 
shareholder. The Court can comment or can review its own view 16 
of the credibility of Mr. Taylor, John Taylor. 17 
There is also the default for failing to provide 18 
the information required by Section 4 of the stock pledge 19 
agreement Exhibits C. The financial statements, they were 20 
required to provide audited statements, they were not provided. 21 
Commission statements, weekly, monthly and other data as the 22 
testimony indicated was not provided. 23 
Now, let me now address -- before I address 24 
entitlement to vote the shares, the position of the defendants 25 
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that there's been some kind of modification of this 
arrangement. The testimony was by Mr. John Taylor that near 
the end of year 2002 there was discussion involving lawyers but 
Mr. Reed Taylor would never sign up on the deal, he would never 
sign up and, therefore, it didn't go anywhere. Then he 
testifies somehow miraculously he and his brother sitting in an 
office -- in his offices in March of 2003 some three months 
thereafter, or approximately three months maybe it's four, 
reaches an oral deal that somehow modifies this agreement. 
Now, this agreement was restructured in 1996 when 
the company couldn't pay, it was restructured with the 
assistance of lawyers. The company actually paid 
Mr. Reed Taylor's fees to the tune of fifty-five -- or up to 
fifty-five thousand dollars for that. At the end of 2002 
lawyers were involved, Idaho -- BOise counsel as 
Mr. John Taylor indicated was involved. And yet somehow he 
would like us -- this Court to believe that an oral deal was 
reached in March of '03 between he and his brother with no 
witnesses. 
Weli, first of all, such an arrangement vioiates 
the statute of frauds as we have set forth in our materials. 
It Violates the bold legend on the promissory note Exhibit A 
referring to that statute of frauds. And for that reason 
alone, it's barred. Secondly -- and firstly, it never took 
place. Secondly -- and for that reason alone, they are not 
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entitled -- I mean because of this issue, and if there's any 
doubt about what the position is, we believe it's clearly --
and it's a summary judgment issue in favor of Mr. Reed Taylor. 
One, there wasn't an agreement; and, two, if there was, it was 
barred by statute of frauds -- No.1, there wasn't an 
agreement; No.2, it's barred by the statute of frauds; and 
No.3, the burden, if the statute of frauds doesn't apply, is 
that Mr. John Taylor must prove this agreement with clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Now, the Court has heard the witnesses, there is 
no clear and convincing evidence under the facts that I have 
just related. And because there is no clear and convincing 
eVidence, Mr. John Taylor and the defendants In question are 
not entitled to any preliminary injunction because they haven't 
demonstrated their likelihood of their success at trial. In 
fact, quite to the contrary, Mr. Reed Taylor, I believe, has 
indicated the likelihood that he will succeed at trial. 
Now, I want to address the right to vote the 
shares, your Honor. Mr. Reed Taylor signed a 12-12-06 notice 
of special meeting of shareholders, his lawyer Patrick Moran 
out of Bellevue sent that to Mr. John Taylor. That notice 
clearly stated his Intent to call -- he called a special 
meeting for December 26th. He indicated in his notice the 
purpose of the meeting was to replace the board of directors 
and thereafter convene a board meeting and replace the 
9.40 




















































officers. That -- 1 won't belabor the details that are set 1 
forth in the brief in the exhibits, that meeting was rebuked, 2 
not allowed to happen, told him he couldn't show up. 3 
Thereafter he set up another meeting for February 5 with a 4 
notice transmitted in January. 5 
There were numerous letters, there was a response 6 
from Miss Duclos. Hard for me to believe the testimony of 7 
Mr. John Taylor that she acted on her own with regard to that. 8 
She responded that it required a 20 percent of the shareholders 9 
to approve that and that the shareholder was AlA Services and 10 
he didn't have a right. Mr. Taylor responded with an 11 
appropriate letter when she said to produce your authority. He 12 
did. And he had other correspondence in response to that. 13 
After his February 1 letter, he had a February 2 letter. In 14 
all instances, reiterating his desire and his intention to 15 
replace the board at this special meeting. His brother even 16 
commented in his letters that he may have a right to do that. 17 
In the Exhibit AE, second paragraph, first 18 
sentence, "We acknowledge that Reed Taylor has a security 19 
interest in AlA lnsurance and may have the right to take the 20 
actions outlined in your letter to Mr. Moran." And Exhibit AF, 21 
Mr. John Taylor states, last sentence, ''If negotiations 22 
eventually fail, I fully recognize that Mr. Taylor may take 23 
actions he deems appropriate including calling a special 24 
shareholder's meeting." 25 
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And again, 1 posit the question I asked to 1 
Mr. John Taylor, why was he even having negotiations if he had 2 
such an amended deal with his brother? Why was he negotiating? 3 
And in response to -- in Exhibit AE 1 find it very interesting 4 
on the third page. He says, John Taylor's letter to Mr. Moran 5 
of January -- or excuse me, December 21, ''If Mr. Taylor 6 
withdraws his request for a shareholder's meeting, we would 7 
agree -- if Mr. Taylor withdraws his request, he's going to -- 8 
if he withdraws it, we will allow Mr. Taylor to be apPointed to 9 
the board." He had that right anyway. "Allow Mr. Taylor to 10 
review all the company's cash records and disbursements." He 11 
had that right anyway. 1 find that very interesting. And in 12 
each instance, his effort was rebuked. 13 
Now, 1 want to call the Court's attention to the 14 
statute, ldaho Code 30-1-7021(b) which specifically says that a 15 
corporation shall hold a special meeting of shareholders if the 16 
holders of at least 20 percent of all the votes entitled to be 17 
cast on any issue propose to be considered. And it says if the 18 
holders of at least 20 percent of all the votes Signed, date 19 
and deliver to the corporation one or more de -- corporation, 20 
and l'm reading from my brief, and I think we have got a typo 21 
there, your Honor. But it basically says written demands 22 
describing the purposes for the meeting will be held. That was 23 
done, it was refused. 24 
And then the consent action under ldaho law allows 25 
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a sole shareholder or shareholders to consent to the action if 
they are acting unanimously. And that is exactly what 
Mr. Taylor did. He had given two notices or more than that 
because the letters that he sent and his lawyer sent also 
indicated what his desire was. There was no misunderstanding 
what he was asking for. And he was trying to do it with a 
meeting and the defendants said no, no. We are stonewalling 
you, we sent -- DUclos writes a letter that's written by a 
lawyer in Chicago, a Crop USA lawyer that says, you know, you 
don't have a right to call a meeting. When he did have a right 
to call a meeting. He very clearly had a right to call a 
meeting. If the Court remembers, and l'm not going to go 
through this at length, but Exhibit C, paragraph section 7 --
excuse me section 6 is very clear on the rights. And these 
rights were bargained for and they're contractual rights as to 
Mr. Reed Taylor's voting rights. On the occurrence or 
continuation of a default, pledgor's right to exercise such 
voting rights shall immediately cease and terminate and all 
voting rights with respect to the pledged collateral shall rest 
solely and exclusively in Reed Taylor. J'm substituting words. 
The foregoing sentence shall constitute and grant to the 
secured party an irrevocable proxy coupled with an interest to 
vote the pledged collateral upon the occurrence and 
continuation of default. 
It could not be more clear. He had an absolute 
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right to vote those shares. And he had a right as soon as 
there was a default and he did so. He called for a meeting, 
the meeting was rebuffed two times and then he exercised his 
rights as a sole Shareholder to utilize a consent procedure to 
move forward. 
1 think it's also appropriate for the Court to 
conSider Section 1 point -- excuse me, 11.2 on page 11 of 
Exhibit C, which says that pledgor will sign such additional 
documents, et cetera. And second sentence, "Pledgor hereby 
grants the secured party a power of attorney to execute any 
such documents as pledgor's attorney in fact. And if there's 
any question, that's what Mr. Taylor did when he signed those 
consents when he had that meeting. Again, such power of 
attorney is coupled with an interest and shall be irrevocable 
until the secured obligations have been fully and finally paid. 
And attached is the assignment separate from the 
certificate signed by John Taylor that the underSigned, 
John Taylor, on behalf of AlA Services Corporation, hereby 
assigns and transfers to Reed J. Taylor all of the shares of 
common stock. And that's not there but it was all the stock as 
testified by John Taylor. Standing in the name of the 
undersigned on the books of AlA lnsurance, lnc., and 
represented by certificate numbers 10 and 11. 
1 understand the Court's concern over the events 




















































situation for Mr. Reed Taylor. He had the right, a lot of 1 
money was paid to lawyers to draft these documents, and he had 2 
the absolute right to vote those shares, to have those 3 
meetings. Those rights were denied and then he had the 4 
absolute right to consent and take the action as the only 5 
person authorized to vote those shares. And he has done that, 6 
he has dismissed the board, he has dismissed the officers, and 7 
they have no authority to act any longer. That is the status 8 
quo. Now, they somehow would like the Court to undue that, 9 
that would take a mandatory injunction to undo that. That the 10 
Court can't do without a very high burden. The act has taken 11 
place, it is done as the case that we cite on page 3 of our 12 
brief talks about. 13 
I think the Articles of Incorporation are 14 
particularly appropriate. Article 10, Sections 3 and 4, "Any 15 
and all of the directors of the corporation may be removed at 16 
any time with or without cause by the holders of a majority of 17 
issued and outstanding voting stock of the corporation." 18 
Paragraph 4, "The board of directors is especially authorized 19 
to remove at any time, with or without cause, any officers of 20 
the corporation." This is the governing corporate document. 21 
So in short, there have been defaults, there have been 22 
significant defaults. Mr. Reed Taylor had the power and 23 
authority to take the actions he took and was rightful when he 24 
did it. The actions have taken place, he is the sole director, 25 
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he is the sole officer, and the Court cannot issue a 1 
preliminary injunction that is incredibly broad. And bear with 2 
me while I look at the proposed order. "That he not vote or 3 
attempt to vote shares of stock in AlA Insurance." That is 4 
directly contrary to Article 7 of the stock pledge agreement. 5 
"He not vote or attempt to vote shares of stock in AlA 6 
Insurance." Well, he had that right, they gave it to him, it's 7 
very clear. There has been a default. The Court's being asked 8 
to take away rights that he bargained for and take away his 9 
contractual rights. There is no indication that these folks 10 
are likely to prevail on the merits. 11 
"Not to act or attempt to act as a director or 12 
officer of AlA Insurance." Well, he's taken the acts necessary 13 
to accomplish that and he's done so rightfully. And to change 14 
the cou rse of history here, when those acts have been done, the 15 
Court cannot do. 16 
"Not to enter the premises of AlA Services 17 
Corporation." Well, if he can't do that, he can't do anything 18 
in terms of operating this business as the on Iy authorized 19 
person to act in the corporate governance at this time. 20 
Now, actually the last one is actually something 21 
we probably can agree to, I mean assuming there is an 22 
injunction, "not to harass or annoy." Now, annoy might be a 23 
problem because sometimes we do annoy people when we don't mean 24 
to, but "harass directly or indirectly any employee of AlA 25 
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Services Corporation or AlA Insurance in person, by telephone 
or by written communication." Frankly, there is no need for 
that, but obviously Mr. Taylor, should the Court determine, we 
believe inappropriately, to issue a preliminary injunction, 
that should not -- that should not be necessary. 
Now, with regard should the Court, contrary to my 
argument, believe that an injunction should issue, the bond 
must be very substantial because Mr. Taylor is owed eight 
million dollars and he's being denied the opportunity -- and 
he's being denied the opportunity to even investigate and 
determine what's been going on with Crop USA where we believe 
the assets of AlA have been siphoned. And, in fact, he cannot 
even protect -- do anything, he can't see what's gone on, he 
has to -- the only recourse he has is through very expensive 
legal proceedings. He cannot bring an action on behalf of the 
corporation unless he as an officer's authorized to do that, 
which we maintain he is. So a preliminary injunction would be 
very detrimental to the interest of Mr. Reed Taylor. 
We have demonstrated that the Defendants have not 
met their burden of proof. The Defendants will not be -- one 
of the -- they have to demonstrate that they are likely to 
prevail but they also have to demonstrate irreparable harm, and 
they have not demonstrated that either. There is no 
irreparable harm. Based on the status of this company, it 
might be better off for Mr. Reed Taylor to go in and do 
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something inappropriate because he's the only one that could 
satisfy a judgment. He's -- he will accept full fiduciary 
responsibility for his actions as an officer and director, and 
is willing to do that. He successfully ran this company for 
many years. He operated it, he was the champion, he brought in 
the money for this company. He made it what it was at one 
point in time. He knows how to sell these insurance products, 
he's demonstrated it time and time again. He's a wealthy man 
because of it. He's very talented. He is an American dream 
story from selling encyclopedias -- this guy can sell anything. 
He's an honest straight-forward man and there is going to be no 
irreparable harm should he run this company. The only thing 
that will occur is that the company will run, it will operate. 
It will operate appropriately with Mr. Reed Taylor at the helm. 
It will do better than it's done, and he will very much have at 
least a chance of recouping some of the eight million dollars 
when he essentially sold out to his brother in 1995. And his 
brother has taken full advantage of that since that time. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cressman. 
Mr. McNichols, anything further? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I will be very brief, your Honor. 
First of all, the Harris case deals with a 
mandatory injunction and we are not seeking that. We have 
proposed a consent order that will provide Mr. Taylor with all 
5(0'2-




















































kinds of protection against any improper conduct. And I would 
suggest to your Honor that actions speak louder than words. 
There is certainly an irreconcilable conflict between the 
testimony of Mr. Reed Taylor and Mr. John Taylor. But for 
example on the lock box, for ten years they haven't had a lock 
box agreement. And would the Court now find that 
Mr. John Taylor was in default for not having -- or not 
Mr. John Taylor, but the corporation is in default because they 
haven't had a lock box agreement in ten years. For four years, 
almost four years the corporation -- AlA Services Corporation 
has been performing, making the reduced payments as agreed. 
That's the evidence. Those are the actions. That money has 
been paid and accepted and no default claimed for four years. 
That, your Honor, we suggest is the best evidence to show that 
there is -- that the agreements were amended. There is no 
default. 
And the concern, I trust for your Honor and for my 
Clients is that if you don't enjoin Mr. Reed Taylor, he will be 
back. We know what he will do. We know that he will hire, at 
his statement, three security people from Coeur d'Alene and 
bring two others in the middle of the night to change the 
locks. We know what he will do. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you Mr. McNichols. 
Well, a lot has happened here in the last few days 
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and now I have heard a substantial amount of testimony today in 
support of the request for the preliminary injunction. I want 
to have the opportunity to review these documents and 
additionally the memorandums that the parties submitted to me 
yesterday, I think in advance of this hearing. At this time 
then the request for the preliminary injunction is going to be 
under advisement. The temporary restraining order that I 
entered on Monday will remain in effect until I rule on the 
request for the preliminary injunction, and by that ruling 
either dissolve that temporary restraining order or issue a 
preliminary injunction in the same or some modified fashion. 
With that then, this matter is under advisement. 
Mr. McNichols, do you have anything else for the record at this 
time? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Nothing, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cressman, anything for the record 
at this time? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, Mr. Bond would like me to 
make one more argument, your Honor. Do you want to hear it? 
THE COURT: No, I gave you your shot. 
MR. CRESSMAN: He's been chomping at the bit all 
day, your Honor. I would actually make it for him. 

















































MR. CRESSMAN: I understand, your Honor. I failed 24 
to pick up one of his pOints, I'm sorry, and I apologized to 25 
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THE COURT: Anything else then, Mr. Cressman? 
MR. CRESSMAN: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you. This matter is 
under advisement then until further order of the court. And 
thank you, gentlemen, for your presentations today. 
p.m.) 
MR. CRESSMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Thereupon, the hearing was in recess at 5:06 
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Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court for a Temporary 
Restraining Order enjoining the Defendants from paying any retainers, payments, and 
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posting any collateral or security for the payment of any and all attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred by any of the Defendants R. John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, or Bryan Freeman in 
this action: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Defendants' sole defense thus far in this action has been that Reed Taylor 
entered the offices of AlA Insurance to change the locks when he had not been paid the 
$8,000,000 owed to him. Based upon this flawed argument, Defendants were able to 
persuade the Court to maintain what they contend is the status quo over vehement 
objections from Reed Taylor based upon the significant corporate malfeasance which 
defines the status quo. 
While disingenuously representing to the Court at the time of the hearing on 
Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction that AlA Insurance would be operated 
under the normal course of business, the Defendants unilaterally elected to unlawfully 
circumvent proper corporate governance by scheduling a shareholder meeting of AlA 
Services to gain approval to pay their attorneys' fees and costs without approval from 
Reed Taylor or the Court. Not only would the payment of such funds constitute a 
fraudulent transfer, illegal dividend, and unlawful transfer of funds Reed Taylor holds a 
valid security interest, but the Defendants' actions occurred without notice to the Court or 
Reed Taylor. Their actions are simply another of a long list of reasons why what they 
maintain is the status quo cannot be maintained. 
The Defendants should be retrained from paying funds, providing retainers, or 
posting any security or collateral which are derived in any way from AlA Insurance for 
the payment the attorneys' fees and costs in this action incurred by R. John Taylor, JoLee 
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Duclos and Bryan Freeman. 
II. RELIEF REQUESTED 
Reed Taylor requests that the Court enter an order restraining the Defendants 
from tendering any funds or assets of AIA Insurance, Inc. for retainers or payments 
(including any assets which could be pledged for the security for the foregoing) for any 
and all attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action by the Defendants R. John Taylor, 
JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. 
III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON 
Reed Taylor relies on this Motion, the Court's file and all prior filings (including, 
without limitation, the transcript of the hearing held on March 1, 2007, attached to the 
Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Motion for Reconsideration), the Affidavit 
of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Temporary Restraining Order, and the Affidavit of 
Roderick C. Bond in Support of Temporary Restraining Order. 
relief: 
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Reed Taylor's Second Amended Complaint expressly prays for the following 
Enjoining the Defendants from using or transferring any funds, assets or services 
of AIA Insurance for the purpose of providing any retainers or payment for legal 
services for R. John Taylor, Bryan Freeman, JoLee Duclos and Connie Taylor. 
Second Amended Complaint, p. 20, ~ 14.5(h). Reed Taylor' Second Amended 
Complaint also specifically prays for the following relief: 
For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants from 
transferring, encumbering or otherwise disposing of any improperly and/or 
fraudulently obtained and/or transferred assets under I.e. § 55-916, et seq. and/or 
other applicable legal authority. 
Second Amended Complaint, pp. 22-23, ~ 14.5. 
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Under the tenns of the Amended and Restated Security Agreement, AlA Services 
and AlA Insurance, provided Reed Taylor a security interest in "all of their right, title and 
interest in and to the Commission Collateral." See Plaintiffs Exhibit E to the Hearing 
held on March 1, 2007, p. 2 § 2; Second Amended Complaint, p. 5, , 2.11. Reed Taylor 
has a perfected security interest in all of AIA Services and AIA Insurance's commissions 
and proceeds of such commissions and priority over all others. Affidavit of Roderick C. 
Bond, Ex. 2. 
Under the tenns of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA 
Services agreed to "not loan funds to any affiliate other than its wholly owned 
Subsidiaries or as authorized by its existing Articles of Incorporation ... " See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit C to the Hearing held on March 1, 2007, p. 6, § 4.8. 
On December 12, 2006, counsel for Reed Taylor advised AIA Insurance, AIA 
Services and R. John Taylor that AlA Insurance or AIA Services were not authorized to: 
pay dividends, make distributions, increase wages, pay bonuses, enter into any 
material contracts or take any other actions outside the ordinary course, or the 
result of which may materially adversely impact the business without the written 
consent of Reed Taylor. 
See Plaintiffs Exhibit F to the Hearing held on March 1,2007, p. 2. 
On February 25, 2007, Reed Taylor wrote a letter to Michael McNichols 
demanding that no funds from AlA Insurance, Inc. be expending representing the 
Defendants. See Plaintiffs Exhibit N to the Hearing held on March 1, 2007. Prior to 
February 25, 2007, counsel for Reed Taylor advised Michael McNichols and David 
Gittins that Reed Taylor would not consent to AIA Insurance's funds being used to pay 
the attorneys' fees and costs of the Defendants R. John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan 
Freeman. Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, ~ 4. 
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The Defendant John Taylor executed a letter on behalf of AIA Services dated 
March 16, 2007, to the shareholders of AIA Services regarding a special shareholder 
meeting for the purposes of obtaining approval to pay the attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in this action by the Defendants R. John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan 
Freeman. A copy of the foregoing letter is incorporated by reference into this Motion and 
attached as Exhibit A. 
The Defendant JoLee Duclos executed the Notice of Special Meeting of 
Shareholders of AIA Services dated March 16, 2007. A copy of the foregoing Notice is 
incorporated by reference and attached as Exhibit B. 
The Defendant John Taylor executed a letter to the Directors and Shareholders of 
ALA Services and AIA Insurance regarding his request for fees dated March 1, 2007. A 
copy of the foregoing letter is incorporated by reference into this Motion and attached as 
Exhibit C. 
The Defendant IoLee Duclos executed a letter to the Directors and Shareholders 
of AIA Services and AlA Insurance regarding her request for the payment of fees dated 
March 16, 2007. A copy of the foregoing letter is incorporated by reference into this 
Motion and attached as Exhibit D. 
The Defendant Bryan Freeman executed a letter to the Directors and Shareholders 
of AIA Services and AIA Insurance regarding his request for the payment of fees dated 
March 16, 2007. A copy of the foregoing letter is incorporated by reference into this 
Motion and attached as Exhibit E. 
Also enclosed with the above documents were letters of resignation for JoLee 
Duclos and Bryan Freeman as directors of ALA Insurance and ALA Services. Copies of 
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the foregoing letters are incorporated by reference into this Motion and attached as 
Exhibit F. 
The Defendants never provided Reed Taylor notice or copies of the documents 
regarding the Special Shareholder Meeting of AlA Services. Affidavit or Reed Taylor, ~ 
2. Reed Taylor has not authorized or consented to the payment of attorneys' fees and 
costs incurred in this action by John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos. 
Counsel for the Defendants never provided notice or copies of the documents 
regarding the Special Shareholder Meeting of AIA Services to Reed Taylor's counsel. 
Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, ~ 3. 
V. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the 
adverse party or the party's attorney if: 
(1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified 
complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the 
applicant before the adverse party or the party's attorney can be heard in 
opposition, and 
(2) the applicant's attorney certified to the court in writing the efforts, if any, 
which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting the party's 
claim that notice should not be required. 
LR.C.P. 65(b). The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to "maintain the status 
quo during the interim and until a hearing can be held after notice to the adverse party on 
the application for a preliminary injunction." Wood v. Wood, 96 Idaho 100, 101, 524 
P.2d 1072 (1974). 
The present status quo is to not permit any funds, assets or security from AlA 
Insurance or derived from AIA Insurance for being diverted or utilized in any way for the 
purpose of paying the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action by the Defendants 
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John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. In addition to the status quo, the 
arguments below provide additional authority why a restraining order should be entered. 
A. AlA Insurance May NOT Make any Dividends or Distributions. 
Authorizations for the advance of expenses for directors must be approved by 
disinterested directors or by the shareholders. I.e. § 30-1-853. 
AIA Insurance's board of directors would need to approve any dividends and 
because the board is comprised of only interested parties, Reed Taylor's vote would be 
required to declare any dividends from AlA Insurance to AIA Services. Through his 
Affidavit, Reed Taylor has expressly stated that he votes against all such actions. 
Even if AIA Insurance was not required to obtain Reed Taylor's vote, it is not 
permitted to make a dividend to AlA Services. Under I.e. § 30-1-640, a board of 
directors may authorize a corporation to make dividends to its shareholders, provided 
that: 
No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect: (a) The corporation would 
not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business; or 
(b) The corporation's total assets would be less than the sum of its total 
liabilities ... 
Le. § 30-1-640(3). Because AIA Insurance and AlA Services are unable to pay their 
debts as they become due and/or their assets are worth less than their total liabilities, no 
money may be distributed or diverted from AlA Insurance for any purpose, including, 
without limitation, for the payment of the John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, and Bryan 
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B. The Defendants May NOT Make Any Self-Dealing Transactions or 
Transfers to Accommodate Their Improper Requests for the Payment 
of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. 
Directors and officers of a corporation hold corporate funds in trust, and any 
attempt by them to divert such funds to their personal interest is violative of the trust. 
Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525, 155 P. 665 (1916). Corporate directors are 
fiduciaries and may not appropriate corporate assets or opportunities for their own gain 
and close scrutiny is given to all corporate actions in which directors have a financial 
interest. Kidwell ex reI. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1292 (Ct. App. 1979). 
John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos are all shareholders of Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc. All of them are benefiting from the resources, funds and assets of 
AIA Insurance which have been improperly and unlawfully utilized to the detriment of 
Reed Taylor. These Defendants are not entitled to indemnification for their actions and 
are not entitled to have their attorneys' fees and costs paid with AIA Insurance funds. 
C. The Defendants May NOT Make Any Fraudulent Transfers to 
Accommodate Their Requests for the Payment of Their Attorneys' 
Fees and Costs. 
Any attempt to delay or defraud a creditor is void against all creditors. I.C. § 55-
906. Transfers are fraudulent as to present and future creditors when: 
(1) A transfer is made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor .. .if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (a) With the 
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor or the debtor. .. 
I.C. § 55-913(1). Under I.C. § 55-914, transfers are fraudulent to present creditors when: 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without 
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation 
and the debtor was insolvent at the time or the debtor became insolvent as a result 
of the transfer or obligation. 
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(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose clam arose 
before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an 
antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had 
reasonable cause to be1iefthat the debtor was insolvent. 
I.C. § 55-914(1)-(2). "A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater 
than all of the debtor's assets, at fair valuation ... or. .. [when a debtor] is generally not 
paying his or her debts as they become due ... " I.C. § 55-911(1)-(2). 
Creditors have the right to avoid fraudulent transactions, attach against assets and 
to obtain an injunction against further disposition of assets. I.C. § 55-916. 
Here, AIA Services and AIA Insurance are insolvent and the Defendants are 
attempting to utilize funds or assets from AIA Insurance to delay, hinder, and/or defraud 
Reed Taylor by attempting to unlawfully use said funds to pay the attorneys' fees and 
costs of John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. However, the Defendants are 
barred from doing so by I.e. § 55-901, et seq. 
D. Reed Taylor Is Entitled to Take Possession of the Commission 
Collateral. 
Upon a default, a secured party "may take possession of the collateral..." I.C. § 
28-9-609(a). A secured party may proceed under I.e. § 28-9-609(a) pursuant to judicial 
process. I.C. § 28-9-609(b). 
Here, Reed Taylor has a valid security interest in the Commission Collateral of 
AIA Services and AIA Insurance and has the right to take possession of the collateral. 
AIA Services is in default of the Amended and Restated Security Agreement (plaintiff s 
Exhibit E to the Hearing held on March 1, 2007), the Amended and Restated Stock 
Pledge Agreement (plaintiff's Exhibit C to the Hearing held on March 1, 2007), and the 
Promissory Note (Plaintiffs Exhibit A to the Hearing held on March 1, 2007). 
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Reed Taylor has the right under Idaho law and the parties' various agreements to 
take possession of all the Commission Collateral, together with the right to prevent any of 
such funds from being utilized for the payment of the legal fees of the Defendants. Reed 
Taylor has exercised his rights as a secured creditor and the Defendants should be 
restrained from using any funds or assets derived from AIA Insurance to pay any of the 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action by John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and 
JoLEe Duclos. 
E. Reed Taylor Should NOT Be Required To Post Security for the 
Temporary Restraining Order. 
Under I.R.C.P. 65(c), the court must order a party to provide security for the 
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. I.R.C.P. 65(c). This rule is 
mandatory unless "the trial court makes a specific finding based upon competent 
evidence that no such costs, damages or attorney fees will result to the restrained party as 
a result of wrongfully issuing of the injunction or order." Hutchins v. Trombley, 95 
Idaho 360, 364, 509 P.2d 579 (1973). 
Here, Reed Taylor has a valid security interest in AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance's Commission Collateral-the same funds the Defendants wish to 
inappropriately and unlawfully divert to pay their attorneys' fees and costs. No bond or 
security should be required as Reed Taylor has a legal right to the possession of such 
funds. In addition, the Defendants' actions are unlawful under all of the authority set 
forth above. 
Moreover, no bond should be required because Reed Taylor is owed over 
$8,000,000 and the relief requested only bars funds from AIA Insurance to be used to pay 
the legal fees and costs ofthe Defendants John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Under anyone or more of the above arguments, the Court should restrain the 
Defendants from paying any funds, providing any retainers or pledging any security or 
assets for the payment of the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action by John 
Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. Reed Taylor has a valid security interest in all 
such funds and has refused to permit such transfers. No bond or security should be set 
because no damages will result to the Defendants by way of the temporary restraining 
order and, if damages did result, they could be simply offset from the $8,000,000 owed to 
Reed Taylor. 
If any funds were paid for the attorneys' fees and costs of the Defendants John 
Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman, the Court should order the Defendants and 
their counsel to return any funds paid or provided for as payment or retainer for their 
attorneys' fees and costs by AIA Insurance or AIA Services to AIA Insurance. 
DATED this 28th day of March, 2007. 
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SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & =SS7:~:" 
By. ~ 
Roderi~ond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
574 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and 
Proposed Restraining Order on the following party(s) via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, AIA 
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 28th day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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AlA Services Corporation 
One Lewis Clark Plaza 
PO Box 538 
AlA Services Lewiston,ldaho 83501·0536 (206) 799-9000 FfV!. (206) 746-8159 
March 16, 2007 
Dear Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation. 
As President and Chairman of AlA Services Corporation, I am calling a special meeting 
of the shareholders. I ask you for your support in defending the Company, its wholly-
owned subsidiary, AlA Insurance, Inc., its directors and shareholders from a lawsuit that 
has been filed by the former majority shareholder, Reed J. Taylor. 
The former majority shareholder has filed suit in the 2nd District Court of Idaho against 
the Company, AlA Insurance, Inc., directors, Jolee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and me. 
The former majority shareholder alleges that the company is in default of its obligations 
to him, that the directors have thwarted his efforts to allow him to legally take control of 
AlA Insurance, Inc., and for other acts that have allegedly diminished the assets of AlA 
Insurance to his detriment. 
The Company and other defendants deny the accusations and have pledged to 
vigorously defend the Company and themselves against the allegations. The Company 
intends to file counterclaims against the plaintiff for damages for his continuous and 
nefarious interference with the operations of the Company, inappropriate and damaging 
actions with regard to the Company's agency force, and for slander against the business 
to the public and the associations which we represent. 
This special meeting has been called to authorize payment of attorneys' fees for the 
current Board of Directors, John Taylor, Jolee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. Since the 
former majority shareholder has sued all the current directors, we are asking for 
shareholder authorization to expend corporate funds to defend against the action. 
Idaho Code 30-1-853 provides that a corporation may advance funds to pay the 
reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a party to a proceeding because 
he/she is a director. Usually this authority to advance funds for defending against 
lawsuits is granted by the disinterested directors of the Board of Directors. In this case, 
the entire Board is named in the suit. Therefore, through this vote of the shareholders, 
we ask for your support of the resolution. 
If you would like a copy of the complaint filed in this matter, please contact me at 
208.799.9000. Thank you very much. 
S7~ 
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AlA SERVICES CORPORATION 
111 Main Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 
TO BE HELD March 28, 2007 
10:00 a.m. (Pacific Time) 
To Shareholders: 
A Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation will be 
held at the offices of AlA Insurance, 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho, in the 
second floor conference room, at 9:00 a.m. (pn on Wednesday, March 28, 
2007, for the following purpose: 
1) Authorization of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 30-
1-853(3)(b) for R. John Taylor, JoLee K. Duclos and Bryan 
Freeman. . 
By ore;, of the Boc.:r. d of Directors, 
9?t~~ i'Jf/vd;,;eJ 
JoLee K. Duclos 
Corporate Secretary 
March 16,2007 
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AlA Services Corporation 
P.o. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
R. JOHN TAYLOR 
2020 Broadview 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Re: Reed J. Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et. al. 
TO: Directors and Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation 
I'm writing this letter. pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-853 and the Articles of 
Incorporation and ARTICLE XI of the By-Laws of the corporation. I have bcen named 
in this litig~tion as a defendant in my capacity as an officer and director of AIA Services 
Corporation. 
I'm writing to affinn my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of 
conduct described in Idaho Code § 30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in 
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases that my conduct was never opposed to 
the best interests of the corporation, that indemnification is permissible under the Articles. 
ofIncorporation of AIA Services Corporation and with respect to any employee plan, that 
I reasonably believed that my actions were in the best interests of the participants and 
beneficiaries of the plan. 
I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am 110t entitled to mandatory 
indemnification under § 30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under § 30-1-854 or 30-
1-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in § 30-1-851, Idaho 
Code. 
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loLee K. Duclos 
2345 Reservoir Road 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
March 16, 2007 
TO: R. lohn Taylor 
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AIA Services Corporation 
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AIA Insurance, Inc. 
Dear Sirs: 
I have enclosed a copy of the following documents: 
> Resignation as a Director of AlA Services Corporation; and 
);> Resignation as a Director of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
As you are aware, the above corporations, as well as me individually, are defendants in a 
lawsuit filed in Nez Perce County under Case number CV-07-00208. I am writing this 
letter pursuant to Idaho Code §30-1-853 and the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of 
the above corporations. I have been named in this litigation as a defendant in my 
capacity as an officer and director of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
I am writing to affirm my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of 
conduct described in Idaho Code §30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in 
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases my conduct was never opposed to the 
best interests of the corporation; and that indemnification is permissible under the 
Articles of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. 
I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am not entitled to mandatory 
indemnification under §30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under §30-1-854 or §30-
1-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in §30-1-8S1, Idaho 
Code. 
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TO: R. John Taylor 
Bryan Freeman 
425 Crestline Circle Drive 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation 
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AIA Insurance, Inc. 
Dear Sirs: 
I have enclosed a copy of the following documents: 
» Resignation as a Director of AlA Services Corporation; and 
» Resignation as a Director of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
As you are aware, the above corporations, as well as me individually, are defendants in a 
lawsuit filed in Nez Perce County under Case number CV-07-00208. I am writing this 
letter pursuant to Idaho Code §30-1-853 and the Articles ofIncorporation and Bylaws of 
the above corporations. I have been named in this litigation as a defendant in my 
capacity as an officer and director of AIA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. 
I am writing to affirm my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of 
conduct described in Idaho Code §30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in 
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases my conduct was never opposed to the 
best interests of the corporation; and that indemnification is permissible under the 
Articles ofIncorporation of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. 
I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am not entitled to mandatory 
indemnification under §30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under §30-1-854 or §30-
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Resignation as Director of 
AlA Insurance, Inc. 
TO: The Board of Directors of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Insurance, Inc., effective 
5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, February 22,2007. 
Dated this 22nd day of February, 2007. 
Bry Freeman 
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EX , IT F 
Resignation as Director of 
AlA Services Corporation 
TO: The Board of DIrectors of AlA Services Corporation 
I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Services Corporation, 
effective 5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, February 22, 2007. 
Dated this 22nd day of February, 2007. 
PLAlNTIFF'S MOTION FOR A 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
B n Freeman 
Resignation as Director of 
AlA Services Corporation 
TO: The Board of Directors of AlA Services Corporation 
I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Services Corporation, 
effective 5:00 p.m. Pa.cific Standard Time, February 22,2007. 
Dated this 22nd day of February, 2007. 
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Jo e K. Duclos 
Resignation as Director of 
AlA Insurance, Inc. 
TO: The Board of Directors of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
I hereby tender my res"ignation as Director of AlA Insurance, Inc., effective 
5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, February 22,2007. 
Dated this 2Znd day of February, 2007. 
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RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISB #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
flED 
ltD? P'M 2.8 ff'I 10 12-
c 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
AFFIDA VIT OF RODERlCK C. BOND IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TRO 
Case No.: CV 06-02855 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
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ORIGINAL 
I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to testify in court, and 
am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff Reed Taylor in this action. I make this Affidavit 
on my personal knowledge. 
2. On March 28, 2007, counsel for all of the Defendants in the above-entitled 
action were served with copies of Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, 
the Affidavit of Reed Taylor in Support of Temporary Restraining Order, this Affidavit 
and Plaintiff's Proposed Restraining Order. On March 27, 2007, notice was provided to 
counsel for the Defendants (Michael McNichols, Jonathan Hally and David Gittins) via 
email and the hearing date in time is the same date and time that 2 other motions are 
scheduled to be heard. A copy of my email to the Defendants' counsel is attached as 
Exhibit 1. In Exhibit 1, I also advised Mr. McNichols that Reed Taylor had a valid 
security interest in the funds, that he did not consent to any action to pay any of the 
Defendants' attorneys' fees and costs, and that any such payment would be inappropriate 
and illegal. 
3. None of the Defendants' counsel provided me or my co-counsel with 
copies of the documents pertaining to the Special Shareholder Meeting of AlA Services 
or notice that such meeting had been scheduled. They also never requested Reed 
Taylor's consent, approval or vote. 
4. I have previously advised Michael McNichols and David Gittins that Reed 
Taylor would not consent to the payment of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by any of 
the Directors of AlA Insurance or AlA Services and that AlA Insurance would be 
bringing claims against John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman at such time as 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TRO - 2 
Reed Taylor is able to take control of AlA Insurance. I also reiterated on numerous 
occasions that it would inappropriate for Mr. McNichols to represent AlA Services, AlA 
Insurance and John Taylor. 
5. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a copy of Reed Taylor's perfected security 
interests in the commissions of AlA Services and AlA Insurance, which I obtained from 
my Access Idaho sUbscription. The result summary shows Reed Taylor's previous Lien 
filed in 2002 and his present Lien, both of these documents are attached as Exhibit 2. A 
subsequent amendment filing was made to correct the incorrect listing of AlA Insurance 
as a secured party. This amendment was filed by me and is also attached as Exhibit 2. I 
also filed another amendment to add AlA Insurance as a debtor and this amendment is 
also attached as Exhibit 2. All of the foregoing documents were accessed, obtained and 
printed by using my paid subscription to Access Idaho. Through my search, I was able to 
confirm that no other parties had valid security interests in AlA Services and/or AlA 
Insurance's commissions. 
DATED: This 28th day of March, 2007. 
Roderick C. Bond 
Residing at: L..eu.rr5tzrn 
My commission expires: i/2.tJ2lJ12. 
AFFIDA VIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TRO - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order against the Defendants on the following party(s) via the 
methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 28th day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
AFFIDA VrT OF RODERlCK C. BOND IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TRO - 4 
Page 1 of 1 
Roderick C. Bond 
From: Roderick C. Bond 
Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2007 2:25 PM 
To: 'Michael McNichols'; 'David A. Gittins'; 'jhally@clarkandfeeney.com' 
Cc: 'pcressman@ac-Iawyers.com' 
Subject: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. 
Mike: 
As you know, we obtained copies of AlA Services' proposed special shareholder meeting to attempt to obtain 
payment of John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos' attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action. This 
is yet another example of how abnormal the present status quo is at AlA. 
Any funds transferred from AlA Insurance must be approved by Reed Taylor's vote, which notice is hereby 
provided to you that Reed Taylor will vote in opposition to any meeting or corporate action involving the payment 
of attorneys' fees and costs of the above-named defendants. 
Reed Taylor does not consent to the use of any funds or assets derived from AlA Insurance to pay the attorneys' 
fees and costs of the above-named defendants. Any transfer, loan, advance or conveyance of AlA Insurance 
funds or assets to AlA Services or any other party constitutes a fraudulent conveyance, illegal dividend, 
inappropriate corporate action, the unlawful distribution of funds in which Reed Taylor holds a valid security 
interest and a continuation of the ongoing conflicts of interest and associated legal ramifications pertaining to your 
representation of AlA Services, AlA Insurance and John Taylor. 
This email also confirms that you never advised us of your clients' action and never provided us with copies of the 
documents pertaining to the alleged Special Shareholder Meeting. 
Finally, we attempted to obtain a time tomorrow with the Court to hear the TRO to no avail. This email serves as 
formal notice that Reed Taylor will be filing a Motion tomorrow for Temporary Restraining Order to prevent the 
payment of such attorneys' fees and costs to be heard at 10 am on Thursday with the other previously scheduled 
motions. 
Rod 
By: RoderickC. Bond 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth S1. 
Lewiston, 10 83501 
Tel: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
rod@scblegal.com 
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which only the 
authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended recipient, please promptly delete this 
message and contact the sender at the above address. Thank you. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN 
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58'f 
EXHI IT 1, 
uce FINANCING STATEMENT 
OllOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and backl CAREFULLY 
A. !-lAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER [opUonaJ] 
JoLee Duclos 
B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address) 
Reed J. Taylor 
7498 Lapwai Road 
L Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 799-9043 
IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE 
02/11/2002 85:00 
CK: CASH CT: 1177 DR: 4454£3 
1 @ 6.88 = 6.88 utel FILE» 2 
Filing ~lbeT: 
6 200e-0~17222-5 
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR fiLING OFFICE USE ONLY 
DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME - In.ert onlYlllllI deblor name (1B or 1b} - do not _!>breviale orcombino name. 
1a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME 
AlA insurance. Inc. 
OR 1 b. INDIVIOUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIODLE NAME SUFAX 
1c. MAIUNG ADDRESS CITY STATE rOSTALCODE COUNTRY 
111 Main Street Lewiston ID 83501 USA 
1d. TAXID#: SSN OR EIN I ;-OO'lINFO RE pe. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 11. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 19. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #.Irany 
=~ZAllON I Corporation I Idaho I C54973 I" NONE 
2 ADDITIONAL DEBTOR S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME - In •• rtonlylllHl deblorname (2" or 2b)- do nolabbrevlala or combine names 
28. ORGANIZATION'S NAME 
AlA Services Corporation 
DR 
2b. INDIVIDUAl'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX 
2c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE rOSTALCODE COUNTRY 
111 Main Street Lewiston ID 83501 USA 
2d. TAX ID #: SSN OR EIN I ,ADD'LINFO RE \2 •. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 21. JURlSDICTIONOF ORGANIZATION 2g. ORGANIZA 1l0NAL 10 #. if any 
~~o:rllON 1 Corporation I Idaho I C74568 I NONE 
3 SECURED PARTY'S NAME (or NAME ofTOTAL ASSIGNEE of ASSIGNOR SIP} -Iosert on~ ,,,cured party name (38 or3b) 
3a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME 
OR 3b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX 
Taylor Reed J. 
3c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE IPOSTALCODE COUNTRY 
7498 Lapwai Road Lewiston ID 83501 USA 
4. Thl. FINANCING STATEMENT covers tho follOWing collateral 
All of Debtors' right. title and interest in and to aU commissions from the sale of insurance or reUated services 
received by. or on behalf of or payable to either Debtor or any subsidiaries of either Debtor, and any interest thereon. 
FlUNG OFFICE COpy - NATIONAL UCC RNANCING STATEMENT (FORM UCC1) (REV. 07129198) IDAfiO FlU.ABLE FORM REV. 07r:tQC.' 
5qf) AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTFF'S MOTION FOR TRO 
EXHI IT 2-
IDSOS UCCl Ol\.TLlNE FIL : B 2006-1016766-7 Page 1 of 1 
UCC FINANCING STATEMENT 
ELECTRONIC FILlNG* 
ft\. NAME, PHONE, EMAIL, FAX OF CONTACT AT FILER: IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE 
RODERICK C. BOND I 208-743-9428 L rod@scblegal.com I 208-746-8421 12/11/2006 11 :05:35 
B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address) $3.00 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC Filing Number: 
508 8TH STREET B 2006-1016766-7 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY 
1. DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME: - insert only one debtor name (la or lb) - do not abbreviate or combine names 
la. ORGANIZATION'S NAME: 
OR 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION 
1 b. LAST NAME: . FIRST NAME: MIDDLE NAME: SUFFIX: 
le. MAILING ADDRESS: CITY: STATE] POSTAL CODE: COUNTR' 
111 MAIN STREET LEWISTON ID 83501 USA 
ld. TAX ID #: SSNORTIN ~r'NFORE ,; le. TYPE OF ORG: ' 1f. JURISDICTION OF ORG: 'lg. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #: (if any) 
~~~TlONi CORPORATION IDAHO ; C74568 
3. SECURED PARTY'S NAME: (or NAME of TOTAL ASSIGNEE of ASSIGNOR SIP) - insert only one secured party name (3a or 3b) 
3a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME: 
OR 
3b. LAST NAME: FIRST NAME: MIDDLE NAME: SUFFIX: 
TAYLOR REED J 
3c. MAILING ADDRESS: CITY: STATE: rOSTAL CODE: COUNTR' 
7498 LAPWAI ROAD LEWISTON ID 83501 USA 
4. ThiS FINANCING STATETMENT covers the follOWing collateral. 
ALL COMMISSIONS FROM THE SALE OF INSURANCE OR RELATED SERVICES, TOGETHER WITH THE 
PROCEEDS THEREOF. 
5. ALTERNATIVE DESIGNATION (if applicable): 
[ ] LESSEE/LESSOR [ ] CONSIGNEE/CONSIGNOR [ ] BAILEE/BAILOR [ ] SELLER/BUYER 
6. [ ] This FINANCING STATEMENT is to be filed (for record) (or recorded) . CheCK to REQUEST SEARCH REPORT(S) on Debtor(s) 
in the REAL ESTATE RECORDS. Attach Addendum if a Jicable (ADDITIONAL FEE) (optional) [ ] All .Debtors [ ] Debtor 1 [ ] Debtor 2 
8. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA: 
'Electronically generated from original XML Document 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTFF'S MOTION FOR TRO 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/servletiTransfonnXMLDoc?URL=file%3A%5C%5CAS IDSO ... 
811 
3/28/2007 
IDSOS UCC3 ONLINE : B 6479385 Page 1 of 1 
UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT 
ELECTRONIC FILlNG* 
A, NAME, PHONE, EMAIL, FAX OF CONTACT AT FILER: 
RODERICK C. BOND I 208-743-9428 I rod@scblegal.com I 208-
746-8421 
IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE 
12/11/200611:59:35 
$3,00 
B, SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address) 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
508 8TH STREET 
LEWISTON, 10 83501 




THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY 
r
1b, This FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT is to be 
[ ] filed (for record) (or recorded) in the REAL ESTATE 
RECORDS, 
2, [ ] TERMINATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above is terminated with respect to security interest(s) of the Secured Party authorizing this Termination 
Statement. 
3, [ ] CONTINUATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above with respect to security interest(s) of the Secured Party authorizing this Continuation Statement 
continued for the additional period provided by applicable law, 
4, [ ] ASSIGNMENT (full or partial): Give name of assignee in item 7a or 7b and address of assignee In item 7c; and also give name of assignor in item 9, 
5, AMENDMENT (PARTY INFORMATION): This Amendment affects [X] Debtor ~ [ ] Secured Party of record, Check only one of these two boxes, 
Also check one of the following three boxes!IDll provide appropriate information in items 6 and/or 7, 
[ ] CHANGE name andlor address: Give current record name In item 6a or 6b; also [ ] DELETE name: Give record 
give new name (if name Change) in Item 7a or 7b and/or new address (if address name to be deleted in Item 6a or 
change) in item 7c, 6b, 
6 CURRENT RECORD INFORMATION' 
6a, ORGANIZATION'S NAME: 
OR 
6b, LAST NAME: FIRST NAME: 
7, CHANGED (NEW) OR ADDED INFORMATION: 
7a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME: 
OR 
AlA INSURANCE, INC. 
7b, LAST NAME: FIRST NAME: 
7c, MAILING ADDRESS: CITY: 
111 MAIN STREET LEWISTON 
7d, TAX ID #: SSN OR TINfofD'L INFO RE 7e, TYPE OF ORG:7f. JURISDICTION OF ORG: 
D~~;~~~ATION CORPORATION' 10 
,
8. AMENDMENT (COLLATERAL CHANGE), check only one box, 
[Xl ADD name: Complete item 7a or 7b, and al 
item 7c; also complete items 7d - 7g (if 
applicable), 
MIDDLE NAME: SUFFIX: 
MIDDLE NAME: SUFFIX: 
STATE: I POSTAL CODE: COUNTF 
10 83501 USA 
7g, ORGANIZATIONAL ID #: (if any) 
: C54973 
Describe collateral [ J deleted or [ J added, or give entire [ ] restated collateral deSCription, or describe collateral [ ] assigned, 
9. NAME OF SECURED PARTY OF RECORD AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT (name of assignor, II this is an Assignment). If this is an Amendment authorized by a 
Debtor which adds collateral or adds the authorizing Debtor, or if this is a Termination authorized by a Debtor, check here [ ] and enter name 01 DEBTOR authorizing this 
Amendment. 
9a, ORGANIZATION'S NAME: 
OR 9b. LAST NAME: FIRST NAME: 
TAYLOR REED 
10, OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA: 
13. Use this space for additional information, 
ADDITION OF DEBTOR 
'Electronically generated from original XML Document 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN 
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MIDDLE NAME: SUFFIX: 
J 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/servletiTransformXMLDoc?URL=file%3A%5C%5CAS IDSO... 3/28/2007 
IDSOS UCC3 ONLIN""E FIL : B 6479384 Page 1 of 1 
UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT 
ELECTRONIC FILlNG* 
A. NAME, PHONE, EMAIL, FAX OF CONTACT AT FILER: 
RODERICK C. BOND I 208-743-9428 I rod@scblegal.com I 208-
746-8421 
IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE 
12/11/2006 11 :59:35 
$3.00 
B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address) 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
508 8TH STREET 
LEWISTON, 10 83501 




THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY 
r
b. This FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT is to be 
[ ] filed (for record) (or recorded) in the REAL ESTATE 
RECORDS. 
2. [ ] TERMINATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above is tenninated with respect to security interest(s) 01 the Secured Party authorizing this Tennination 
Statement. 
3. [ ] CONTINUATION: Effectiveness 01 the Financing Statement identified above with respect to security Interest(s) of the Secured Party authorizing this Continuation Statement 
continued for the additional period provided by applicable law. 
4. [ ] ASSIGNMENT (full or partial): Give name of assignee in item 70 or 7b and address of assignee In item 7c; and also give name of assignor in item 9. 
5. AMENDMENT (PARTY INFORMATION): This Amendment affects [ ] Debtor ~ [X] Secured Party of record. Check only ~ 01 these two boxes. 
Also check one of the following three boxes and provide appropriate infonnation in items 6 andlor 7. 
[ ] CHANGE name andlor address: Give current record name In item 6a or 6b; also [X] DELETE name: Give record 
give new name (il name change) in item 7a or 7b andlor new address (il address name to be deleted in item 6a or 
change) in item 7 c. 6b. 
6 CURRENT RECORD INFORMATION' 
6a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME: 
OR 
6b. LAST NAME: FIRST NAME: 
AlA INSURANCE, INC. 
7. CHANGED (NEW) OR ADDED INFORMATION: 
7a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME: 
OR 
7b. LAST NAME: FIRST NAME: 
7e. MAILING ADDRESS: CITY: 
7d. TAX ID #: SSN OR TlNfor'L INFO RE7e. TYPE OF ORG: .7f. JURISDICTION OF ORG: 
RGANIZA TION ~> 
DEBTOR: :, 
i 
8. AMENDMENT (COLLATERAL CHANGE): check only one box. 
] ADD name: Complete item 7a or 7b, and al 
item 7c; also complete items 7d - 7g (if 
applicable). 
MIDDLE NAME: SUFFIX: 
MIDDLE NAME: SUFFIX: 
STATE: I POSTAL CODE: COUNTF 
:7g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #: (if any) 
i , 
Describe collateral [ ] deleted or [ ] added, or give entire [ ] restated collateral description, or describe collateral [ ] assigned. 
9. NAME OF SECURED PARTY OF RECORD AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT (name 01 assignor, ilthis is an Assignment). If this Is an Amendment authorized by a 
Debtor which adds collateral or adds the authOrizing Debtor, or if this is a Tennination authorized by a Debtor, check here [ ] and enter name of DEBTOR authorizing this 
Amendment. 
9a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME: 
OR 9b. LAST NAME: FIRST NAME: 
TAYLOR REED 
10. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA: 
13. Use this space for additional information. 
REMOVE SECURED PARTY 
'Electronically generated from Original XML Document 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN 
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MIDDLE NAME: 
J 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/servletiTransforrnXMLDoc?URL=file%3A%5C%5CAS IDSO ... 
SUFFIX: 
3/28/2007 
IDSOS Search Result Summar 
IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE 
Search Result Summary 
Page 1 of2 
Ben Ysursa, Secretary of State 
lien Search Results 
[ New Search ] 
This page shows results 1 through 2 
Lien 8200610167667, filed 11 Dec 2006 
Type: Basic 
Status: CURRENT 
2 Debtors: AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, filed 11 Dec 2006 
111 MAIN STREET 
LEWISTON, ID USA 
AlA INSURANCE, INC., filed 11 Dec 2006 
111 MAIN STREET 
LEWISTON, ID USA 
2 Secured Parties: AlA INSURANCE, INC. 
REED J TAYLOR 
Lien 8200209172225, filed 11 Feb 2002 
Type: Basic 
Status: LAPSED-ACTIVE 
2 Debtors: AlA INSURANCE, INC., filed 11 Feb 2002 
111 MAIN STREET 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, filed 11 Feb 2002 
111 MAIN STREET 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
1 Secured Party: REED J. TAYLOR 
Subscriber Options 
Transaction Reports Look at charges related to the UCC/Lien search, 
and any other Access Idaho application, that 
you have been billed for. 
Eree Segfch Use the free search to experiment with different 
types of searches. Then return to the premium 
search for details. 
UCCl and UCC3 fili7(l File UCC-l and UCC-3 Financing Statements 5=lLf 
AFFIDA.VI I OF RODERIC C. BOND IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTFF'S MOTION FOR TRO 
https:/lwww.accessidaho.org/secure/sos/liens/search.html 3/28/2007 
rDSOS Viewing Lien Detail Page 1 of 1 
IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE 
Viewing Lien Detail 
Detailed View of 6200209172225 
[ Summary] [New Search] 
Lien 8200209172225, filed 11 Feb 




AlA INSURANCE, INC., filed 11 Feb 2002 
111 MAIN STREET 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
Ben Ysursa, Secretary of State 
View document 
(TIFF format) 
Help Me Print/View 
TIFF 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, filed 11 Feb 2002 
111 MAIN STREET 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
1 Secured Party: 
Subscriber Options 
REED J. TAYLOR, filed 11 Feb 2002 
7498 LAPWAI ROAD 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
Transaction Reports Look at charges related to the UCCjLien search, 
and any other Access Idaho application, that 
you have been billed for. 
Free Search Use the free search to experiment with different 
types of searches. Then return to the premium 
search for details. 
UCCl and UCC3 filing File UCC- l and UCC-3 Financing Statements 
online. 
Business Entity Search Search for an Idaho business entity online, and 
purchase a certificate of existence from the 
Idaho Secretary of State. 
Log out Log out from Access Idaho 
Comments, questions or suggestions can be emailed to: sosinfo@sos.idaho.gov 51<;" 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN 
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https ://www.accessidaho.org/secure/sos/liens/search.html?SearchFormstep=viewlien&Sear... 3/28/2007 
RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISB #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3lO0 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
FILED 
1fIl{ f1YIR za IlP\ 10 1Z 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR 
IN SUPPORT OF TEMPORARY 




Case No.: CV 06-02855 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
ORIGINAL 
I, Reed Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to testify in court, and 
am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I make this Affidavit on my personal 
knowledge. 
2. None of the Defendants or their counsel provided me with notice or copies 
of the Special Shareholder Meeting Scheduled for AlA Services Corporation on March 
28,2007. 
3. The Defendants' actions an attempt to improperly take action to prevent 
me from voting the shares pledged to me. All actions taken without permitting me to vote 
the shares are causing repairable injury to me. The Defendants are continuously 
thwarting my right to vote the shares, while falsely representing to the Court that the 
business will be ran appropriately. 
4. In addition, I am owed over $8,000,000 by AlA Services and have claims 
against the other Defendants in this action. As the value of AlA Insurance is 
approximately $2,000,000 as established by the testimony of John Taylor, there is no 
assurances that any the Defendants will be able to pay any judgment over the value of 
AlA Insurance. Every dollar that the Defendants are able to use for other purposes and 
not pay to me is likely money that I will never see which will cause me irreparable injury. 
Damages will not likely provide me with any relief because the collectability of any 
judgment against the Defendants is questionable at best. 
5. I have a valid security interest in all of AlA Services and AlA Insurance's 
commissions and have perfected my security interest by filing financing statements with 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR 
IN SUPPORT OF TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER - 2 
Secretary of State ofIdaho. All of AlA Services' funds are derived from AlA Insurance. 
To legally transfer funds from AlA Insurance to AlA Services, AlA Insurance must 
declare a dividend. 
6. This Affidavit may be relied upon by any party as a proxy for my vote of 
all of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance against resolution or proposal to authorize 
any and all payments, dividends, and distributions from AlA Insurance to AlA Services, 
or any other entity and any person for the purpose of paying any attorneys' fees, costs or 
expenses incurred in this action by John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos. 
DATED: This 28th day of March, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of March, 2007. 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR 
IN SUPPORT OF TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER - 3 
Notary Public or the State ofIdaho 
Residing at: Lenn'otzry) 
My commission expires: 1./24-/2.04.2. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of the Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
Temporary Restraining Order on the following party(s) via the methodes) indicated 
below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
eX) Hand Delivered 
e ) Overnight Mail 
e ) Facsimile 
Via: 
e ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
eX) Hand Delivered 
e ) Overnight Mail 
e ) Facsimile 
Via: 
e ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
eX) Hand Delivered 
e ) Overnight Mail 
e ) Facsimile 
Signed this 28th day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR 
IN SUPPORT OF TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER - 4 
Roderic 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 743-9295 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants 
AlA Services Corporation, 
AIA Insurance, Inc. and 
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AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No: CV 07-00208 
MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER 
Defendants AlA Services Corporation and John Taylor submit this 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER. 
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I. 
IDAHO CODE 
Idaho Code § 30-1-853 permits corporations to advance funds for the 




Article XI of the NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF AlA SERVICES 
CORPORATION, copy attached as Exhibit B, requires the corporation to advance the 




Bya letter dated March 1, 2007, John Taylor submitted to AlA Services 
Corporation the undertaking required by Idaho Code § 30-1-853 and Article XI of the 
NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF AlA SERVICES CORPORATION. A copy is 
attached as Exhibit C. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman are entitled to, and AlA 
Services Corporation is obligated to pay for the costs of defending them in this case. 
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Cio/ 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of March, 2007. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
BY:~~~~~~~~&~ 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jf. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 




__ X __ TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
~.Jt 
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30-1-8G3 ('ORPOR,,\TIONS 
tion with the proceeding. [I.e., * :30-1-852, as added by 199'7, ch. ;i66, * 2, 
p. 1080.J 
Sec. to st'c. ref. T'hi~ section is r'efl'rn-d to 
in §§ :lO- H~53. :10- t -854. :10· t ·856, :10-I-A58, 
and 30·1·1621. 
ABA OFFICIAL COMMENT 
Section 851 dd"rrninps wh"lhE'r indE'mnifimtion may be mad" voluntarily by a corporation 
ifit elpcts to do so . Section 852 detprmines whpthpr!.\ corporation mllst indl,mnify a dirpctor for 
his expenses; in other words, section 852 creatpR !.\ statutOl,' right of indemnification in fa\'or 
ofthe director who meets the rpquirements of that section . Enforcement of thill right by judicial 
proceeding is specifically contpmplated by spclion R54111( a 1. Section 85412 1 givE'S thp diN-etor a 
statutory right to recover expenses incurrpd by him in enforcing his statutory right to 
indemnification under section 852. 
The basic standard for mandatory indemnification is that the director haR bpen "wholly 
successful. on the mprits or otherwise: in the defensp of the proceeding. The word "wholly" is 
added to avoid the argument accepted in Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wol(Hon, ,~21 A.2d 
138 mel. 1974), that a dpfendant may be entitled to partial mandatory indemnification if, by 
plea bargaining or otherwise, he was ahle to obtain the dismissal of some but not all counts of 
an indictment. A dAfl.'ndant is "wholly successful" only if the I'ntire proceeding is disposed of on 
a basis which does not involve 11 finding of liability. A director who is prpcludPd from mandatory 
indemnification by this requirement may still be tmtitled to pnrmissible indemnification under 
section 85H U or court-orderAd indemnification under section 85411)( c I. 
The language in earlier versions of the Model Act and in many other state statut!;.; thllt thl' 
basis ofsucccss may be "on the merits or otherwise" is retained . WhilH this Rtandard rna)' result 
in an occasional defendant becoming entitled to indt·mnificution bf'cause of proc(,dural deft-nses 
not relaind to th" merits, e.g., the statute of limitations or disqualification of the plaintiff, it ii; 
unreasonable to mquire a defendant with a valid procedurul defense to I.Indeq('o a pOl'sibly 
prolonged and expensive trial on the mel'ii~ in order to l,stablish ,!ligibility lor mandatory 
indemnification . 
If the corporation indemnifieR or advances !'x,wnses to a director in confll,ction with u 
derivative proceeding, the corporation mu~t ff'port that fact to the shaff·holder prior to their 
next meeting. See section 1621(1). 
IDAHO REPORTER'S COMMENT 
The only real Hub6tHlltivl' changl~ here from prior I.e. § 30-1-5Iel is nil' addition ofthl' adw'rb 
"wholly" to avoid the urgulllenl that a defendant IIlOY be entitled to paltial mandato,',Y 
indernnifkation ifablt. to oht.uin dillmi!;sal OfllOIllP hut lIot al\ counts of lin indiclnll~nl. A din-clor 
who is pn,clud"d frum lllandatory indemnification by this "I'qIlJI'(,IllI'nl mny still be entitled to 
permisHible inti,'mnifical.ion undf'r lwction 8511 1 I or court-ordprod ind.,mnilic:atwil lindt-I" 
section 854( 1 )I c I. 
30·1·853. Advance for expenses. - (1) A cOI'Poration may, before 
final riisposition of a proceeding. auvance funds to pay for or reimburse tlw 
reasonahle pxpenses incurred by a director who is a party to a proceeding 
becHuse hf; is a director if he delivers to the corporation: 
(11) A written afIirmatiun of his good faith belief that Iw haR mel til!:' 
relf'v:tnL standa I'd of eonduct dest:ribed in section ~iO-l-HG 1. Idaho Code, 01' 
that t.hf> prcH'(·('ding involvpH conduct for which liahility has l)('en elimi-
natt~d under a provision of the al'ticl(~s of inl'ul'por:d.iofl as :Illthorizt~d by 
sel'lion 30-1-:W~Cl)(d), Iduho Codt!; and 
(h) His wrilLpll undpl'Laking to I'<'pay any ('unds ad\':1ncl!d if'lw i ... not 
entitled to lllandatory indl'lllnification undt'1' ~('ttion :.lO-1-85~, fdaho 
Code, and it is ultimatel'y Jelel'lnined undl-I" st'clion ;jO-] -HG·t 01' ;1O-l-~!j!), 
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:133 (;ENERAL BUSINESS rORPORATIONS ;~O-1-853 
Idaho Code, that he has not met the relevant standard of conduct 
described in section 30-1-851, Idaho Code. 
(2) The undertaking required by subsection (l)(b) oft.his section must be 
an unlimited gpneral obligation of the director but need not be secured and 
may be accepted without reference to the financial ability of the director to 
make repayment. 
(3) Authorizations under thi8 section shall be made: 
(a) By the board of directors: 
(il If there are two (2) or more disinterested directors, by a majority 
vote of all the disinterested directors, a majority of whom shall for such 
purposes constitute a quorum, or by a majority of the members of a 
committee of two (2) or more disinterested directors appointed by such 
a vote; or 
Iii) If there are fewer than two (2) disinterested directors , by the vote 
necessary for action by the board in accordance with section 30-1-
824(3), Idaho Code, in which authorization directors who do not qualify 
as disinterested directors may participate; or 
(bl By the shareholders, but shares owned by or voted under the control 
of a director who at the time does not qualify as a disinterested director 
may not be voted on the authorization. II.C., § 30-1-853, as added by 
1997, ch. 366, § 2, p. 1080.] 
Sec. to sec. ref. Thi~ Rection is refe ITed to 
in §§ 30-1-850,30-1-854 • .'30-1-858, and 30-1-
1621. 
ABA OFFICIAL COMMENT 
Section 85.'3 authorizes, but does not require, a corporation to pay for or reimburse, in 
advance, A rlirr,ctor's reasonable expenses if two conditions are met. This authorization is 
RU\)jf'ct to :my limitations Ret forth in the articles of incorporation pursuant to section 858(3i. 
Section R53 recognizes nn important difference between indemnification und nn advance for 
"Xp<HlHCS: Indnmnification is retrospective and. thl!rf·fore, enables the persons dutl'rmining 
whether to indpmnify to do HO on the basis of known facts, including the outcome of the 
pl'oct"eding. Advance for expenses is npcessllrily prOfJpective nnd the individuals making thl' 
rlo'cblion whether t~ advllnce expenses gl'llerully havf! fewer known facts on which to base their 
IIl'ciflion. Indmnnification mAy include reimburBpment for non-advunccd nxpenses. 
Section 853 rellects u determination thut it is Round public policy to permit the corporation 
to advonce (by direct payment or by reimbursemenO the defense expenses of 11 director so long 
IlS the direl'lor bf.'lipvf!s in good faith that he was ncting in accordance with the relevl1nt 
standard for indrmnificution set forth in section 851 or that the proceeding involves conduct for 
wnich linhility has 1"'l'n ("imina\.l'e1 pursuant tu section 202(211<1) !lnd agrl'f~s to rf!pny any 
:(mounts adv:tJ1(·( ·d If It i~ ultimllt£'ly df'lnrmilll'c1lhat he is nut f:!ntiUed to indemnificution. This 
policy is bllsed upon the view that a pl'rson who Hf'I'Ves fin entity in a rr.prpRentativ(, capacity 
should lIot bl' 1'I''1uirpd to finance hil:! own oefpnsI· . MOrt·'IVf:!r. :1I!t·qIW\t· leglll /'('pl'I 's('ntution 
olll'n 1't''1uin's suh~t.antiall'xJlenRlls during t.ht! prm'I'l'ding nnel many individual!' are willing to 
~I'rvl' as ,'irf'rtor~ only ifth ... y hav .. th .. aRHur:m~e t.hat lh .. corporat.ion hal' thl' puw"r In :nh alH'!' 
th,'~~· I'xpensl's. In fad , many corporat.ions cont.ractually obli~Htf' fh"nl:lI,lv"s Ih,\'" flrovi~i()n in 
fill' ;,,·t ides 01' hylawl! or uthl'rwisl' I to advance p.xl)f'nl!e~ fol' din.clor~ . Sen Bt-ction H!)l\t 11 . 
S"ction Rn:lt 11 rt''1"in's;( wril1l'n affirmatioll by tht' din'clor uf hi~ good fnith b"lif!f thatlw 
has 1111'1 t h" rl'll'\' ant slandarrlof l'onciul'l nt,("p~Rary for inrll'mnilkat iOI1 o.\' f hI' corpor:lf.inn and 
" wrill,'n IIJldt'rtaking II.\' thp dirf'dor to n·pa.\' nn.v fUllfIl! ar1\ancpd if it is IIltul1atf'ly 
r1"'I ·nltillt·d lhal he has Ilot melllw s tandard of l'olldlll·t. . A ~ill~It' IInch,rtakint: l1\a." ClIver all 
fllilds ;"I\'anl'l'oI in ('ol1lll'l'IiOJl with Uw Pl·ol'l'E'din~ . End!'r I<f>dion Hfi:J(2I, thp IJlu!.'rtaking ,1t'r.d 
flot hi' SI'I'uI'I",1 ,,/Hi linallrial ahilitr to n'ra)" is not. :1 pl'l'rf!ljuisilr· . TtH! th"llrY I /oIh · rlyin~ thi~ 
I'LJb~l'd 1<1/1 is that. wl'alt.hy t1iret'lors should Ilot IJI' favof'f'li o\'ur diI'Pctl)l'!! whoSI! financial 
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time, in its absolute discretion, think proper as a reserve or reserves 
to meet contingencies, or for equalizing dividends, or for repairing or 
maintaining any property of the corporation, or for such other purpose as 
the Board of Directors shall think conducive to the interests of the 
corporation; and the Board of Directors may modify or abolish any such 
reserve in the manner in which is was created. 
ARTICLE XI 
INDEHNInCATIOR or DIREC'l'ORS I ORlCERS, 
EMPLOYEES AND 0'l'BER AGENTS , 
Section 11.1 Directors and Executive Officers The corporation 
shall indemnify the directors and executive officers of the corporation 
or another enterprise to the full extent permitted by the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act, as the same exists or may hereafter be amended (but, in 
the case of any such amendment, only to the extent that such amendment 
permits the corporation to provide broader indemnification rights than 
siad Act permitted the corporation to provide prior to such amendment); 
provided, however, that the corporation may limit the extent of such 
indemnification by individual contracts with its directors and executive 
officers; and provided, further, that the corporation shall not be 
required to indemnify any director or executive officer in connection with 
any proceeding (or part ·--thereof) initiated by such person or any 
proceeding by such person against the corporation or its directors, 
officers, employees or other agents unless (a) such indemnification is 
expressly required to be made by law; (b) the proceeding was authorized 
by the Board of Directors of the corporation or (c) such indemnification 
is provided by the corporation under the Idaho Business Corporation Act. 
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-5(a),(b». 
Section 11.2 Other Officers, Employees and Agents. The corporation 
shall have the power to indemnify other officers, employees and other 
agents of the corporation or another enterprise as set forth in the Idaho 
Business Corporation Act. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-5(a),(b». 
Section 11.3 Good raith. For purposes of any determination under 
this Bylaw, a director, officer, employee or other agent of the 
corporation or another enterprise shall be deemed to have acted in good 
faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to 
the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal 
action or proceeding, to have had no reasonable cause to believe that his 
conduct was unlawful, if his action is based on the records or books of 
account of the corporation or another enterprise, or on information 
supplied or reports made to him by the officers of the corporation or 
another enterprise in the course of their duties, or on the advice of 
legal counsel for the corporation or another enterprise or on information 
or records given or reports made to the corporation or another enterprise 
by an independent certified public accountant or by an appraiser or other 
expert selected with reasonable care by the corporation or another 
NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF 
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enterprise. The provisions of this Section 11.3 shall not be deemed to 
be exclusive and/or to limit in any way the circumstances in which a 
person may be deemed to have met the applicable standard of conduct set 
forth by the Idaho Business Corporation Act. (Idaho Code Sections 30-1-
5(a).(b); 30-1-35). 
Section 11.4 Another Enterprise. The term "another enterprise" as 
used in this Article XI shall mean any other corporation, partnership, 
joint venture, trust or other enterprise, including any employee benefit 
plan, or which a person is or was serving at the request of the 
corporation as a director, officer, employee or other agent. (Idaho Code 
Section 30-1-5(a),(b». 
Section 11.S Expenses. The corporation shall advance. prior to the 
final disposition of any proceeding, promptly following request therefor, 
all expenses incurred by any director, officer, or employee or other agent 
of the corporation or another "enterprise in connection with such 
proceeding upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of such person 
to repay said amount if it should be determined ultimately that such 
person is not entitled to be indemnified under this Article XI or 
otherwise. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-5(e». 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, unless otherwise determined pursuant 
to Section 11.6. no advance shall be made by the corporation if a 
determination is reasonablY and promptly made (a) by the Board of 
Directors by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who were 
not parties to the proceeding, or (b) if such quorum is not obtainable or. 
even if obtainable, a quorum of disinterested directors so directs. by 
independent legal counsel in a written opinion that, based upon the facts 
known to the decision-making party at the time such determination is made, 
such person acted in bad faith or in a manner that such person did not 
believe to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, 
or, with respect to any criminal proceeding, such person believed or had 
reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful. (Idaho Code 
Section 30-1-5(d». 
Section 11.6 Enforcement. Without the necessity of entering into 
an express contract, all rights to indemnification and advances under this 
Article XI shall be deemed to be contractual rights and to be effective 
to the same extent and as if provided for in a contract between the 
corporation and the person who serves as a director. officer, employee or 
other agent of the corporation or another enterprise at any time while 
this Article XI and relevant prOVisions of the Idaho Business Corporation 
Act and other applicable law, if any, are in efefct. Any right to 
indemnification or advances granted by this Article XI to any person shall 
be enforceable by or on behalf of the person holding such right in any 
court of competent jurisdiction if (a) the claim for indemnification or 
advances is denied. in whole or in part, or (b) no disposition of such 
claim is made within ninety (90) days of request therefor. The claimant 
in such enforcement action. if successful in whole or in part. shall be 
entitled to be paid also the expense of prosecuting his claim. It shall 
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be a defense to any such action that the claimant has not met the 
standards of conduct which make it permissible under the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act for the corporation to indemnify the claimant for the 
amount claimed; but the burden of proving such defense shall be on the 
corporation. Neither the failure of the corporation (including its Board 
of Directors, independent legal counselor its stockholders) to have made 
a determination prior to the commencement of such action that 
indemnification of the claimant is proper in the circumstances because he 
has met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act, nor an actual determination by the corporation (including 
its Board of Directors, independent legal counselor its stockholders) 
that the claimant has not met such applicable standard of conduct, shall 
be a defense to the action or create a presumption that claimant has not 
met the applicabe standard of conduct. 
Section 11.7 Hon-exclusivity of rights. The rights conferred on 
any person by this Article XI shall not be exclusive of any other right 
to which such person may now or hereafter be entitled under any statute, 
provision of the Articles of Incorporation, 'or Bylaws, agreement, vote of 
stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to action 
in his official capacity and as to action in another capacity while 
holding office. The corporation is specifically authorized to enter into 
individual contracts with any or all directors, officers, employees or 
other agents of the corporation or another enterprise respecting 
indemnification and advanceS~ as provided by law. (Idaho Code Section 30-
1-5(f)}. 
Section 11.8 Survival of rights. The rights conferred on any 
person by this Article XI shall continue as to a person who has ceased to 
be a director, officer, employee or other agent of the corporation or 
another enterprise and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors 
and administrators such a person. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-5(i». 
Section 11.9 Amendments. Any repeal or modification of this 
Article XI shall only be prospective and shall not affect the rights under 
this Article XI in effect at the time of the alleged occurrence of any 
action or omission to act that is the cause of any proceeding against any 
agent of the corporation or another enterprise. 
Section 11.10 Savings Clause. If this Article XI of the Bylaws or 
any portion hereof shall be invalidated on any ground by any court of 
competent jurisdiction, then the corporation shall nevertheless indemnify 
each agent to the full extent permitted by any applicable portion of this 




Section 12.1 Notice to Stockholders. 
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Whenever under any provision 
uo7 
March I, 2007 
AIA Services Corporation 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
R. JOHN TAYLOR 
2020 Broadview 
Lewlston,ID 83501 
Re: Reed 1. Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et. al. 
TO: Directors and Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation 
I'm writing this letter pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-853 and the Articles of 
Incorporation and ARTICLE XI of the By-Laws of the corporation. I have been named 
in this litigf!.tion as a defendant in my capacity as an officer and director of AlA Services 
Corporation. 
I'm writing to affirm my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of 
conduct described in Idaho Code § 30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in 
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases that my conduct was never opposed to 
the best interests of the corporation, that indemnification is permissible under the Articles 
of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation and with respect to any employee plan, that 
I reasonably believed that my actions were in the best interests of the participants and 
beneficiaries of the plan. 
I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am not entitled to mandatory 
indemnification under § 30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under § 30-1-854 or 30-
1-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in § 30-1-851, Idaho 
Code. 
Very trulY,yours, 
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Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 743-9295 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants 
AlA Services Corporation, 
AIAInsurance,Inc. and 
R. John Taylor 
DEF;! 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TA YLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No: CV 07-00208 
MOTION OF 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS 
TO WITHDRAW AS 
COUNSEL FOR 
AlA SERVICES 
CORPORATION AND AlA 
INSURANCE INC. 
Michael E. McNichols moves the Court, pursuantto Rule Il(b )(2) LR.C.P., 
for leave to withdraw as counsel for defendants AlA Services Corporation and AIA 
Insurance Inc., on the grounds that, while there is no current or reasonably anticipated 
conflict of interest between the corporations and John Taylor, there is a possible future 
MOTION OF MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS 
TO WlTHDRA W AS COUNSEL FOR 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION AND 
AIA INSURANCE INC. -1-
conflict between them and they have agreed that Michael E. McNichols should continue 
to represent John Taylor but no longer represent the corporations. 
DATED March 28,2007. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
____ u.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED 
-----OVERNIGHTMAIL 
__ X TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
Michael E. McNichols 
MOTION OF MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS 
TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION AND 
AIA INSURANCE INC. -2-
lilD 
I 
Michael E. McNichols 
r, • 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS,tf}.A,;-':' T~J ,'1. 
Attorneys at Law --", ,c-_: 
321 l3 th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services Corporation, 
AIA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
Corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR AND 
CONNIE T AYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof: 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person: 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
















Case No: CV 07-00208 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
R. JOHN TAYLOR 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify 
as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
R. JOHN TAYLOR 
IJtI 
2. In March of 2007, I purchased a used 2005 Porsche Cayenne from Lyle 
Pearson in Boise, Idaho. The vehicle is registered in my name. Neither AIA Services 
Corporation nor AIA Insurance, Inc. purchased or leased this vehicle for me. 
Dated March 28, 2007. f' 
( 
R. John Taylor ) 
/ \ 
.. ,Iv i' .. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this ;1.(6 day ofMirch, 2007. 
AFFIDA VIT OF 
R. JOHN TAYLOR 
Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho, 
Residing at Lewiston, therein. 
My Commission Expires: ;{)- 19 - if 
(P/Z. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, WA 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
_____ U.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED -----
OVERNIGHT MAIL -----
__ -,-,-X __ TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
Michael E. McNichols 
AFFIDA VIT OF 
R. JOHN TAYLOR 
351 Auto Drive 
Boise, Idaho 83709 
Phone: (208) 377-3900 
PURCHASER'S 
NAME ,Ii 
ADDRESS ,'!. ,. ; i "" i', ,i " 
LE t'EAR~{ N 




DATE.:....:..-'-__ ~~'_'_', --_____ ___ 
; '; ZIP 'c •.. ' 
PHONE i ,,'::,; I . ,,' ',,:, 'r: SALESPERSON & NUMBER' -'-'-_~.:....:..-'-.:.':.c.! -,' ':.c.' '"'"'--'--________ -'-__ _ 
PLEASE ENTER MY ORDER FOR THE FOLLOWING 
ONEW:DcAR 
o USED 0 TRUCK 
YEAR __ ..:.....:...._ MAKE _:_'~" -'---'-'-_____ MODEL OR SERIES ~.....:' ''---__ I -.;...;' '.;...;' '..:.,;.' \;...:.....-u 
BODYTYPE fii! COLORz""'""!lj,,iI .. ..-'-"'i ___ TRIM _____ SERIALNO. :,>::",::(: ,'ii" I'; 'i; 
TO BE DELIVERED ON OR ABOUT NO. OF CYL. STOCK NO . .;...;> -,-,: ;.!.L' ; . ....:".;...;: '.::;..' __ --II 
USED CAR TRADE· IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS 
YEAR MAKE 
MODEL BODY TYPE 
SEA. '* 
MILEAGE:' 
BALANCE OWED TO: 
ADDRESS: 
CITY: STATE: ZIP: 
USED TRADE·IN ALLOWANCE $ 
BALANCE OWED ON TRADE· IN $ 
NET ALLOWANCE ON USED TRADE·IW $ 
EQUIPMENT SOLD ON UNIT: 
DISK NO.; 
NEW CAR MILEAGE .:,' 1 t.' ; j 
USED WARRANTY DISCLAIMER 
USED VEHICLES: Th. Dealer (Lyle PeanlOl1 Company) hereby dlac:;laJma all 
warrantl.a elth .... xp ... ued or ImpU4Id. The vehlcle(a) eold under this con-
tract ar. purchased by the buy ....... Is" .nd the D •• 1er doea not w ...... nt 
that they .... of merchantable quality nOl' that they C8n be used for .ny par· 
tlcular purpo ... ' I 
We aCknOWied. #?, that tho .et.· e statement was called to our attention prior to 
consummation ,0'( ~: .T~: .' tha;~r:c,lVed. copy thereof. 
Signed, \Jf.! / "1'" \ 1 I, (Pu[~haser) 
, " ... , 
---- ! . ~EW WA~~~N~ISC~;"ER 
This vehicle is covered by limited factory warranty only. Any warranty on any 
new vehicie is that made by the manufacturer only. The Ottaiar (Lyia PMI'8OI1 
Comp.ny) hereby dlllcl.lml .11 w ...... ntl .. either .xpreaaed 01' Implied. Th. 
D .... r don not w ...... n! that the v.hlcle{a) acid under thla contnlct .... of 
merch.ntable quality nor that th.y can b. used for .ny partlcul.r purpo .. . 
This disclaimer by the Dealer in no way affects the tenns 01 the manufacturer's 
warranty. 
Signed ___________________ (Purcnaser) 
CASH DELIVERED PRICE OF UNIT 
1. CASH SAlE PRICE OF DESCRIBED MOTOR VEHICLE 
A. STATE AND LOOAL TAXES 
B. ntle Transfer and/or Registration Fee 
2. Total Price of Unit 
3, MBI Insurance 
4, Total 
5. Down Payment: 
A. Consiat;ng of S Trad ..... 
B. CASH OR CHECK 
6, UNI¥<IO CASH BALANCE DUE ON oeUVERY 
I '! " i: I 
$ J ; ;~, 1l~. ~ I i 
$ - -.. - , , i 
$ 11 
$ :1 'I .~ I ) , 
$ .. f , L; 
$ ./i ,Ii: I ., 
$ t~,t .' ! ~~ 
$ 'J r. 
$ }/ \ j 
The Iront and back 01 this order. together with any installment sales contract which may be signed by Purchaser and Deater, comprise the antire agreamentlfMcting IhIa 
purchase and no ~r agreement, represant. alion or understanding 01 any nature concerning same has been made or entered Into. or will be recognized. I hereby C*1I1y!hlt 
no credit has been xtended 10 me lor the purcnasa of this motor vehicla except as appears in writing 91'1 the face 01 INs agr_nt or the InItaIImen! Sale Contrlld. 
I have raadJl,e tter printed9fl-lhe back hereof and agreato it as a part 01 this order as if it wentJ'riO!ed above my lignaf!!".1 certify that. I am 18 ve- 01 age or older, 
This order/s nof vafid unles!" signed by Dealer and a cash deposit accepted, '" // ' \ 
.'f(- J., ([ \! .'.,,\ ---'- J / ~~ '..'. 1 
Signed ; , I.' - ! ! '. (Purchaser) Signed --.- (Dealer) 
'" . • f 
The terms ;{~iFiri~\rITt~~cx:i~itd except by subsequent written agreement signed by De.ler, 
Signed __ ..!oR.!;!" .~J~O~' HN~' :~.T~A~Y~: L=:::,~O~R~ _____ (Purchaser) 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 743-9295 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants 
AIA Services Corporation, 
AIA Insurance, Inc. and 
R. John Taylor 
FILED 
um [fPR z. M 9 Lf(J 
;qR;;,ms~ 
U flY (t 0 EPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No: CV 07-00208 
ANSWER OF AIA SERVICES 
CORPORATION, AIA 
INSURANCE, INC., AND 
R. JOHN TAYLOR 





DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor 
("these defendants"), answer plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint as follows: 
ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, 
AlA INSURANCE, INC., AND R. JOHN TAYLOR 
TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
and COUNTERCLAIM and DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL -1-
I. 
These defendants deny all of the allegations in plaintiff s Second Amended 
Complaint except for those allegations which are expressly admitted. 
II. 
These defendants admit paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4,1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8 and 2.1. 
III. 
These defendants deny paragraphs 2.3, 2.4, 2.13, 2.l6, 2.17, 2.28, 2.30, 3.2, 
3.3,4.2,4.3, 5.2, 5.3, 6.2, 6.3, 7.2, 8.2, 8.3,9.3,9.4, 10.2, 10.3, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 12.2 and 
13.4. 
IV. 
These defendants reallege and incorporate their admissions and denials to the 
paragraphs incorporated by paragraphs 3.1,4.1,5.1,6.1,7.1,8.1,9.1,10.1,11.1,12.1 and 
13.1. 
V. 
Answering paragraph 2.2, these defendants admit the first and third sentences, 
admit that this action involves claims which accrued prior to the divorce and deny all the 
other allegations. 
VI. 
Answering paragraph 2.5, these defendants admit the first sentence and the 
third sentence and allege that in 1995 Reed desired to retire and have AlA Services 
Corporation redeem his stock, and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.5. 
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VII. 
Answering paragraph 2.6, these defendants admit that AlA Insurance, Inc., is 
a wholly owned subsidiary of AlA Services Corporation, admit that AlA Insurance is a lessee 
of the office building located at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho, and deny all the other 
allegations of paragraph 2.6. 
VIII. 
These defendants admit paragraph 2.7 but allege that the agreements were 
amended at a later time. 
IX. 
These defendants admit paragraph 2.8 but allege that the Promissory Note 
provided that it was subordinate to the payment of redemption obligations owed by AlA 
Services Corporation to Donna Taylor and that the agreements were amended at a later time. 
X. 
Answering paragraph 2.9, these defendants admit that AlA Services 
Corporation agreed to execute a Security Agreement and Stock Pledge Agreement, admit the 
second sentence of paragraph 2.9 and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.9. 
XI. 
Answering paragraph 2.1 0, these defendants admit that, in 1996, AlA Services 
Corporation, AlA and plaintiff agreed to modify the Stock Redemption Agreement and 
executed the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and executed an Amended and 
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and an Amended and Restated Security Agreement but 
allege that the agreements were amended at a later time and deny all the other allegations of 
paragraph 2.1 0. 
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XII. 
These defendants admit paragraph 2.11, but allege that the agreements were 
amended at a later time. 
XIII. 
Answering paragraph 2. 12, these defendants allege that the Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement speaks for itself, and deny all of the other allegations of paragraph 
2.12. 
XIV. 
Answering paragraph 2.14, these defendants allege that the Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement speaks for itself and deny all of the other allegations of paragraph 2.14. 
xv. 
Answering paragraph 2.15, these defendants admit that plaintiffwas the largest 
creditor of AlA Services Corporation and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.15. 
XVI. 
Answering paragraph 2.18, these defendants admit that plaintiff, through his 
counsel, claimed that AlA Services Corporation was in default and deny all the other 
allegations of paragraph 2.18. 
XVII. 
Answering paragraph 2.19, these defendants deny that they have failed to 
comply with the agreements as amended and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.19. 
XVIII. 
Answering paragraph 2.20, these defendants admit that plaintiff attempted 
to schedule a special shareholder meeting for December 26, 2006, a date on which the 
offices of AlA Insurance, Inc., were scheduled to be closed, admit that no special 
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shareholders meeting was held, and deny all of the other allegations of paragraph 2.20. 
XIX. 
Answering paragraph 2.21, these defendants admit that the quoted words are 
part of one of the sentences in one of the paragraphs of a letter from John Taylor to 
plaintiff's legal counsel. 
xx. 
Answering paragraph 2.22, these defendants allege that the documents speak 
for themselves, deny that plaintiff had a right to call a shareholders meeting of AIA 
Insurance Inc., allege that AIA Insurance Inc., properly declined to hold a special 
shareholder meeting and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.22. 
XXI. 
These defendants deny paragraph 2.23, and allege that none of them is in 
default under the terms of any of the agreements as amended. 
XXII. 
Answering paragraph 2.24, these defendants deny that they were in default, 
deny that plaintiff had a right to vote the pledged shares and deny that plaintiff had the 
authority to take the action he purportedly took, and deny all the other allegations of 
paragraph 2.24. 
XXIII. 
Answering paragraph 2.25, these defendants admit that AIA paid 
$1,510,693.00 to purchase Series C Preferred Shares in AIA Services Corporation from 
an entity in which John was the single largest shareholder but allege that the stated value 
of the Series C Preferred Shares, together with mandatory accumulated dividends likely 
exceeded $3,000,000.00 and that the transaction was substantially beneficial to AIA 
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Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. These defendants admit that the 401(k) 
plan of AlA Services Corporation held Preferred C shares and that no shares were 
purchased or redeemed from the plan and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.25. 
XXIV. 
Answering paragraph 2.26, these defendants admit that John purchased a 
parking lot and rents the parking lot to AlA Insurance, Inc., for $1,250.00 per month and 
deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.26. 
xxv. 
Answering paragraph 2.27, these defendants deny the first sentence and deny 
the second sentence for lack of information and belief. 
XXVI. 
Answering paragraph 2.29, these defendants admit that plaintiff executed a 
Consent in Lieu of Board Meeting, allege that the Consent speaks for itself, allege that 
p laintiffhad no right to execute the Consent, admit that these defendants refused to recognize 
the Consent as binding on them and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.29 
XXVII. 
Answering paragraph 9.2, these defendants admit that as of2002 or 2003 John 
owed AlA Services Corporation $307,271.00 and allege that in 2002 or 2003 John and 
plaintiff entered into an agreement to extinguish John's debt to the corporation and to reduce 
the corporation's debt to Reed by an amount of$307,271.00 and other sums, as a part ofa 
proposed transaction between Reed, John and AlA Services Corporation which Reed later 
repudiated and refused to complete, and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 9.2. 
XXVIII. 
Answering paragraph 13.2, these defendants allege that the documents speak 
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for themselves, allege that the documents have been amended, allege that they are not in 
default of any provisions in the documents as amended and deny all the other allegations of 
paragraph 13.2. 
XXIX. 
Answering paragraph 13.3, these defendants admit that they have refused to 
comply with plaintiffs demands and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 13.3. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
On July 1, 1996, plaintiff, AlA Services Corporation and Donna 1. Taylor 
entered into a SERIES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT which provides 
that no principal payments may be made by AlA Services Corporation to plaintiff until the 
entire redemption price due Donna Taylor is paid in full. The redemption price due Donna 
Taylor has not been paid in full. Therefore, no principal payments are due to plaintiff. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
At different times since the written agreements were executed, plaintiffs and 
some defendants have orally modified the written agreements. The modifications include, 
without limitation, an agreement that the interest payable to plaintiff from AlA Services 
Corporation would be paid in installments of $15,000.00 per month (together with the 
assumption of responsibility for other expenses). AlA Services Corporation has paid 
plaintiff the sum of $15,000.00 per month and has assumed responsibility for the other 
agreed expenses in accordance with the modified agreements since they were entered into 
and plaintiff has accepted those payments. None of these defendants is in default of the 
modified agreements with plaintiff. 
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The claims of the plaintiff are barred by applicable statutes of limitation, 
including Idaho Code §§ 5-216,5-218,5-224 and 5-237. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is estopped from asserting his claims against these defendants. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has waived his right to assert claims against these defendants. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims against these defendants are barred by the equitable doctrine 
of unclean hands. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims in his THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION violate Rule 9(b) 
I.R.c.P. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff s claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to state a claim for a shareholder's 
derivative action, plaintiffs claims are barred because he failed to give the notice required 
by Idaho Code § 30-1-742. 
These defendants counterclaim against the plaintiff as follows: 
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM 
In 1995, plaintiffwas the majority shareholder of AlA Services Corporation. 
AlA Services Corporation was the sole shareholder of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
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In 1995, AlA Services Corporation redeemed plaintiffs interest in AlA 
Services Corporation through a corporate redemption of the plaintiff s stock. 
After the purchase of plaintiff s stock, plaintiff intentionally undertook a course 
of action to injure AlA Insurance and to devalue the businesses of AlA Services Corporation. 
Plaintiffs intentional course of action included intimidating the management of the 
businesses of AlA Services Corporation, inducing AlA Insurance, Inc., employees and agents 
to terminate their employment and contracts with AlA Insurance, Inc., and to accept 
employment and contracts with plaintiff and/or his controlled organizations. Plaintiff, with 
the former employees and former agents of AlA Insurance, Inc., engaged in business 
competitive with AlA Insurance, Inc., and seriously damaged the business and value of AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and the value of the businesses of AlA Services Corporation. 
Because of plaintiff s intentional injury to the business of AlA Insurance, Inc., 
AlA Services Corporation was unable to pay plaintiff all of the amounts of money due at the 
times due, prior to the amendment of the agreements. Before the agreements were amended 
plaintiff threatened to sue AlA Services Corporation and to foreclose and take over AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and threatened and coerced these defendants into employing friends and 
relatives of plaintiff and paying plaintiff s friends and relatives salaries and compensation 
substantially in excess of the value of their services. Plaintiff also told those friends and 
relatives that they were not obligated to report to or take direction from these defendants' 
management. 
Plaintiffhas intentionally breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
implied in the agreements with these defendants and has damaged these defendants in 
amounts to be proved at trial. 
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SECOND COUNTERCLAIM 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Plaintiff has intentionally inflicted emotional distress on John Taylor and 
damaged John Taylor in an amount to be proved at trial. 
THIRD COUNTERCLAIM 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE 
ECONOMIC ADV ANTAGEIINTENTIONAL INDUCEMENT 
OF TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS WITH COMPANIES 
OWNED IN PART BY R. JOHN TAYLOR 
Plaintiff has damaged these defendants by intentionally causing businesses to 
terminate contracts with companies owned in part by these defendants and therefore 
diminishing the value of these defendants' investment in those companies. Plaintiff has 
damaged these defendants in an amount to be proved at trial. 
FOURTH COUNTERCLAIM 
DECLARATION OF INVALIDATION OF PROXY 
The written agreements provide that plaintiff will have an irrevocable proxy 
from AlA Services Corporation to vote the stock of AlA Insurance, Inc., in the event and 
only in the event of an uncured default by AlA Services Corporation. 
Plaintiff claims that AlA Services Corporation is in default and has thus 
claimed the right to act as AlA Services Corporation proxy and to vote its shares in AlA 
Insurance, Inc. Defendants deny that AlA Services Corporation is in default. 
Plaintiffhas stated in writing his intention to vote AlA Services Corporation's 
shares in AlA Insurance, Inc., to remove all of the current directors of AlA Insurance, Inc., 
and then to cause new directors to be appointed to remove all of the officers of AlA 
Insurance, Inc. 
The immediate removal of all of the directors and officers of AlA Insurance, 
Inc., would result in catastrophic losses to AlA Insurance, Inc., all to the substantial 
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detriment of AIA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation. 
A proxy is an agent of his principal and owes a fiduciary duty to his principal. 
Plaintiff seeks to act as a proxy for AlA Services Corporation but has announced his 
intention to do serious and catastrophic damage to his principal, AlA Services Corporation. 
Because of plaintiff s announced intention to violate his fiduciary duty to AlA 
Services Corporation and to take actions which will result in catastrophic losses to AlA 
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., the Court should find, order and determine 
that plaintiff does not have a right to act as a proxy for AlA Services Corporation in the 
voting of its shares of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
FIFTH COUNTERCLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on Sunday, February 24,2007, without notice to 
any defendants, plaintiff and several individuals entered the offices of AlA Insurance, Inc., 
and AlA Services Corporation at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho. 
Accompanying plaintiff and his security personnel was a locksmith whom 
plaintiff directed to begin to change the locks on the offices of AlA Services Corporation and 
AlA Insurance, Inc., for the purpose of preventing access to those offices by their current 
management and employees. 
The action and conduct of plaintiff and his associates constituted a trespass 
upon the property of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., which, if it had been 
successful, would have caused irreparable injury to both AlA Services Corporation and AlA 
Insurance, Inc. 
Plaintiff should be enjoined from harassing and/or interfering with the 
management ofthe business known as AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation. 
Plaintiff should be enjoined from entering upon the premises of AlA Insurance, Inc., and 
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AlA Services Corporation without the express permission of John Taylor. Plaintiff should 
be enjoined from acting or attempting to act as a director or officer of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
Plaintiff should be enjoined from harassing or annoying, directly or indirectly, any employee 
of AlA Services Corporation or AlA Insurance, Inc., in person, by telephone, or by written 
communications. 
SIXTH COUNTERCLAIM 
In the early morning hours of Sunday, February 25, 2007, plaintiff and several 
of his associates entered the offices of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc., 
without notice and without permission, which constitutes an intentional trespass on the 
property of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc., which caused those 
corporations damages in amounts which will be proved at trial. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO AMEND 
These defendants hereby give notice of their intention to request the Court to 
permit them to amend these counterclaims to include a claim for punitive damages. 
WHEREFORE, these defendants request the Court: 
1. To dismiss the First Amended Complaint of the plaintiff, with prejudice and 
to award these defendants their costs and reasonable attorneys fees. 
2. To award these defendants damages for plaintiffs breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing in the amounts proved at trial. 
3. To award John Taylor damages for plaintiffs intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, in the amounts proved at trial. 
4. To award these defendants damages for plaintiffs intentionally causing 
businesses to terminate contracts with companies owned by him in amounts to be proved at 
trial. 
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5. To find, order and declare that plaintiff did not have a right to act as a proxy 
for AlA Services Corporation in the voting of its shares of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
6. To enjoin the plaintiff from harassing and/or interfering with the 
management of the business known as AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation 
and to enjoin the plaintiff from entering upon the premises of AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA 
Services Corporation, without the express permission of John Taylor and to enjoin the 
plaintiff from acting or attempting to act as a director or officer of AlA Insurance, Inc., and 
to enjoin the plaintiff from harassing or annoying, directly or indirectly, any employee of 
AlA Services Corporation or AlA Insurance, Inc., in person, by telephone, or by written 
communications. 
7. To award these defendants damages for plaintiffs trespass. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just. 
Dated: March 30, 2007. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
By: 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS 
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY 
These defendants demand a trial by jury of all of the issues in this case that are 
triable to a jury. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
By: 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, WA 98104-4088 




__ X __ TELECOPY (FAX) 
ANSWER OF AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, 
AlA INSURANCE, INC., AND R. JOHN TAYLOR 
TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
and COUNTERCLAIM and DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL -14-
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISB #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
FILED 
ZlUf f1fR i P P1 Z. 30 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN T AYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
PLAINTIFF REED 1. TAYLOR'S 
RESPONSE TO MOTION OF MICHAEL E. 
MCNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS 
COUNSEL FOR AlA SERVICES 
CORPORA TION AND AlA INSURANCE, 
INC. 
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") submits this Response to Motion of 
Michael E. McNichols to Withdraw as Counsel for AlA Services Corporation and AlA 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 




I. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
A. There Is A Current Conflict of Interest Which Requires Michael E. 
McNichols to Withdraw as Counsel for AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance. 
The First Amended Complaint contains significant claims against John Taylor, 
Bryan Freeman and JoLee Taylor as directors and officers of the corporations. See 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Emergency Motion, pp. 26-29. Thus, 
Michael E. McNichols is taking the action required by the Rules of Professional Conduct 
and should be permitted to withdraw as counsel for AlA Services and AlA Insurance. 
B. The Court Should Require Mr. McNichols' Files Be Held Inviolate 
Until Further Order of the Court to Protect the Interests of Reed 
Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, and AlA Insurance, Inc. 
"Leave to withdraw as counsel of record may be granted by the court for good 
cause shown and upon such conditions or sanctions as will prevent any delay in 
determination and disposition of the pending action and the rights of the parties." 
LR.C.P. 11(b)(2). 
Mr. McNichols' files in this action represent the interests of John Taylor, Reed 
Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance. Mr. McNichols is in no position to determine 
how to separate his files, information and notes regarding privileges owed to all of the 
above parties. Thus, the Court should enter an order requiring Mr. McNichols to keep all 
of his files inviolate and that he may not purge or separate the files in any way until 
further order from the Court. 
III 
II I 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
MOTION TO WITHDRA W- 2 
II. CONCLUSION 
The Court should permit Michael E. McNichols to withdraw as counsel for AlA 
Services and AIA Insurance and require that all of Michael E. McNichols' files 
pertaining to this action be held inviolate and no information in the files be purged or 
separated until further order from the Court. 
DATED this 5th day of April, 2007. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
MOTION TO WITHDRA W- 3 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
BY~_ 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Response to Motion of Michael E. McNichols to 
Withdraw as Counsel for AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. on the 
following party(s) via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Via: 
e ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
eX) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
eX) Hand Delivered 
e ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 5th day of April 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
MOTION TO WITHDRA W- 4 
1 
2 JONATHAND. HALLY 
3 CLARK and FEENEY 
Idaho State Bar No. 4979 
4 1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
5 Lewiston,ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9516 
6 Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 













IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
20 
21 
REED 1. TA YLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 07-00208 
NOTICE OF NON-OBJECTION TO 
MOTION OF MICHAEL E. MCNICHOLS 
TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR AlA 
SERVICES CORPORATION AND AlA 
INSURANCE, INC. 
COMES NOW the defendant CONNIE TA YLOR, by and through her attorney of record, 
22 Jonathan Hally ofthe law firm of Clark and Feeney, and hereby notifies the Court and counsel that 
23 defendant CONNIE TAYLOR has no opposition to defendant's Motion of Michael E. McNichols 
24 
to Withdraw as Counsel for AIA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. 
25 
NOTICE OF NON-OBJECTION TO MOTION OF MICHAEL 
26 E. MCNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 1 
LA W OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 






DATED this II day of April, 2007. 
CLARK and FEENEY 
afuan D. Hally, an as iate of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Connie W. Taylor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
6 I HEREB Y CERTIFY that on the I day of April, 2007, I caused to be served a true and 




















Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith and Cannon 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneysfor Reed Taylor 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Ave., Ste. 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104 
Attorneys for Reed Taylor 
Michael McNichols 
Clements, Brovvn & McNichols 
321 13 th Street 
PO Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
David A. Gittins 
Law Offices of David A. Gittins 
843 7th Street 
PO Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 

































~ afuan D. Hally, an a ciate of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Connie W. Taylor 
NOTICE OF NON-OBJECTION TO MOTION OF MICHAEL 
26 E. MCNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 2 
LA W OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants 
AIA Services Corporation, 
AIA Insurance, Inc. and 
R. John Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No: CV 07-00208 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
OF MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS 
TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
FORAIA SERVICES 
CORPORATION AND AlA 
INSURANCE, INC. 
The MOTION OF MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS 
COUNSEL FOR AlA SERVICES CORPORATION AND AlA INSURANCE INC., came 
on for hearing, pursuant to Notice, on Thursday, April 12, 2007, at 10:00 o'clock a.m. 
Plaintiff was represented by Ned A. Cannon and Roderick C. Bond ofthe firm 
of Smith, Cannon & Bond. Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance Inc., and 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF MICHAEL E. 
McNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
FOR AlA SERVICES CORPORATION AND 
AlA INSURANCE, INC. -1-
R. John Taylor were represented by Michael E. McNichols of the firm of Clements, Brown 
& McNichols. 
The Court heard the arguments of counsel. 
IT IS ORDERED that the MOTION OF MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS TO 
WITHDRA W AS COUNSEL FOR AlA SERVICES CORPORATION AND AlA 
INSURANCE INC., is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no documents in the files of Michael E. 
McNichols regarding this case may be destroyed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael E. McNichols shall serve a copy 
of this Order on AIA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc., as required by Rule 
11(b)(3) LR.C.P. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3) LR.C.P., that AlA 
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc., appoint another attorney to appear within 
twenty (20) days from the date of service or mailing of this Order to AlA Services 
Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc. If AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance 
Inc., fail to file an additional written appearance through a newly appointed attorney 
within twenty (20) days of the mailing ofthe Order of withdrawal to them, their failure 
shall be sufficient ground for entry of default and default judgment against them, without 
further notice. 
DATED this 13th day of April, 2007. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF MICHAEL E. 
McNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
FOR AlA SERVICES CORPORATION AND 
AIA INSURANCE, INC. -2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of April 2007, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
AlA Services Corporation 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
/ U.S.MAIL 
----"'--- HAND DELIVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
----TELECOPY (FAX) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION F EL E. 
McNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
FORAIA SERVICES CORPORATION AND 
AIA INSURANCE, INC. -3-
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements, Brown & McNichols 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Facsimile: (208) 743-9295 
AlA Insurance Inc. 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 743-9295 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants 
AlA Services Corporation, 
AlA Insurance, Inc. and 
R. John Taylor 
FILED 
1Ji1I APR 16 FIP1 9 '13 
PATTY 0 'II ~~~.:l\\~S",_J L rllt: -. 1Ytfft!J I 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No: CV 07-00208 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify 
as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge. 
2. On April 13, 2007, I mailed a copy of the ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
OF MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR AlA SERVICES 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE -1-
CORPORATION AND AlA INSURANCE INC., by certified mail to P.O. Box 538, 
Lewiston, Idaho, 83501, which is the last known address most likely to give notice to AlA 
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc. 
3. I also mailed copies of the ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF MICHAEL 
E. McNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FORAIA SERVICES CORPORATION 
AND AlA INSURANCE, INC., to counsel for all the other parties to this case. 
4. A copy of the U.S. Postal Service Receipt for Certified Mail notice is 
attached and incorporated by reference. 
DATED: April 13th, 2007. 
AFFIDA VIT OF SERVICE -2-
Michael E. McNichols 
Notary Public in and for the State of 
Idaho, residing at Lewiston, therein. 
My Commission Expires: 10/19/11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of April, 2007, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
X U.S. MAIL 
-- --HAND DELIVERED 
OVERNlGHT MAIL -----
____ TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
Michael E. McNichols 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE -3-
7160 3901 9848 ".1 8259 
TO: AIA Services Corporation 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, 10 83501 
SENDER: Michael E. McNichols 
REFERENCE: Taylor v. AlA, et. al. 






Return Receipt Fee 
Restricted Delivery 
Total Postage & Fees 
Receipt for 
C€~rtified Mail 
POSTMARK OR DATE 
+-13-°7 
7160 3901 9646 6411 8266 
TO: 
AlA Insurance Inc. 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, 10 83501 
SENDER: Michael E. McNichols 
REFERENCE~aylor v. AlA, et. al. 
PS Form 3800 June 2000 
RETURN P05tage 
RECEIPT Certified Fee 
,-
SERVtCE ----
Return Receipt Fee r--
RestnGted Doltvery 
Total Postage & Fees 
U.S t):\~:,:~ar "::;,·1;-\1 :'.~9 POSTMARK OR DATE 
Receipt for 
Certified Mail If- /3- (J 7 
('k,'·"-·,, ( " .. /' ,. r' .... :! 
., "". ',ii ,i;:,';1'1 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
o. 
J 
GaryD. Babbitt ISB No. 1486 
D. John Ashby ISB No. 7228 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
~ 877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: (208) 344-6000 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829 
Email: gdb@hteh.com 
j ash@hteh.com 
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services Corporation 
and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 





Case No. CV-07-00208 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
Fee Category: I(1a) 
Filing Fee: $58.00 
TO: REED J. TAYLOR, PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED, AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF 
RECORD 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Gary D. Babbitt and D. John Ashby, members ofthe firm 
of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, P.O. Box 1617, Boise, Idaho 83701, hereby enter an 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 1 
43369.0002.920656.1 
appearance as Attorneys of Record for Defendants AIA Services Corporation and AIA 
Insurance, Inc. 
DATED THIS;;;!- day of April, 2007. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
C bcdLh( 
GaryD.B~No.1486 
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services 
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
43369.0002.920656.1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2- day of April, 2007, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Paul R. Cressman, Jf. 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman] 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor] 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor] 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
----t- Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
-L Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
~ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
~ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 




'-----Gary D J3a:§;Itt 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 3 
43369.0002.920656.1 
Gary D. Babbitt ISB No. 1486 
D. John Ashby ISB No. 7228 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: (208) 344-6000 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829 
Email: gdb@hteh.com 
j ash@hteh.com 
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services Corporation 
and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
~ILE D 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 





Case No. CV -07 -00208 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., by and through their counsel of 
record, Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP, hereby moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs 
Second Amended Complaint pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
43369.0002.926521.1 
This motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed 
concurrently herewith. 
DATED THIS ~ day of May, 2007. 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
shby I 
omeys for Defendants AIA Services 
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
43369.0002.926521.1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this n. day of May, 2007, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
__ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
LEmail 
__ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
-LEmail 
__ u. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman] 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
-t:-Email 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor] 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor] 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 3 
__ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
-t.-Email 
__ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
Telecopy X Email 
D~ 
43369.0002.926521.1 
Gary D. Babbitt ISB No. 1486 
D. John Ashby ISB No. 7228 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: (208) 344-6000 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829 
Email: gdb@hteh.com 
j ash@hteh.com 
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services Corporation 
and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
1=-ILED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN a single person; and ) 





Case No. CV-07-00208 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
According to Plaintiffs complaint, which must be assumed as true for purposes of a 
motion to dismiss, Plaintiff, the former founder and majority shareholder of AIA Services, 
entered into various agreements with AIA Services to have his 613,494 shares of common stock 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
43369.0002.922920.3 
in AlA Services redeemed. Second Amended Complaint, 'Il2.5. The original contracts -- the 
Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement -- were 
executed on or about July 22, 1995. Id. at 'Il2.7. Then, in 1996, Plaintiff entered into various 
amended agreements, including the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, Amended and 
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, and the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement 
(collectively, the "Amended Agreements"). Id. at 'Il2.l0. According to Plaintiff, those contracts 
provided that AlA Services would, among various other contractual obligations, make monthly 
interest payments on the $6,000,000 principal debt. Id. at 'Il2.11. 
Plaintiff further asserts that, according to the terms of the various Amended Agreements, 
AlA Services would be in default if it failed to make timely interest payments; became insolvent; 
failed to maintain a Lock Box to hold insurance commissions; failed to keep Plaintiff on AIA 
Services' Board of Directors; or several other events of default. Id. at 'Il2.12. 
According to the Complaint, AIA Services has never been in compliance with the terms 
of the various agreements, and has been in breach since the Amended Agreements were entered 
into. Id. at 'Il'll2.13 - 2.16. For example, Plaintiff alleges: 
Id. at ~ 2.13. 
Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Reed 
was required to be a member of the board of directors of AIA 
Services until Reed was paid in full or sufficient security was 
posted to ensure the payment of the Promissory note. AIA 
Services never posted bonds or other security for the payment of 
the Promissory Note. In excess of six years, AIA Services, John 
Duclos and/or Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed 
to the Board as required. 
Indeed, Plaintiff further alleges that AIA Services has been in breach of the various 
contractual obligations ever since the contract was entered into: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
433690002.922920.3 
Because AIA Services has failed to timely and properly pay Reed 
as required during all relevant times, John Duclos and/or Freeman 
owe Reed special obligations because of his status as AIA 
Services' largest creditor. 
.... During all relevant times, the value of AIA Services was less 
than the aggregate amount of its debts, which constitutes AIA 
Services' insolvency. During all relevant times, AIA Services was 
in default of various provisions of the agreements with Reed, 
insolvent and/or unable to timely pay its debts to Reed. During all 
relevant times, AIA Services has failed to comply with the terms of 
the promissory note. 
Id. at~' 2.14 - 2.16 (emphasis added). 
Despite that fact that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have been in breach of the various 
contractual provisions since 1996, Plaintiff waited until January 29,2007 -- more than 10 years 
after the alleged breaches, to file his complaint. Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action 
accrued ten years ago and has long since been barred by the five-year statute oflimitations for 
breach of contract. 
Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because all of Plaintiffs causes 
of action hinge on the underlying claim that Defendants are in breach of the Amended 
Agreements. 
Moreover, although Plaintiff s Complaint contains ten separate causes of action, the 
remaining causes of action should be dismissed for a variety of reasons particular to those causes 
of action. Those causes of action are no more than an improper attempt to turn a simple breach 
of contract claim into something that it is not, and several ofthe so-call "causes of action" are 
not causes of action at all. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
1. First Cause Of Action Alleges Breaches of Contract Which Are Barred By 
The Statute Of Limitations. 
Plaintiffs "breaches of contract" cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations because Idaho Code § 5-216 provides that any "action upon any contract, obligation 
or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" must be brought within five years from the 
time the cause of action accrues. A cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon the 
breach ofthe contract. Balivi Chemical Corp. v. Industrial Ventilation, Inc., 131 Idaho 449, 451, 
958 P.2d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 1998). Stated differently, "The cause of action [for breach of 
contract] accrues, and the statute oflimitation begins to run, when a party may sue another." 
Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc. 103 Idaho 912, 915, 655 P.2d 119,122 (Ct. App. 1982). Indeed the 
cause of action accrues upon the breach even though no damage may occur until later." Mason v. 
Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 436,871 P.2d 846, 853 (Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that 
the statute of limitations began to run when an erroneous transcript "was first delivered" because, 
"At that time, Mason could have brought an action for specific performance"). 
In this case, the alleged breaches of contract occurred much more than five years before 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint. Here, Plaintiff s own complaint alleges that AIA services was in 
breach of various provisions ofthe Amended Agreements virtually since the time they were 
executed in 1996. See Second Amended Complaint, '1['1[ 2.15 - 2.16 ("AIA Services has failed to 
timely and properly pay Reed as required during all relevant times"; "During all relevant times, 
AIA Services was in default of various provisions of the agreements with Reed, insolvent and/or 
unable to timely pay its debts to Reed"); see also id. at '1[ 2.13 ("In excess of six years, AIA 
Services, John, Duclos and/or Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed to the Board 
as required.") (emphasis added). 
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Although Plaintiff alleges that AIA Services has been in breach ofthe Amended 
Agreements and otherwise in default for over ten years, Plaintiff failed to bring suit until January 
29,2007, well beyond the five-year statute oflimitations. Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of 
action is, therefore, barred. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179,484 P.2d 728 
(1971) is controlling here. In Skaggs, the parties entered into a written leasing agreement in 
1961 for the rental of an appliance store in the Overland Shopping Center located in Burley, 
Idaho. The leasing agreement contained a restrictive provision prohibiting the lessors from 
renting space in their shopping center to any other party engaged in the sale of major appliances. 
In 1962, the lessors, the Jensens, leased a portion of their property to a Montgomery Ward Store 
which sold appliances and, in 1969, the lessors entered another leasing agreement with Sears 
Roebuck and Co., which also sold appliances. Despite the fact that the lease had been violated 
since 1962, the lessees, Skaggs, did not file suit until 1969. In affirming the lower court's 
holding that the statute of limitations barred the action related to the lease to the Montgomery 
Ward Store, the Idaho Supreme Court explained: 
In 1962, the Jensens rented space to Montgomery Ward in 
violation of the first leasing agreement. Suit was not commenced, 
however, until 1969. Thus it is evident that more than five years 
elapsed between the time the cause of action accrued and the time 
suit was instituted. The Jensens (lessors) were entitled to rely on 
the statute of limitations as a defense to the Skaggs' (lessees') claim 
since actions in contract must be brought within five years in this 
jurisdiction. See also Toellner v. McGinnis, 55 Wash. 430, 104 P. 
641 (1909) where the Washington Supreme Court held an action 
on a lease covenant was barred after six years even though the 
lease itself was intended to run for fifteen. In view of the length of 
time that Skaggs rested on their rights, it would be inequitable 
in this Court's opinion to allow them to now bring suit. By 
failing to object within a reasonable time after they felt their 
rights were being violated, they ratified and modified the 
restrictive provision, thus vitiating its force. 
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Id., 94 Idaho at 180,484 P.2d at 729 (emphasis added). 
Here, Plaintiffs breach of contract claim alleges that Defendants have been in breach at 
all times for far more than the five-year statute oflimitations. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs did not 
bring suit to enforce their rights within five years of the alleged breaches. By failing to do so, 
they are now barred from bringing those claims by the statute oflimitations. In the words of the 
Idaho Supreme Court, "By failing to object within a reasonable time after they felt their rights 
were being violated, they ratified and modified the restrictive provision[sJ, thus vitiating [their] 
force." Id. (emphasis added).1 
A. The Second Through Tenth Causes Of Action Are Also Barred 
Because Each Cause Of Action Hinges On Claims Occurring More 
Than Five Years Ago. 
The remainder of Plaintiff s claims should be dismissed for the same reason as the breach 
of contract claim. Idaho Code § 5-216 provides that any "action upon any contract, obligation or 
liability founded upon an instrument in writing" must be brought within five years from the time 
the cause of action accrues. All of Plaintiffs causes of action arise from the alleged breach of 
obligations set forth in the Amended Agreements. As set forth above, Plaintiff is barred by the 
statute of limitations from now asserting that those contractual obligations have been breached. 
1 The Skaggs decision makes clear that a breach of contract cause of actions arises from the 
time of the first breach. See also Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 436,871 
P.2d 846, 853 (Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that the statute oflimitations began to run when 
an erroneous transcript "was first delivered" because, "At that time, Mason could have 
brought an action for specific performance") (emphasis added); Hoglan v. First Sec. Bank of 
Idaho, NA., 120 Idaho 682, 819 P.2d 100 (1991) ("An action on a written contract must be 
commenced within five years. I.C. § 5-216. The earliest act which could be considered the 
basis for a breach of contract claim occurred in March of 1983, when First Security stopped 
sending the monthly statements") (emphasis added). 
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For example, the Second Cause of Action for fraudulent transfer alleges that Defendants 
fraudulently transferred assets to avoid paying Plaintiff the money due under the Amended 
Agreements. Given that Plaintiff cannot enforce the alleged obligations under the Amended 
Agreements, Defendants cannot face liability for fraudulent transfer. 
Another example ofa contract-based action is Plaintiffs Tenth Cause of Action for 
"Enforcement of Rights." Defendants presume that this is an attempt to plead a declaratory 
judgment cause of action. That cause of action seeks declaratory relief based on contract 
breaches along the following lines: 
Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security 
Agreement, and Restructure Agreement, Reed is entitled to vote 
the pledged shares of AIA Insurance (and all ancillary rights, 
including, without limitation, to vote the shares to remove the 
board and take all actions related in any way to his right to vote the 
pledged shares), sell that shares of AIA Insurance at public or 
private sale, judicially sell the pledged shares in AIA Insurance, 
entitled to timely receive audited financial statements and financial 
information, and/or seize all of the AIA Insurance and AIA 
Services' commissions in the required Lock Box. When AIA 
Services became in Default, it lost its right to vote the pledged 
shares of AIA Insurance and the right vested exclusively in Reed. 
Second Amended Complaint, ~ 13.2. (emphasis added). 
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Plaintiffs Tenth Cause of Action, like the others, is founded on alleged breaches of the 
written agreement that first occurred over ten years ago, and the cause of action is now barred by 
the statute of limitations. 2 
A cursory review of the causes of action show their dependence and reliance on breaches 
of contract. There are, however, substantial legal defects with the other causes of action which 
will also be briefed next. 
B. Third Cause of Action -- MisrepresentationlFraud. 
LR.C.P. 9(b) provides that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, or violation of civil or 
constitutional rights, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake, or violation of civil or 
constitutional rights shall be stated with particularity." The Idaho courts explain that "[t]he party 
alleging fraud must support the existence of each of the elements of the cause of action for fraud 
by pleading with particularity the factual circumstances constituting fraud." Estes v. Barry, 132 
Idaho 82, 86, 967 P.2d 284,288 (1998). Failure to plead fraud with particularity results in 
dismissal of the fraud cause of action. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 
240, 108 P.3d 380, 387 (2005) (dismissing fraud cause of action where "there were no facts 
alleged which demonstrated Larry's reliance on any representations made to him, which in tum, 
resulted in some injury"); Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 127, 106 
P.3d 449,453 (2005) (dismissing fraud cause of action that contained only "utterly general 
2 Indeed, all of Plaintiffs causes of action are founded on alleged breaches of contract that 
occurred over ten years ago, requiring that every single cause of action be dismissed. This 
brief uses the Second and Tenth causes of action as examples to demonstrate that all causes 
of action rely on the time-barred alleged contractual breaches. Moreover, this brief uses the 
Second and Tenth causes of action as examples because the Third through Ninth Causes of 
action should each be dismissed for independent reasons as set forth below, in addition to 
their reliance on time-barred alleged contractual breaches. 
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averments" directed at fraud and "fail [ ed] to allege anything other than the elements of the prima 
faci e case 0 f fraud."). 
The Ninth Circuit describes the strictures of the nearly identical federal rule as follows: 
Rule 9(b) demands that. .. the circumstances constituting the 
alleged fraud be specific enough to give defendants notice of the 
particular misconduct so that they can defend against the charge 
and not just deny that they have done anything wrong. Averments 
of fraud must be accompanied by the "who, what, when, where, 
and how" of the misconduct charged. A plaintiff must set forth 
more than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction. 
The plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a 
statement, and why it is false. 
Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 
Put differently, the complaint must set forth the "time, place, and specific content of the false 
representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation." Edwards v. 
Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). 
Here, Plaintiff's complaint does not contain any specific allegations of fraud. Plaintiff's 
complaint does not allege even a single specific representation, much less explain the falsity of 
any representations or how Plaintiff relied on any representations to his detriment. The third 
cause of action should, therefore, be dismissed for failure to plead fraud with particularity. 
C. Fourth Cause of Action -- Conversion. 
Plaintiff's conversion cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. Conversion is defined as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over another's 
personal property in denial of or inconsistent with rights therein. Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. 
v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 743, 979 P.2d 605,616 (1999). 
Plaintiff's complaint makes it clear that Plaintiff's relief, if any, lies in a breach of 
contract claim, but not for conversion. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants have taken 
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anything from Plaintiff's possession, but, rather, that Defendants have not paid Plaintiff money 
allegedly due to him under the various contracts cited in Plaintiff's complaint. See Second 
Amended Complaint, ~ 6.2 ("AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman's 
conduct constitutes willful interference with Reed's property and money which should have been 
paid to him, without lawful justification, which deprived Reed ofthe possession of such money 
and/or property.") (emphasis added). 
The failure to pay money due under a contract is actionable in contract, but, as a matter of 
law, does not constitute conversion. See, e.g., South Trust Bank v. Donely, 925 So.2d 934, 942 
(Ala. 2005) ("Donely has alleged that SouthTrust has failed to pay her a debt, and the proper 
action for that claim is a breach-of-contract action, not a conversion action."); Alex Hofrichter, 
PA. v. Zuckerman & Venditti, PA., 710 So.2d 127, 128, n.3 (Fla. App. 1998) ("a mere refusal to 
pay money owed under a contract does not, without more, amount to conversion or civil theft."). 
A cause of action for conversion requires and affirmative act, i.e., that the defendant takes 
property from the plaintiff's possession. See e.g., Peasley Transfer & Storage Co., 132 Idaho at 
743 ("A [conversion] right of action accrues in favor of the owner of property as soon as the 
property is wrongfully taken from his possession or wrongfully converted.") (emphasis added); 
18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 21 ("Some affirmative act on the part ofthe defendant is usually 
regarded as necessary to constitute a conversion ... Even where it results in the loss of the 
property, the failure to perform an act made obligatory by contract will not amount to a 
conversion."). Here, plaintiff alleges that he was not paid funds due to him, not that any property 
has been taken from his possession. 
Plaintiff's remedy, if any, lies in his breach of contract action, and his conversion cause 
of action must be dismissed. 
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D. Fifth Cause of Action -- Alter Ego. 
Plaintiff s Fifth Cause of action -- "Alter Ego" -- is not a cause of action at all, and must 
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As set forth in the 
leading treatise on corporations: 
A claim based on the alter ego theory is not in itself a claim for 
substantive relief, but rather to disregard the corporation as a 
distinct defendant is procedural. A fmding of fact of alter ego, 
standing alone, creates no cause of action. It merely furnishes a 
means for a complainant to reach a second corporation or 
individual upon a cause of action that otherwise would have 
existed only against the first corporation. An attempt to pierce the 
corporate veil is a means of imposing liability on an underlying 
cause of action, such as a tort or breach of contract. 
Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 41.10 (1999). 
Courts consistently hold that "alter ego" is not a cause of action. See, e.g., Local 159, 
342, 343 & 444 v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 185 F.3d 978,985 (9th Cir. 1999) ("A request to 
pierce the corporate veil is only a means of imposing liability for an underlying cause of action 
and is not a cause of action in and of itself."); Gallagher v. McClure Bintliff, 740 S. W.2d 118, 
119-120 (Tex. App. 1987) ("An attempt to pierce the corporate veil, in and of itself, is not a 
cause of action but rather is a means of imposing liability on an underlying cause of action such 
as a tort or breach of contract."); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. 
Brumm, 264 F.Supp.2d 697, 701 (N.D. Ill. 2003) ("Piercing the corporate veil, however, is a 
doctrine to be applied in an underlying cause of action; it is not an action itself."). 
Given that alter ego is not an independent cause of action, Courts routinely dismiss "alter 
ego" causes of action and permit the factual allegations of alter ego to be pled as part of the 
underlying causes of action. See, e.g., Green Atlas Shipping S.A. v. Us., 306 F.Supp.2d 974, 
977 (D. Or. 2003) ("[P]ierced corporate veil is not a separate cause of action and I will dismiss 
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the fifteenth claim but allow the United States to make its alter ego allegations in the context of 
the remaining underlying substantive claims for liability in this action."); Fiber Consultants, Inc. 
v. Fiber Optek Interconnect Corp., 792 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91 (N.Y.A.D. 2005) (dismissing separate 
alter ego cause of action because it is not a separate cause of action, and granting leave to assert 
facts to support alter ego liability as part underlying causes of action). 
Here, even if alter ego were a separate cause of action, the complaint does not state a 
claim for alter ego liability. In general, the stockholders of a corporation are not personally 
liable for corporate obligations, and the corporate veil will be pierced only under limited 
circumstances. "[T]wo requirements for application of the [alter ego] doctrine are (1) that there 
be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and 
the individual no longer exist and (2), that if the acts are treated as those of the corporation an 
inequitable result will follow." Chick v. Tomlinson, 96 Idaho 483, 485, 531 P.2d 573,575 
(1975). "Factors which influence whether the corporate veil will be pierced (and a subsidiary 
deemed an 'alter ego' of the parent) include the obvious under-capitalization of the subsidiary; 
the failure of either the parent or subsidiary to adhere to corporate formalities; and the formation 
of the subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud." Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 845, 761 P.2d 
1169, 1197 (1988). 
Plaintiff does not allege any reason for which the corporate veil should be pierced. 
Rather, he merely asserts that "Because ofthe fraudulent, wrongful and/or inappropriate acts 
and/or omissions of John, Duclos, Freeman and/or other shareholders of AlA Services, the 
corporate veil of AIA Services should be pierced thereby holding John, Duclos, and/or Freeman 
and/or certain shareholders of AIA Services personally liable for all indebtedness to Reed as 
equity requires such action." See Second Amended Complaint, 1 5.2. 
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Thus, Plaintiff asserts that the alter ego theory permits him seek recovery from individual 
shareholders for the contractual obligations of the corporations. Plaintiffs cause of action under 
the alter ego theory is for breach of contract. However, as set forth in Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF 
CORPORATIONS, § 41.85, courts are very reluctant to pierce the corporate veil in contract causes 
of action: 
The alter ego doctrine and its criteria are applicable to impose 
substantive liability whether that liability is in causes of action in 
tort, in contract, or both, although mere breach of contract is 
generally not sufficient to justify a disregard of the corporate 
entity. In other words, courts usually apply more stringent 
standards to piecing the corporate veil in a contract case than they 
do in tort cases. This is because the party seeking relief in a 
contract case is presumed to have voluntarily and knowingly 
entered into an agreement with a corporate entity, and is expected 
to suffer the consequences of the limited liability associated with 
the corporate business form, while this is not the situation in tort 
cases. Further, one who has contracted with a selected party and 
received the promise bargained for should not be allowed to look 
to another merely because he or she is disappointed in the selected 
party's performance. Thus, under contract law, the disappointed 
one may not hold the other liable without additional compelling 
facts. 
Id. at p. 691-93. 
"[A] finding of fraud is an essential element of an alter ego determination in contract 
cases, while no finding of fraud is required in tort cases." Id. at p. 693. This is because, unlike 
in a tort claim, "the injured party in contract cases had the opportunity to select the entity with 
whom he or she contracted .... Accordingly, absent very compelling equitable considerations, 
courts should not rewrite contracts or disturb the allocation of risk the parties have themselves 
established." Id. Two central factors courts consider to determine whether a Plaintiff in a 
contract cause of action should be permitted to pierce the corporate veil are: (1) the sort of 
contract involved -- i.e., small creditors, like consumers, are unlikely to do a full investigation or 
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negotiate guarantees, but a large creditor should be expected to do so; and (2) "is the nature of 
the activity complained of something of which the plaintiff can be considered to have assumed 
the risk." Id. at p. 694. 
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege the fundamental requirements to pierce the corporate veil. 
He does not allege inadequate capitalization, nor does he make (much less with the requisite 
particularity) any allegations of fraud that warrant piercing the corporate veil. Moreover, if ever 
there were a plaintiff that entered into contractual obligations with a corporation with full 
knowledge ofthe risk associated with the contract, it is Plaintiff here. As set forth in Plaintiffs 
own pleadings, Plaintiff "was the founder and majority shareholder of AlA Services." See 
Second Amended Complaint, ~ 2.5. Plaintiff entered into certain contractual obligations (over 
$7.5 million according to Plaintiff) with AIA Insurance and AlA Services, not with any 
individual shareholders and without any individual guarantees. More than anybody else, 
Plaintiff himself was intimately familiar with the financial status of the corporations, the extent 
to which they were fully capitalized, and their ability to pay a $6 million debt. Especially given 
Plaintiffs familiarity with the financial position of AlA Services and AlA Insurance and failure 
to state a claim for fraud, Plaintiff fails to state any basis for alter ego liability or otherwise 
permit him to pierce the corporate veil. 
This case involves no more than a claimed breach of contactual obligations to pay a debt 
and Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action (if one even existed) to pierce the corporate veil. 
E. Sixth Cause of Action -- Equitable Indemnification. 
Plaintiff s cause of action for equitable indemnification fails as a matter of law. 
Equitable indemnification is a tort cause of action that simply does not apply in this contract 
case. Equitable indemnification provides a remedy whereby one tortfeasor seeks indemnity from 
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another tortfeasor. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 283, 285, 858 P.2d 822, 824 (Idaho 
App. 1993) ("An indemnity relationship between tortfeasors exists when the parties share a 
common liability for the same hann"); Miller v. Ellis, 103 Ca1.AppAth 373,379-380, 126 
Ca1.Rptr.2d 667, 672 (2002) ("The doctrine of equitable indemnification allows liability to be 
apportioned between wrongdoers based on their relative culpability. It is premised upon the 
principle that as a matter of fairness, joint tortfeasors should share the burden of discharging the 
legal obligation to the injured party for the damages caused by their mutual negligence."). 
The doctrine of equitable indemnity does not apply unless both parties are jointly liable to 
a third party in tort. See, e.g., 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indemnity, § 20 ("For indemnification implied-in-
law, more an equitable remedy than an action in and of itself, there must be an underlying injury 
sounding in tort, and the party seeking indemnity must have imputed or derivative liability for 
the tortious conduct from which indemnity is sought. ... The doctrine of equitable indemnity 
applies only among defendants who are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff."). 
Plaintiffs cause of action fails for at least two reasons. First, Plaintiff and Defendants 
are not joint tortfeasors in any way, nor does Plaintiff allege that they are. This is yet another 
example of Plaintiff attempting to create a cause of action where, other than his breach of 
contract claim (which, itself, is time-barred), one does not exist. As stated by one court: 
In short, "This is an improper attempt to recast a breach of contract 
cause of action as a tort claim. Nor is there any social policy that 
would demand resort to tort remedies. Without any action 
sounding in tort, there is no basis for a finding of potential joint 
and several liability on the part of [cross-Jdefendant[BTMG], 
thereby precluding a claim for equitable indemnity." 
Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland Medical Group, 143 Ca1.AppAth 1036, 1041-42, 
49 Ca1.Rptr.3d 609, 613 (2006). 
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Second, even if equitable indemnification were an applicable legal theory, an equitable 
indemnification cause of action does not arise until Plaintiff makes payment to the underlying 
injured party. See May Trucking Co. v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 319, 322, 543 
P.2d 1159, 1162 (1975) (explaining that an indemnity cause of action arises at "the time of 
payment or settlement by the indemnitee," and that, "[iJn this case the record is unclear as to 
when, if ever, May Trucking Company paid Farmer for the damage"). Here, Plaintiffs own 
complaint admits that Donna Taylor has yet to be paid: 
8.2 Donna Taylor is the holder of Series A Preferred Shares in 
AIA Services, and such shares were issued to her as a result of a 
dissolution action between her and Reed. Ifnot for AIA Services, 
AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman's fraudulent, 
wrongful and/or inappropriate acts, Donna Taylor's Series A 
Preferred Shares would have been redeemed by AIA Services 
and/or AIA. As of the date of this Second Amended Complaint, 
over $500,000 must be paid to Donna Taylor to redeem her Series 
A Preferred Shares. 
8.3 Reed is entitled to be equitably indemnified by AIA 
Services, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman for any sums owed to 
Donna Taylor because of AIA Services' failure to timely redeem 
her Series A Preferred Shares as required. 
See Second Amended Complaint, ~~ 8.2, 8.3 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs cause of action for equitable indemnification should be dismissed both because 
there is no joint tortfeasor relationship and because any indemnity cause of action has yet to 
anse. 
F. Seventh Cause of Action -- Account StatedIMonies Due. 
Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action -- "Account StatedIMonies Due" -- should be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief rna y be granted. Plaintiff calls this an 
"account stated" cause of action, but Plaintiff s own complaint establishes that his claim does not 
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fit within the elements of the account stated cause of action. Idaho Courts require specific 
elements to establish a cause of action for an account stated: 
An account stated is "a document, a writing, which exhibits 
the state of account between parties and the balance owed one to 
the other, and when assented to, either expressly or impliedly, it 
becomes a new contract. ... [T]he account, in order to constitute a 
contract, should appear to be something more than a mere 
memorandum; it should show upon its face that it was intended to 
be a final settlement up to date, and this should be expressed with 
clearness and certainty." .... The transaction must be understood 
by the parties as a fmal adjustment of the respective demands 
between them and of the amount due. 
Modern Mills, Inc. v. Havens, 112 Idaho 1101, 1105-06, 739 P.2d 400, 404-05 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
A casual perusal of Plaintiffs complaint finds that several of these elements are lacking. 
First, although an account stated cause of action requires a writing, Plaintiff does not allege that 
any writing exists at all, much less a writing that shows "upon its face that it was intended to be a 
final settlement up to date." Id.; see also Kugler v. Northwest Aviation, Inc., 108 Idaho 884, 887, 
702 P.2d 922,925 (Ct. App. 1985) (noting that "[a]n account stated requires a writing," and 
concluding that "the theory of an account stated is inapposite here" because "[n]o such writing 
appears in the record"). 
Moreover, an account stated cause of action requires that the writing demonstrate mutual 
assent between the parties and a "final adjustment of the respective demands between them and 
of the amount due." Modern Mills, 112 Idaho at 1106 (emphasis added). Rather than allege that 
the parties reached a written agreement as to any specific amount due, the complaint alleges that 
the account stated "remains unpaid, along with any others which may have occurred but which 
Reed is unaware of at this time, the dates and exact amount of which will be proven at trial." See 
Second Amended Complaint, ~ 9.2. Plaintiffs complaint makes clear that there is no writing 
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setting forth a specific amount due. Rather, it admits that Reed is not aware of any writing and 
that he is not even aware of the exact amount allegedly due. 
The Sixth Cause of action fails to state a claim for account stated, and must be dismissed. 
G. Seventh Cause of Action -- Unjust Enrichment. 
Plaintiff's unjust enrichment cause of action should be dismissed for several reasons. 
First, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the elements of unjust enrichment. The required elements of an 
unjust enrichment claim are that: "(1) a benefit is conferred upon defendant by plaintiff, (2) 
appreciation by the defendant of the benefit, and (3) acceptance of the benefit under 
circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment 
of the value thereof." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 
917,923 (1999) (emphasis added). 
Here, no benefit has been conferred upon AIA Services, AIA Insurance, or any other 
defendant by Plaintiff. See also Holladay v. Lindsay, 152 P.3d 638, 641 (Ct. App. 2006) ("The 
essence of a cause of action for unjust enrichment is 'the claim that the defendant has been 
enriched by the plaintiff and that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain that benefit 
without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit. "') (emphasis added) (quoting 
Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 666, 619 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1980)). Rather, 
Plaintiff asserts that: 
AIA Services,AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman have 
retained the benefit of their fraudulent, wrongful, improper and/or 
overreaching conduct and/or transfers. 
John and/or anyone or more ofthe other Defendants would be 
unjustly enriched if allowed to retain the benefit of the assets, 
securities, loans, advances and/or other services received through 
ALA Services and/or ALA Insurance, all of which funds should 
have been paid to Reed. 
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See Second Amended Complaint, ~ 10.2 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff does not allege that he conferred a benefit upon Defendants. Rather, he is 
simply alleging that funds "should have been paid to Reed." As is the case with many ofthe 
other causes of action, Plaintiff is attempting to squeeze a simple breach of contract cause of 
action into something that it is not. 
Second, Plaintiff is precluded from bringing an unjust enrichment cause of action because 
Plaintiff alleges that there is a valid contract between the parties governing the Defendants' 
obligations to Plaintiff. (see generally Second Amended Complaint, setting forth the various 
agreements under which Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to payment). The precise issue presented 
here was addressed as follows in Wilhelm v. Johnston, 136 Idaho 145, 152,30 P.3d 300, 307 (Ct. 
App.2001): 
Id. 
A right of recovery in quasi-contract, also known as unjust 
enrichment, occurs where "the defendant has received a benefit 
which would be inequitable to retain at least without compensating 
the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust." ... This doctrine 
may not be appropriately applied in the present case because 9: 
recovery for unjust enrichment is not permissible where there is an 
enforceable express contract between the parties covering the same 
subject matter. ... Here, the existence of an enforceable 
promissory note and deed of trust, which define the parties' rights 
and responsibilities, precludes application ofthe unjust enrichment 
doctrine. 
Just like in Wilhelm, various agreements govern the rights ofthe respective parties in this 
action, and a claim for unjust enrichment is, therefore, precluded. See id.; Mannos v. Moss, 
Idaho _ (February 22,2007) ("where parties have entered into a contract, a claim for unjust 
enrichment will be precluded"); Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 191, 
108 P.3d 332, 338 (2005) ("Because quantum meruit is a species of implied contract, such 
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recovery will not normally lie where there is an express contract governing the relationship of 
the parties."); Iron Eagle Development v. Quality Design Sys., 138 Idaho 487 (2003) ("When 
parties enter into an express contract, a claim based in equity is not allowed because the express 
contract precludes enforcement of equitable claims."). 
H. Eighth Cause of Action -- Constrnctive Trust. 
Plaintiff's cause of action for constructive trust must be dismissed for the same reasons as 
the "alter ego" cause of action. "Constructive trust" is not a cause of action at all, but, rather, a 
remedy. See, e.g., Gulf States Steel, Inc. v. Lipton, 765 F.Supp. 696, 704 (N.D. Ala. 1990) ("In 
fact, the court's research has revealed no case in any jurisdiction that supports GSS' argument 
that constructive trust constitutes a cause of action. Rather, the case law indicates unanimously 
that a constructive trust is a remedy imposed to prevent the enjoyment of a fraud or of a breach 
ofa fiduciary duty."); Stansfield v. Starkey, 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 76 (1990) ("In their third 
amended complaint appellants alleged, as causes of action, a resulting trust and a constructive 
trust. But neither is a cause of action (5 WITKIN, CAL. PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, 
§§ 788-791, pp. 232-235), only a remedy."); Marion v. Benistar, Ltd., 2005 WL 563698, *1 
(E.D. Pa. 2005) ("The claim based upon the assertion of a constructive trust, in Count II, will 
also be dismissed. A constructive trust is a remedy, not an independent cause of action."). 
Like the other improper causes of action, the constructive fraud cause of action should be 
dismissed, leaving Plaintiff with the option of seeking the remedy ifhe prevails on any causes of 
action that would entitled him to the remedy of a constructive trust. See, e.g, Fujisawa 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, 16 F.Supp.2d 941, 952 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("A constructive 
trust is an equitable remedy, not an independent cause of action .... Accordingly, while the 
claim is dismissed, it is understood Fujisawa may attempt to prove a constructive trust is an 
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appropriate equitable remedy should it prevail on other claims."); 3Corn Corp. v. Electronics 
Recovery Specialists, Inc., 104 F.Supp.2d 932,942 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("Therefore, ifplaintiff 
prevails on claims for which constructive trust is an appropriate remedy, it is free to argue that 
such a remedy should be imposed .... Insofar as plaintiff alleges constructive trust as a separate 
cause of action in count IX, that count is dismissed."). 
I. Ninth Cause of Action -- Director Liability. 
Plaintiff s Ninth Cause of Action for "Director Liability" should be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim. As an initial matter, "director liability," just like "alter ego" or "constructive 
trust" is not a cause of action, but rather is a mechanism to hold directors individually liable for 
the actions of a corporation. For that reason alone, the "director liability" cause of action should 
be dismissed. 
Second, Plaintiffs complaint does no more than assert the bald allegation that certain 
directors should be held liable. See Second Amended Complaint, 112.2 ("John, Duclos, and 
Freeman should be held personally liable for all fraudulent, wrongful, improper, overreaching 
transactions, transfers, loans, advances, loan guarantees and fraudulent conveyances which 
occurred during their tenure as member of the Board of Directors and as officers of AIA Services 
and AIA Insurance."). Plaintiffs simple assertion that certain directors are individually liable, 
absent any allegation setting forth a basis under which they should be held liable, does not state a 
claim upon which relief should be granted. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs entire action is a belated attempt to recover under a contract that Plaintiff 
alleges was breached over ten years ago. The entire action is barred by the five year statute of 
limitations applicable to actions based upon "obligation or liability founded upon an instrument 
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in writing." Additionally, most of the remaining causes of action either fail to state a claim 
against Defendants or are not causes of action at all. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS M day of May, 2007. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
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PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
MOTION 
Plaintiff, Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), submits this Response to Defendants AIA 
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance Inc. (collectively "Defendants") LR. C.P. 12(b)( 6) 
Motion ("Motion"). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss (collectively "Motion") for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, 
principally relying on the theory that the I.C. § 5-216 contractual statute of limitations (the 
"Statute") has run, in an effort to preclude the Court from considering the significant evidence 
that the Statute has not run. 
Under Idaho law, motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are disfavored, viewed as 
a potential waste of resources, and contrary to the primary objective of law. Wackerli v. 
Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 404, 353 P.2d 782 (1960). Granting Defendants' Motion when this 
Court has already been presented evidence contradicting the legal assertions in Defendants' 
Motion 'would fly in the face of the Idaho policy disfavoring such motions. 
Reed Taylor's Response is based upon all of the pleadings filed to date in this action, and 
the testimony and exhibits presented and considered at the March 1, 2007 Preliminary Injunction 
Hearing ("Hearing"). The Court is requested to specifically consider the following to 
demonstrate that Reed Taylor can prove facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to 
relief and to therefore offer evidence in support of his claims: 
1. February 26, 2007 Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Emergency 
Motion; 
2. February 27,2007 - Affidavit of John Taylor; 
3. February 28, 2007 - Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Support of 
his Emergency Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition 
to Motion of John Taylor, AlA Insurance, and AlA Service for Preliminary 
Injunction; 
4. February 28, 2007 - Affidavit of Aimee Gordon; 
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5. Testimony and Exhibits at March 1,2007 Hearing; 
6. March 1, 2007 - Affidavit of Ernie Dantini; 
7. March 12, 2007 - Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Reconsideration of Preliminary Injunction Against Reed J. Taylor; 
8. March 22,2007 - Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion to Compel Audit; 
9. March 28, 2007 - Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion for a Temporary Restraining 
Order seeking restraint of Defendants from taking collateral pledged to Reed 
Taylor to pay attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Defendants; 
10. March 28,2007 - Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order; 
11. April 2, 2007 - Reed Taylor's Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Audit; 
12. April 4, 2007 - Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiff Reed 
Taylor's Motion to Compel Audit; 
13. May 29, 2007 - Affidavit of Paul R. Cressman, Jr. in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion for Protective Order; and 
14. May 29,2007 - Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Opposition to Moti6n to Dismiss. 
Should the Court construe Defendants' Motion as one for summary judgment, Reed 
Taylor objects to the lack of notice and improper noting the Motion. Further, should the Court 
treat this Motion as one for summary judgment, Reed Taylor reserves the right to continue the 
Motion to conduct discovery as provided by I.R.c.P. 56(f). Defendants have to date thwarted 
almost all of Reed Taylor's attempts to conduct discovery. Should the Court find that Reed 
Taylor's pleadings are deficient in any respect, Reed Taylor further requests leave to amend 
pursuant to LR.C.P. 15. Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611, 533 P.2d 730 (1975) (the 
Court dismissed plaintiffs complaint, but allowed him 15 days leave to file an amended 
complaint). 
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Reed Taylor has not waived or given up any of his claims for unpaid interest or principal 
owing by AIA Services pursuant to the August 1, 1995, Promissory Note ("Note") which 
specifies that "the entire balance of all principal and any accrued but unpaid interest shall be due 
and payable on" August 1, 2005. Exhibit A, Hearing. AlA Services, through its actions, 
documents, and the testimony of its Chief Executive Officer and Director, John Taylor, and 
Accounting Manager, Aimee Gordon, have continuously affirmed the obligations owing to Reed 
Taylor pursuant to the Note. 
On every annual financial statement covering the time period from December 31, 1995, 
through December 31, 2006, AIA Services' management has listed the obligation of the 
$6,000,000 Note as a liability on AlA Services' balance sheet as "Obligation to former majority 
common stockholder," or "Obligation to Former Shareholder," in the case of the December 31, 
2006, financial statements. Exhibits AL, AM, AN, AO, AP, AQ, X, AR, AS, and W to the 
Hearing; the December 31, 2006, financial statements attached to AlA Services' Responses to 
Plaintiffs First Request for Production of Documents; and Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Paul R. 
Cressman, Jr. in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Protective Order and Motion 
for Protective Order ("Cressman Affidavit"). 
An examination of the cash flow statements contained within AlA Services' financial 
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See Exhibits U, AM, AN, AO, AP, AQ, X, AR, AS, and W to Hearing, and the AIA Services 
Consolidated Financial Statements for December 31, 2006, attached to AlA Services' Responses 
to Plaintiff s Requests for Production of Documents, Exhibit A to Cressman Affidavit. 
The summaries of AlA Services' Account No. 1951-00-0, pertaining to Reed Taylor's 
Note, provided to Reed Taylor'S attorney, Roderick C. Bond, prior to the commencement of this 
litigation, are also on point. See Exhibit AJ to the Hearing. These summaries detail the 
payments and balances of principal and interest on the Note from January 2, 2002, through 
December 31, 2006, as kept on the books and records of AlA Services. Hearing Transcript 
("Transcript"), p. 120. As testified by both John Taylor and Aimee Gordon, the year end 
December 31, 2006, statement understated the principal sum owing by $307,271. Transcript, 
p. 88; February 28, 2007, Affidavit of Aimee Gordon ("Gordon Affidavit"), ~ 5. Ms. Gordon 
further testified that John Taylor directed her to reverse the $307,271 reduction in the principal 
amount of the Note, bringing the principal sum owing back up to $6,000,000. Gordon Affidavit, 
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AlA Services has continued to make monthly payments of interest to Reed Taylor in 
2007, and after suit was commenced in January 2007. Affidavit of Reed 1. Taylor in Opposition 
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
An additional AlA Services' document evidencing the obligations owing to Reed Taylor 
pursuant to the Note is the AlA Services Term Sheet, provided to Reed Taylor's attorney, 
Roderick C. Bond, prior to commencement of this litigation, which also details yearly payments 
and the balance owing at year end 2006, $6,000,000 in principal and $2,197,114 in interest. 
Exhibit 2 to February 26,2007, Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Emergency Motion. 
AlA Insurance and AIA Services even went so far as to file a UCC Financing Statement 
on February 11, 2002, within five years of the date Reed Taylor's suit was filed, which 
Financing Statement ensured the continuation of Reed Taylor's security interest in "all of 
Debtors' right, title and interest in and to all commissions from the sale of insurance or related 
services received by, or on behalf of or payable to either Debtor or any subsidiaries of either 
Debtor, and any interest thereon." Such continuation filing was made by JoLee Duclos, an 
officer and board member of AIA Insurance, and at least a board member and shareholder of 
AlA Services. Exhibit 2, March 28, 2007, Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order. 
Correspondence from John Taylor further evidences the validity of the continuing 
obligations owing to Reed Taylor by AlA Services pursuant to the Note. In his December 21, 
2006, letter to Attorney Patrick Moran, John Taylor stated: "We acknowledge that Reed Taylor 
has a security interest in AlA Insurance, Inc .... " Exhibit AB, Hearing. 
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In his January 3, 2007, letter to Patrick Moran, John Taylor stated: "If the negotiations 
eventually fail, I fully recognize that Mr. Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate, 
including calling a special shareholders meeting." Exhibit AF, Hearing. Such statement is clear 
evidence that John Taylor understood AlA Services' continuing obligations to Reed Taylor 
under the Note shortly before suit was filed. 
John Taylor's testimony at the Hearing is in accord: 
Q. Take a look at Exhibit A, would you please, in Volume 1. Is that the 
promissory note dated August 1, 1995, in the amount of six thousand 
dollars that remains unpaid to your brother? 
A. It appears to be a copy of the original promissory note. 
Q. And do you agree with the statement contained in Aimee Gordon's 
declaration that the entire principal of$6,000,000 remains owing? 
A. Yes, I do. By Services, yes. 
Q. Do you also agree that in addition to the principal, at least according to her 
calculations, $2,189,614 in accrued interest is also owing as of the end of 
December 31, 2006? 
* * * 
A. I believe that's probably an accurate representation, yes. 
Transcript, pp. 52-53 (Emphasis added.) 
It is also noteworthy that John Taylor testified at the Hearing that he orally modified the 
obligations owing to Reed Taylor in March of 2003. Transcript, pp. 66-68 and 70-71. Although 
Reed Taylor disputes that the transaction was ever modified, John Taylor's testimony affirms the 
existence of the obligations owing to his brother in March 2003. John Taylor further testified 
that "during 2005-2006 we had extensive discussions on restructuring," again affirming the 
validity of the obligations owing to Reed Taylor in 2006. Transcript, p. 71. 
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John Taylor further affirmed the obligations owing to his brother in his October 7, 2005, 
e-mail to Reed Taylor's accountant, Ernie Dantini. Exhibit AI to March 1, 2007, Affidavit of 
Ernie Dantini. In his e-mail, the subject line of which was "Reeds Note," John Taylor made 
numerous statements of material fact affirming the obligations owing to Reed Taylor pursuant to 
the Note: 
I hope that you and he can come up with some specific proposals to modify the 
debt .... 
* * * 
I am willing to explore all options, but will need a written proposal. 
I propose that we enter into a joint cross agreement like the one we almost did 
three years ago. 
Alternatively: I would like to reverse the transaction of 10 years ago. 
* * * 
You need to be aware: 
* * * 
2. Any default will freeze up all money to Reed, Donna (and likely 
me) until all the GGMIT debt is paid. 
* * * 
6. Three of the four investors of Crop know Reed personally. The 
fourth is Jim Becks buddy and the major owner of the brokerage 
house that does the bond deals. If the note is put in default, I will 
not be able to keep any of them on board to do any type of buyout, 
merger or deal with Reed. 
Affidavit of Ernie Dantini, Ex. AI (Emphasis added). 
John Taylor further testified that Reed Taylor was paid $274,729 in interest on the Note 
in 2006. Transcript, p. 121. 
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The record for the Hearing also reflects numerous non-monetary defaults in the 
obligations owing to Reed Taylor, all of which occurred within five years of the filing of this 
action. One of such defaults was the execution of the October 27, 2006, Loan and Security 
Agreement by which AlA Insurance, Inc. guaranteed the $5,200,000 loan to CropUSA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. (with a potential indebtedness of up to $15,000,000). Exhibit R, Injunction 
Hearing; Transcript, pp.84-87. See Sections 4.9 and 4.10 of Amended and Restated Stock 
Pledge Agreement, Exhibit C, Hearing on Preliminary Injunction. 
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
As a preliminary matter, Defendants AIA Services and AlA Insurance have moved to 
dismiss three claims, alter ego, director liability, and account stated / monies due, which they 
lack standing to dismiss. Reed Taylor brings these claims against defendants John Taylor, 
Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman, and/or JoLee Duclos, not Defendants AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance. As a result, Defendants cannot move to dismiss these claims as they do not pertain to 
them. Despite Defendants lack of standing to dismi,ss these claims, Reed Taylor demonstrates in 
this Response that these claims are properly pled. 
Motions to dismiss under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) are viewed with disfavor because of the waste 
of time in case of reversal, and because the primary objective of the law is to obtain a 
determination of claims on the merits. Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 404, 353 P.2d 782 
(1960). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond 
a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle 
him to relief. Id. 
III 
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On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court looks only at the pleadings, 
and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 
Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately 
prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id. at 104. 
"Every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a complaint against a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim." Idaho Comm'n on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 217, 
506 P.2d 112 (1973). 
Idaho has adopted a system of notice pleading. Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 
13 P.3d 857 (2000). A pleading need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. .. " Id., quoting Durstler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 
697 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1985). Under a notice pleading, "a party is no longer slavishly bound to 
stating particular theories in its pleadings." Cook, 135 Idaho at 33. All pleadings shall be so 
construed as to do substantial justice. I.R.c.P. 8(f). 
A. When Questions Exist as to the Accrual or Tolling of the Statute of 
Limitations, a Motion to Dismiss is Improper 
Motions to dismiss complaints on the basis of statutes of limitation are generally viewed 
with disfavor. Singleton v. Forster, 98 Idaho 149, 151, 559 P.2d 765 (1977), citing Duff v. 
Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 527 P.2d 1257 (1974). When questions exist as to whether a cause of 
action has accrued and the Statute has begun to run, dismissal under I.R.c.P. 12(b)(6) is 
improper. Singleton, 98 Idaho at 151. Even accepting, arguendo, Defendants' contention that 
the Statute began to run in 1996, the granting of an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion is inappropriate 
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when reasons exist as to why the Statute may have been tolled. 1 Id. These reasons "need not 
have been expressly set forth in the complaint." Id. No LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion can dismiss a 
complaint for failure to state a claim merely because it does not negate any possible statute of 
limitations defenses. Duff, 96 Idaho at 305. 
1. Reed Taylor's Complaint Alleges That the Breach of Contract Actions 
Accrued in 2005, and It is Not His Obligation to Negate Statute of 
Limitations Defenses In His Complaint 
Defendants acknowledge that all allegations in the Complaint must be presumed true for 
purposes of a Motion to Dismiss. Motion to Dismiss at 1. Reed Taylor's Complaint alieges 
Defendants failed to pay $6,000,000, plus interest, on the Note which came due on August 1, 
2005, in breach of the parties' contractual agreement. 2nd Am. Complaint, ,~ 2.7-2.8. August 1, 
2005, is well within the five-year statute oflimitations. I.C. § 5-216. 
It is not Reed Taylor'S obligation to negate each statute of limitations defense in his 
Complaint. Duff, 96 Idaho at 305. The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint alone are 
enough to resist Defendants' LR.C.P. 12(b )(6) Motion as to the statute of limitations claims. 
Nevertheless, an examination of the record reveals that the Statute has not fUll. For instance, 
Defendant AlA Services paid Reed Taylor interest on the Note in excess of a quarter million 
dollars every year between 2001 and 2006. Exhibits X, AQ, AR, AS, W, and the AlA Services 
Conso Ii dated Financial Statements for December 31, 2006 attached as Exhibit A to Cressman 
I Contrary to the Defendants' contentions, Reed Taylor merely alleges "during all relevant times" or "during a time" 
or "during times" in his Second Amended Complaint pertaining to various breaches of the various agreements.. See 
2nd Am. Complaint, CJCJ 2.15, 2.16, and 2.25-2.28. Reed Taylor's Second Amended Complaint does not allege 
breaches in 1996 and all inferences must be granted Reed Taylor for purposes of Defendants' Motion. As the Idaho 
Supreme Court held in Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611-12, 533 P.2d 730 (1975), for a complaint to be 
dismissed on a I.R.C.P. 12(b)( 6) Motion based upon an affirmative defense, the affirmative defense must "appear on 
the face of the complaint itself" Id. at 611 (Emphasis added). For this reason alone, the Defendants' Motion must 
be denied. Nevertheless, in this Response, Reed Taylor addresses Defendants' wrongful contention that breaches 
occurred as early in 1996. 
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Affidavit. John Taylor has testified to this payment obligation and the sums owing. Transcript, 
pp. 52-53 and 121. Further, Defendants filed a UCC Financing Statement ensuring continuation 
of the security interest on this same debt within five years of Reed Taylor's suit. See Exhibit 2 to 
March 28, 2007, Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order .. Defendants are asking this Court to determine that the Statute had run on Reed Taylor's 
claims in the year 2001, four years before the principal payment was due on the Note, and that 
the Statute was not tolled by the payments and the continuation statement filed by AlA Services.2 
Defendants' argument fails as a matter oflaw. 
2. Even if the Breach of Contract Statute of Limitations Began to Run in 
1996, the Statute of Limitations Has Been Tolled3 
Even accepting Defendants' contention that the Statute began to run in 1996, the granting 
of an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion is improper when reasons exist as to whether the Statute had 
actually accrued or has been tolled. Singleton. 98 Idaho at 151. As cited above, it is not Reed 
Taylor's obligation to negate Defendants' statute of limitations defenses in his Complaint. 
Nevertheless, the argument and legal theories set forth below demonstrate sufficient reasons why 
Reed Taylor's causes of action did not accrue more than five years before suit was filed, or was 
tolled if it had begun to run against some part of Reed Taylor's claim in 1996.4 While Reed 
Taylor does not concede that each of the following legal theories apply to this case, each legal 
theory alone raises sufficient questions to warrant denial of Defendants' Motion as to the statute 
of limitations. 
III 
2 See Footnote 1. 
3 See Footnote 1. 
4 See Footnote 1. 
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First, questions exist as to whether each cause of action accrues separately for each 
installment under the installment contract between Reed Taylor and AlA Services. Where 
money is payable in installments, the Statute begins to run against those installments at the time 
the installment comes due. Cassia Creek Reservoir Co. v. Harper, 91 Idaho 488, 492, 426 P.2d 
209 (1967). The Note entered into by Reed Taylor and Defendants provided that installments of 
interest would be paid monthly, with the principal and any unpaid interest due on August 1, 
2005. Exhibit A, Hearing. Accordingly, while a separate and distinct cause of action may have 
accrued for Reed Taylor upon breach of each installment, the terms of the Note provided that the 
principal, in addition to any accrued but unpaid interest was due on August 1, 2005. In turn, 
Reed Taylor's cause of action for the principal and unpaid interest did not accrue until August 1, 
2005. 
Second, questions exist whether Reed Taylor's cause of action accrued when Reed 
Taylor never accelerated payment pursuant to the acceleration clause in the Note. When an 
acceleration clause in a contract gives the option to declare the entire indebtedness due on default 
in the payment of one installment, the Statute does not begin to run against the entire 
indebtedness until an affirmative election is made to accelerate. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. 
Keith, 58 Idaho 471, 74 P.2d 699 (1937). The Note contains the following remedy should AlA 
Services fail to pay after notice of default and a five day opportunity cure: 
... the entire remaining balance of principal and interest and all interest accrued 
thereon may, at the option of the holder hereof, be declared to be immediately 
due and payable without notice (the "Acceleration") and the lien given to secure 
its payment may be foreclosed. 
Exhibit A, Hearing (Emphasis added). Based upon the optional acceleration clause in the Note, 
Reed Taylor'S cause of action would not have accrued against Defendants until Reed Taylor 
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accelerated the Note and the Defendants were provided the five day opportunity to cure. At no 
time did Reed Taylor exercise his right to accelerate and, accordingly, at no time were the 
Defendants provided an opportunity to cure, prior to the August 1, 2005, maturity date of the 
Note. See May 29,2007, Affidavit of Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor had no right to sue on the Note 
until the earlier of the date of acceleration and failure to cure, or the maturity date of the Note. 
See Galbrath v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912, 915, 655 P.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1998) ("The cause of 
action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when a party may sue another"). 
Therefore, his cause of action did not accrue on the Note, and the Statute did not begin to run 
until August 1, 2005.5 
Third, assuming that the Statue ran as the Defendants contend, questions exist as to 
whether partial payments of interest to Reed Taylor tolled the statute of limitations.6 Idaho law 
provides that the Statute is extended when an obligor makes partial payment of a debt after the 
Note is due, as such partial payment is deemed equivalent to a new promise by the obligor to 
satisfy the debt. I.C. § 5-238; Thomson v. Sunny Ridge Partnership, 118 Idaho 330, 796 P.2d 
539 (1990); Holland Bank v. Brockman et aI., 52 Idaho 324, 324, 14 P.2d 621, 621 (1932) ("By 
the payment of interest, she invited and enjoyed respondent's indulgence, knowingly lulling it 
into a sense of security"). 
In this case, Defendants contend that the Statute began to run in 1996, and it barred Reed 
Taylor's causes of action in 2001.7 Nonetheless, as stated above, Defendants proceeded to pay 
5 Accordingly, Reed Taylor's remedies (including the right to vote the pledged shares in AlA Insurance) under the 
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement also accrued when the principal and interest were due under the 
Note on August 1, 2005, as the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement acts as security for the Note. See 
also Foomote 1. 
6 See Foomote 1. 
7 See Foomote 1. 
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Reed Taylor $311,471 in 2001, $378,487 in 2002, $344,382 in 2003, $279,651 in 2004, 
$322,502 in 2005, and $520,042 in 2006, thereby knowingly lulling Reed Taylor into a sense of 
security. See Holland Bank, 52 Idaho at 324; Exhibits X, AQ, AR, AS, W, Hearing on 
Preliminary Injunction and Exhibit A to Cressman Affidavit. Each of these partial payments is 
deemed the equivalent of a new promise pursuant to § 5-238 of the Idaho Code, and the Statute 
has not run on the obligations owing to Reed Taylor pursuant to the Note.8 
Lastly, Defendants assert as an affirmative defense in their Answer, that Reed Taylor and 
AlA Services orally modified their agreement pursuant to the Note. While Reed Taylor rejects 
this assertion of oral modification, Defendants' Second Affirmative Defense admits AlA 
Services is currently paying interest to Reed Taylor, even if pursuant to these alleged oral 
modifications. Answer at p. 7. ("AlA Services Corporation has paid plaintiff the sum of 
$15,000.00 per month and has assumed responsibility for the other agreed expenses in 
accordance with the modified agreements since they were entered into and plaintiff has accepted 
those payments. None of these defendants is in default of the modified agreements with 
plaintiff'). Regardless of how Defendants try to twist the facts, it is clear, through Defendants' 
own admissions, that they recognize current payment obligations to Reed Taylor, and the Statute 
has not run as to all sums and obligations owed to Reed Taylor. 
While Idaho law does not require that Reed Taylor negate Defendants' claims that the 
Statute has run, Reed Taylor has done just that. With respect to Defendants' assertion that the 
Statute has run on Reed Taylor'S breach of contract claims, Defendants' Motion should be 
8 Along with each new promise, Reed Taylor is entitled to all rights and remedies under the Amended and Restated 
Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended and Restated Security Agreement and Stock Redemption Restructure 
Agreement, e.g., the right to vote the pledged shares, the right to a security interest in the commissions, the right to 
be on AlA Services' board, and the right to receive financial information. See Exhibits B, C, and E, Hearing. 
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denied. 
3. The Contractual Statute of Limitations Does Not Apply to the 
Remaining Causes of Action 
In their Motion, Defendants attempt to piggyback a dismissal of all of Reed Taylor's 
causes of action based upon their claim that the Statute had run on the breach of contract claims. 
This contention by Defendants should be rejected not only because Reed Taylor has definitively 
resisted Defendants' Motion, and Defendants cannot prevail in dismissing the contract claims 
based on the Statute, but because Defendants have misapplied the law as to application of the 
Statute to other claims. See, e.g., Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 99 Idaho 246, 247, 580 P.2d 
849,850 (1978), quoting Hillock v. Idaho Title and Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 450, 126 P. 612, 
616 (1912) (In detennining which statute of limitations applied, the court stated, "The test ... is 
not whether the fraud or mistake occurred in a contract or independently of contract, but the test 
rather is whether the action seeks relief from or on account of fraud or mistake"). The Statute 
only applies when the breach is the cause of action upon which the claim is founded. 
In Hillock, the court held that the fraud statute of limitations applied when material 
misrepresentations were made to a prospective purchaser, who then entered into a contract to buy 
land. Hillock, 22 Idaho at 450. This case is substantially similar in that many of Reed Taylor's 
claims, e.g., fraudulent conveyance, conversion, and fraud, are not premised on Defendants' 
breaches of contract, but on other actions that are unlawful. These causes of action did hot arise 
until after Defendants allege the Statute had run on the breach of contract claim. To conclude 
that the Statute had run as to these claims before they occurred is illogical and not supported by 
law. This Court should follow other Idaho courts in their reluctance to dismiss pursuant to 
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) based upon the running of the statute of limitations, and deny Defendants' 
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Motion.9 
B. Reed Taylor Has Pled Valid Causes of Action for Fraud and Constructive 
Fraud. 
A claim of fraud must be "stated with particularity ... " but "intent, knowledge, and other 
conditions of mind of a person may be averred generally." LR.C.P. 9(b) (emphasis added). 
The Defendants cite cases with facts significantly dissimilar to those before the Court in 
this action. See e.g., Estes v. Barry, l32 Idaho 82,967 P.2d 284 (1998) (failure to plead fraud as 
a specific cause of action); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 141 Idaho 233, 239-40, 108 
P.3d 380 (2005) (dismissal of a fraud claim on summary judgment because "the original 
complaint only generally alleged that Boise Cascade was involved in several false 
statements ... [and] had failed to plead with particularity any of the other required elements ... "); 
Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 127, 106 P.3d 449 (2005) (the 
complaint did "not address representations, falsity, materiality, intent, reliance or injury based 
upon representations"); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(rejecting the argument that the Federal Rule 9(b) should not be applied to a state-law cause of 
action in federal court); Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(dismissal of a "mail fraud" claim because the plaintiff failed to comply the requirements 
necessary for "mail fraud" and had already been provided the chance to amend and declined to 
exercise it). 
III 
9 Defendants only challenge the Fraudulent Conveyance and Enforcement of Rights causes of action based upon 
their assertion that the contract statute of limitations has run. Because Defendants' statute of limitations arguments 
fail, and there are no other challenges to the Fraudulent Conveyance and Enforcement of Rights claims, the Court 
must deny Defendants' Motion as to these claims. 
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In sum, all of the cases cited by the Defendants are not on point and they are not 
analogous to the facts and allegations set forth in Reed Taylor's Second Amended Complaint. 
To successfully bring an action for fraud, a plaintiff must establish the existence of the 
following elements: 
(1) a statement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the 
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the 
hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable 
reliance; and (9) resultant injury. 
Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (holding that misrepresentations 
and discrepancies in corporate financial statements precluded summary judgment in buyer's 
action for fraud). Even representations of a third party conveyed through a defendant or a 
defendant's silence constitutes actionable fraud. Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708,571 P.2d 769 
(1977), overruled by Own v. Boydstun, lO2 Idaho 31, 624 P .2d 413 (1981 ) (overruled on other 
points of law). 
Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive fraud" as an alternative cause of action 
to common law "fraud" and that "constructive fraud" does not require a plaintiff to plead the 
nine elements of common law "fraud." See e.g., McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 371, 353 
P.2d 760 (1960) (Recognizing constructive fraud as an alternative cause of action to fraud and 
that the requirement of pleading and proving all nine elements of fraud "is not the case"); 
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 61,415 P.2d 698 (1966)(a promise to build a house to certain 
standards constitutes "constructive fraud" when the builder failed to do so). 
Moreover, a cause of action under "constructive fraud" is discussed in significant detail 
in numerous treatises (treatises which are frequently followed and cited by the Idaho Supreme 
Court): 
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Constructive fraud is a breach of duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares 
fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive, to violate confidence, or to injure public 
interests. 
Constructive fraud is fraud that arises by operation of law from conduct, which if 
sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage. It is a breach of legal or 
equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declares 
fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate public or private 
confidence, or to injure public interests. The legal duty may arise from a statute, a 
contract, or a trust. 
To establish constructive fraud, it is necessary only to prove acts of fraud. Neither actual 
dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential element. Thus, a party whose 
actions constitute constructive fraud might still have acted in good faith ... 
37 C.J.S. Fraud § 5 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (Emphasis added). 
Constructive fraud is defined as an act done or omitted that amounts to positive fraud, or 
is construed as a fraud by the court because of its detrimental effect upon public interests 
and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or omitted with an 
actual design to perpetrate positive fraud or injury upon other persons. Otherwise stated, 
"constructive fraud" arises by operation of law from a course of conduct which, if 
sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage, irrespective of the 
existence or evidence of actual intent to defraud. Constructive fraud, sometimes called 
legal fraud, is nevertheless fraud, although it rests upon presumption and rests less upon 
furtive intent than does moral or actual fraud. It is presumed from the relation of the 
parties to a transaction or from the circumstances under which it takes place. 
Constructive fraud arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship to another that induces justifiable reliance by the other to his or her 
prejUdice. 
The conscience is not necessarily affected by it. Indeed, it has been said that constructive 
fraud generally involves a mere mistake of fact. It requires neither actual dishonesty nor 
intent to deceive, being a breach of legal or equitable duty that, irrespective of the moral 
guilt of the wrongdoer, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive 
others, to injure public interests, or to violate public or private confidence. In its generic 
sense, constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a 
breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence that results in damage to another. 
Hence, the terms "constructive fraud" and "legal fraud" both connote that in certain 
circumstances one may be charged with the consequences of his words and acts as though 
he has spoken or acted fraudulently, although, properly speaking, his conduct does not 
merit this opprobrium. 
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If there is any distinction to be found between the terms "constructive" and "legal" as 
applied to fraud, it probably amounts to this: Breach of a fiduciary relationship or of a 
contract uberrimae fidei is usually called "constructive fraud," whereas the term "legal 
fraud" is generally used to characterize a misrepresentation made without knowledge of 
its falsity. Constructive fraud may result from reckless and heedless representations, 
although they are not made with a deliberate intent to deceive. 
37 Am. Jr. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 9 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (Emphasis added). 
Reed Taylor's Second Amended Complaint contains specific facts pled to support a cause 
of action pertaining to the Defendants' common law fraud andJor constructive fraud: 
AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, andJor Duclos made statements of fact 
regarding pay, finances, transferCs), loan guarantees, andJor services provided to other 
entities, transactionCs), payment of debts to Reed, andJor rights granted to Reed by AIA 
Services or AIA Insurance, such statements of fact were false; such false statements were 
material; AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos andJor Freeman knew or should 
have known the falsity of such statements; AlA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, 
andJor Freeman intended to induce reliance; Reed was ignorant to the falsity of such 
statements; and Reed relied on such statements; Reed had a right to rely on such 
statements. 
As a result of AlA Services, AlA [Insurance] [sic], John, Duclos andJor Freeman's acts, 
false statements, andJor omissions, Reed was damaged as [a] [sic] consequence or 
proximate result of such acts, false statements, andJor omissions. 
2nd Am. Complaint, " 5.2-5.3 (Emphasis added). Significantly, Reed Taylor specifically pled 
all nine required elements of fraud pertaining to pay, finances, transfers, loan guarantees, andJor 
services provided to other entities, transactions, payment of debts, and rights granted to him. 
Moreover, Reed Taylor "re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained 
in the other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under [fraud]." 2nd Am. Complaint, , 
5.1. 
As noted above, Reed Taylor's Second Amended Complaint alleges substantial facts 
together with all nine elements of fraud as a basis for a cause of action of fraud against the 
Defendants. Because Reed Taylor has pled sufficient facts and the elements necessary for 
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common law fraud, he has also pled facts sufficient for constructive fraud as the burden is 
substantially reduced for constructive fraud. 
Moreover, Reed Taylor incorporated other paragraphs in his Second Amended Complaint 
to support his fraud cause of action. For example, Reed Taylor alleges the following (which 
apply to either common law fraud or constructive fraud): 
Because Reed has not been on the Board as required, all actions taken by AIA Services' 
Board were not properly authorized and, therefore, not ratified by AIA Services; and such 
acts are the personal actions of John, Duclos and/or Freeman during their tenure on the 
Board of AlA Services. 
2nd Am. Complaint, ~ 2.13 (e.g., Reed relied on the representation that he would be a member of 
the board of directors). 
AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman utilized funds that Reed had 
a security interest in to make investments in, transfer assets to, or loan money to, or 
provide services on behalf of John and/or entities operated and/or partially owned by 
John. 
Id., 1 2.17 (e.g., Reed relied on the representation that he would have a security interest in all 
commissions). 
This transaction inappropriately and/or fraudulently transferred $1,510,693 of AIA 
Insurance's funds to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. when such funds should have 
been tendered to Reed ... 
!d., 1 2.25 (e.g., Reed again relying on the fact that he had a valid and perfected security interest 
in all of AIA Insurance and AlA Services' commissions). 
Reed also discovered that John had purchased a parking lot and entered into a lease 
agreement with AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to lease the parking lot from him for 
$1,250 per month. This transaction was also the transfer of funds to John, which should 
have been paid to Reed during a time in which AIA Services was unable to service its 
debt to Reed and was otherwise insolvent. 
Id., ~ 2.26 (e.g., Reed relying on the Defendants' representations that the corporations would be 
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operated in accordance with applicable legal standards). 
Based upon the above-referenced acts, transfers and transactions, together with 
transactions referenced in the foot notes to AlA Services and/or AIA Insurance's 
fmancial statements, there are other unauthorized and inappropriate transfers, loans, 
payments, advances and other actions which occurred during time AlA Services defaults 
and inability to pay Reed ... 
2nd Am. Complaint, , 2.27 (e.g., Reed relying on the fact, or omission thereof, that all available 
sums would be paid on his Note and/or that the corporations would be operated in accordance 
with legal standards). 
John has used AIA Services and AlA [Insurance] [sic] as his personal source of funds 
and/or assets, including, without limitation, acts in which John has transferred assets to 
their name; taken advances that John never paid back; transferred assets and/or funds to 
other entities partially owned or controlled by John ... made transfers and/or entered into 
transactions which benefited John and/or anyone of more of the other defendants; and 
provided services for entities partially owned by John and/or anyone of more of the other 
Defendants without such actions being arms-length transactions ... All of the above acts 
occurred during times in which AIA Services was not current with payments to Reed 
under the Promissory Note, in Default of other provisions, and insolvent. 
Id.,,2.28. 
Reed has a valid security interest in AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance's commissions, 
among other security interests. AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or 
Freeman fraudulently, wrongfully and/or improperly used funds, which should have been 
paid to Reed, for investments, personal use, inappropriate transactions, loans, advances, 
.self-dealing, and/or other wrongful and/or inappropriate purposes. 
Id·,111.2. 
John, Duclos, and Freeman should be held personally liable for all fraudulent, wrongful, 
improper, overreaching transactions, transfers, loans, advances, loan guarantees and 
fraudulent conveyances which occurred during their tenure as members of the Board of 
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All of the above allegations are incorporated by reference into Reed Taylor's fraud cause 
of action and all support a cause of action for fraud or constructive fraud under Idaho law. IO 2nd 
Am. Complaint, 1 5.1. 
Other examples of fraud are set forth in the Affidavit of Reed Taylor and can be easily 
ascertained from the specific facts set forth in the Second Amended Complaint. For example, 
AIA Insurance and AIA Services represented on their financial statements that AIA Insurance 
held an investment in AIA Services worth approximately $1,500,000, when the investment is, 
and was, worthless at all times (representations regarding finances). In addition, John Taylor, as 
Chainnan and President of AIA Insurance and AlA Services, falsely represented that Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc. was being developed on behalf of AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance. 
See John Taylor Affidavit dated February 28, 2007, Ex. A. There are other examples of fraud in 
the Affidavit of Reed Taylor and in the exhibits in the record-all of which fall under the 
representations raised in Reed Taylor's Complaint. 2nd Am. Complaint, 115.1-5.2. 
But most significant is the fact that the Defendants are fully cognizant from Reed 
Taylor's Second Amended Complaint that he is seeking to recover every dollar in cash and 
services which has been the subj ect of fraud. II 
III 
III 
10 Defendants were fully cognizant of the fact that when they filed their Motion that Reed Taylor was preparing a 
Third Amended Complaint for filing with the Court. Reed Taylor will clarify his fraud claims in his Third Amended 
Complaint. Thus, any issues raised by the Defendants regarding pleading will be moot. The Court should note that 
the Defendants never inquired about the status of the Third Amended Complaint prior to filing their Motion. 
II It is noteworthy to note that the Defendants are seeking the dismissal of Reed Taylor's fraud claims at a time in 
which they are thwarting his discovery requests, attacking appropriate subpoenas to AlA Insurance's accountants, 
and taking all possible actions to prevent Reed Taylor from discovering the nature and extent of the fraud at AlA 
Insurance and AlA Services for which other Defendants have unlawfully benefited. 
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C. The Complaint States a Claim for Conversion in Alleging a 
Misappropriation of Corporate Funds and Resources That 'Were Subject to 
Reed Taylor's Security Interest 
Reed Taylor's conversion claim is based upon a number of wrongful acts. First, as set 
forth in ~ 2.25 of the Second Amended Complaint, in the weeks leading up to the filing of this 
action, Reed Taylor discovered that in 2004, AlA Insurance paid $1,510,693 to CropUSA 
Insurance Agency, Inc., an entity in which John Taylor is the single largest shareholder, in 
exchange for preferred stock in AlA Services which was worthless, as AlA Services was 
insolvent, and there were not sufficient assets to pay Reed Taylor, much less preferred 
shareholders. This $1,510,693 payment devalued Reed Taylor's security interest in all of the 
shares of AlA Insurance and unlawfully side-stepped his perfected security interest in the 
$1,510,693 of commissions utilized for the wrongful transaction. Such a payment constitutes 
conversion. Nelson v. Jones, 38 Idaho 664, 224 P. 435, 438 (1924); Western Farm Service, Inc. 
v. Olsen, 151 Wn.2d 645, 90 P.3d 1053 (2004) (when a debtor transfers collateral subject to a 
perfected security interest, the secured party may commence an action against the purchaser for 
conversion). These claims are further supported by the Exhibits at the Hearing. See Exhibit AS, 
Consolidated Financial Statements for Year End December 31, 2004, for AlA Services 
Corporation and subsidiaries, Exhibit AU, Audited Financial Statements of AlA Insurance for 
Years Ending December 31, 2004, and 2005, Note 14, and Exhibit AV, Audited Financial 
Statements for CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. for Years Ending December 31, 2004, and 
2005, Note 11. 
There are at least four other known bases for claiming conversion based on information 
in the record. First, John Taylor drew his salary entirely from AlA Insurance, but spent half his 
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time working for CropUSA. Transcript, pp. 98-99. 
Second, AlA-salaried employees perfonned services for CropUSA. John Taylor testified 
that "eight or nine" AlA Insurance employees "are salaried with AIA, but they perfonn services 
for both [AIA Insurance and CropUSA]." Transcript, p. 96. 
Third, AlA Insurance "provides office space and certain human resource and computer 
processing services to [CropUSA] at no cost under an administrative agreement that expires in 
2008." Exhibit AV, Note 7, Hearing. This claim is further supported by the following statement 
contained in Addendum A to the Administrative Agreement referred to in the immediately prior 
reference note: 
CropUSA shall bear all expenses in connection with services to be rendered by 
AlA in connection with the insurance cooperation of CropUSA, except for the 
following charges, costs, and expenses that will be borne by AlA: 
(a) Human resource and payroll processing related costs; 
(b) Rent on the AIA location at the Lewis Clark Plaza at 111 Main Street, 
Lewiston, Idaho; and 
(c) AlA computer processing costs. 
See Exhibit B to Cressman Affidavit (Emphasis added). All of these costs, including CropUSA's 
rent, are picked up by AlA Insurance without compensation. In addition, the Administrative 
Agreement confinns John Taylor's testimony at the Hearing that CropUSA does not reimburse 
AIA Insurance for any portion of John Taylor'S payroll or benefit costs, although he spends 
approximately half of his time working for CropUSA. 
All of the claims mentioned constitute conversion, because they involve the 
misappropriation of corporate assets for personal benefit. Such actions have historically been 
regarded as conversion. See, e.g., Lussier v. Mau Van Development, Inc., 667 P.2d 804, 814 
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(Hawaii App. 1983). Such misappropriations hanned Reed Taylor's security interest in AlA 
Insurance's stock and other assets, and constitutes "willful interference with Reed's property and 
money" as alleged in the conversion claim. 2nd Am. Complaint, 1 6.2. 
The final known act of conversion is the payment of attorneys' fees and costs by AIA 
Insurance, the sole entity with assets, for the Defendants' in this action. This act of conversion is 
the subject of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, dated March 
28,2007, which is awaiting ruling by the Court. 
Defendants' Motion misinterprets the law of conversion, arguing "[tJhe failure to pay 
money due under a contract is actionable in contract, but, as a matter oflaw, does not constitute 
conversion." Motion at p.10. Reed Taylor's conversion claim is not based solely upon 
Defendants' failure to pay their debts. It lies in the misappropriation of AlA Insurance's 
corporate resources to the detriment of Reed Taylor's security interest in all of AlA Insurance's 
stock and in the other assets of AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor's claims further rely on the 
misappropriation of AIA Insurance and AlA Services' assets for Crop USA Insurance Agency, 
Inc. and that Defendants John Taylor, Duclos and Freeman benefited from such conversion by 
way of their ownership in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.,shares that should be owned and 
held by AlA Insurance,not Defendants John Taylor, Duclos and Freeman. 
D. Reed Taylor Has Successfully Stated Claims for 
Alter Ego, Constructive Trust and Director Liability 
In their Motion, Defendants assert that the Alter Ego, Constructive Trust, and Director 
Liability causes of action must be dismissed because they are not in fact, causes of action. In 
concluding that each of these claims are not separate causes of action, Defendants cite non-Idaho 
authority, including unpublished case law, in support of their assertion that these causes of action 
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should be dismissed. 
These theories are in fact recognized as causes of action. See, e.g., Magic Valley 
Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 849 P.2d 107 (1993) (recognizing alter ego as a 
claim); Brigham Young UniverSity v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 156 P.3d 782 (Utah 2007) 
(recognizing alter ego as a cause of action); Weiss v. Marcus, 124 Cal.Rptr. 297, 51 Cal.App.3d 
590 (1975) (plaintiff could state a cause of action for relief in the form of constructive trust); 
Blankenship v. Citizens National Bank of Lubbock, 449 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tx.Civ.App. 1970) 
(holding that a "constructive trust may arise whenever property is acquired or retained under 
circumstances amounting to fraud") Ong Hing v. Arizona Harness Raceway, Inc. 459 P.2d 107 
(Ariz. App. 1969) (recognizing a cause of action for director liability). Nonetheless, the extent to 
which these causes of action are independent, dependent, or derivative of other causes of action 
has not been defined by Idaho law. When dealing with issues that are undefined by Idaho law, 
the Court should not accept Defendants' recitation of law from other jurisdictions to determine 
whether a claim has been stated. Stewart v. Arrington Const. Co., 92 Idaho 526,531,446 P.2d 
895 (1968) ("The court should be especially reluctant to dismiss on the pleadings where the 
asserted theory of liability is novel or unusual since it is important that such legal theories be 
explored and assayed in the light of actual facts, not a pleader's supposition"). 
In response to an l.R.c.P. 12(b)(6) Motion, it is not Reed Taylor's burden to engage in a 
battle of out-of-state authority and treatise material which demonstrates whether or not he has 
adequately stated a claim. All inferences must be drawn in favor of Reed Taylor, and 
Defendants' claim that these causes of action do not exist in Idaho, must be rejected. 
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Beyond challenging the existence of these causes of action, Defendants assert Reed 
Taylor failed to factually plead claims for relief with respect to alter ego and director liability. 
First, with respect to the alter ego claims against the director-defendants, Reed Taylor has 
alleged sufficient facts to establish the "unity of interest" and "inequitable result" requirements 
of Idaho law. 12 The Complaint repeatedly alleges claims that demonstrate a unity of interest 
between the corporation and individuals, which could lead to an inequitable result if the 
individuals are not held liable for the acts of the corporation. See, e.g., 2nd Am. Complaint at ~~ 
2.13,2.15,2.17,2.19,2.25,2.28,3.2,3.3,4.3,5.2,6.2, 7.2, 8.2, 8.3,9.2,9.3,10.3,11.3, and 
12.2. Further, the record in this case establishes that the corporate entity has been disregarded by 
the director-defendants. See, e.g., Transcript, pp. 66-68 and 70-71 (John Taylor's disregard of 
corporate formalities through his alleged oral modification of obligations owed to Reed Taylor). 
Under Idaho's notice pleading system, these allegations are adequate to state a claim for alter 
ego. 13 
With respect to the director liability claims, Defendants assert that Reed Taylor does 
nothing more than assert bald allegations of director liability in paragraph 12.2 ofthe Complaint. 
Defendants again misinterpret Reed Taylor's pleading obligations. The same allegations in the 
Complaint which support the personal liability of the directors under the alter ego theory, are 
12 For the limited purposes of this Response, Reed Taylor accepts the standards laid out by Defendants for the 
application of the alter ego doctrine. "[T]wo requirements for application of the [alter ego] doctrine are (1) that there 
be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and individuals no long 
exist and (2), that if the acts are treated as those of the corporation an inequitable result will follow." Chick v. 
Tomlinson, 96 Idaho 483, 485, 531 P.2d 573, 574 (1975). "Factors which influence whether the corporate veil will 
be pierced (and a subsidiary deemed an 'alter ego' of the parent) included the obvious under-capitalization of the 
subsidiary; the failure of either the parent or subsidiary to adhere to corporate formalities; and the formation of the 
subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud." Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 845,761 P.2d 1169, 1197 (1988). 
Motion at 12. 
13 Defendants' Motion continues with a two page discussion of how the dictates of a corporate treatise require 
dismissal of Reed Taylor claims. Motion at 13-14. This discussion of how a corporate treatise views alter ego law 
is irrelevant in a LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 
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also sufficient for purposes of the director liability theory. See e.g., 2nd Am. Complaint at ~~ 
2.13,2.15,2.17,2.19,2.25,2.28,3.2,3.3,4.3,5.2,6.2, 7.2,8.2,8.3,9.2,9.3,10.3,11.3, and 
12.2. Further, the director-defendants are liable for participating in the fraud of the corporation, 
as outlined in a preceding section of this brief. VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 334, 109 
P .3d 714 (2005). Accordingly, Reed Taylor has adequately stated a claim for director liability. 
E. Reed Taylor Has Stated a Cause of Action for Equitable 
Indemnification for Sums He Owes to Donna Taylor as a Result 
of AlA Services' Failure to Timely Redeem her Preferred Shares 
Reed Taylor's Complaint sets out a factual scenario in which Reed Taylor, John Taylor, 
Connie Taylor, and Defendants are commonly liable for the same harm, which gives rise to an 
indemnification obligation. 2nd Am. Complaint, ~ 8.2; See also, Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 
283, 285, 858 P.2d 822 (1993). The obligation is further evidenced by the letter agreement 
between AlA Services, John Taylor, Reed Taylor, and Donna Taylor. February 27, 2007 
Affidavit of John R. Taylor, Ex. A. The obligation can be either in tort or through implied 
contractual indemnity, a form of equitable indemnity. See e.g., Bay Dev., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 
50 Ca1.3d 1012, 791 P.2d 290 (1990) (holding "implied contractual indemnity is a form of 
equitable indemnity"). Defendants' conclusive statement in their Motion that "equitable 
indemnification is a tort cause of action that simply does not apply in this contract case" is false. 
See Motion at 14. Reed Taylor is entitled to, and has successfully pled, causes of action in both 
contract and tort, and Defendants' contentions that Reed Taylor's breach of contract claim 
somehow limits his ability to sue in tort is without basis. 
III 
III 
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F. Reed Taylor Has Stated a Claim for Account Stated / Monies Due 
Reed Taylor has adequately stated a claim for relief, as Idaho is a notice pleading state. 
Cook v. Skyline Corp., l35 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857 (2000). Reed Taylor's claim for account 
stated I monies due pertains to the $307,271 John Taylor credited against Reed Taylor's Note, 
and debited against obligations owing by John Taylor to Defendants. This is reflected on the 
account statements, Exhibit AJ, Hearing, which were provided by Defendants to Reed Taylor's 
counsel prior to the initiation of suit. If the transaction has not been reversed, which has been 
contended by John Taylor, John Taylor and Connie Taylor personally owe at least $307,271 to 
Reed Taylor. 
For purposes of an I.R.C.P. l2(b)(6) Motion, the allegations in Reed Taylor's Complaint 
adequately state facts to show an account stated and monies due. 2nd Am. Complaint, "9.1-9.4. 
G. Reed Taylor's Allegations That Majority Corporate Control and 
Shares in AIA Services Were Transferred to John Taylor 
Without Proper Payment States a Claim for Unjust Enrichment 
Contrary to Defendants' assertion that Reed Taylor fails to plead the elements of unjust 
enrichment, and that no benefit was conferred to Defendants, the Complaint alleges that Reed 
Taylor transferred his shares in AlA Services, making John Taylor the majority shareholder, and 
passed control of the company to John Taylor. 2nd Am. Complaint at , 2.5. The Complaint 
further alleges that Reed Taylor was not paid the amount agreed upon for the benefit conferred. 
2nd Am. Complaint at ~2.18. These statements, and all inferences therein, clearly provide a short 
plain statement that Reed Taylor is entitled to relief under the elements of unjust enrichment 
outlined in Defendants' Motion. See Motion at 18, quoting Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. 
Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88 P.2d 917 (1999) (unjust enrichment requires, "(1) a benefit is conferred 
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upon defendant by plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of the benefit, and (3) acceptance 
of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the 
benefit without payment of the value thereof'). 
Second, Defendants make the argument that a claim for unjust enrichment is precluded 
when the parties have an enforceable contract. Motion at 19. Defendants appear to be 
suggesting that Reed Taylor cannot request relief under alternative theories of contract and 
quasi-contract / unjust enrichment. Such is not the case. See I.R.C.P. 8( e )(2); Associates 
Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 733 P.2d 824 ("The first such standard is that, under 
modern pleading practice, a plaintiff may advance alternative theories relating to an alleged set 
offacts. I.R.c.P. 8(e)(2)"). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss must be denied. 
DATED: This 29th day of May, 2007. 
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SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
By: ____ _ 
Roderick C. 
Ned A. n 
Paul R. ressman, Jf. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, Affidavit of 
Reed Taylor in Opposition to Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion, and Affidavit of Paul Cressman in 
Opposition to Defendants' I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion on the following party(s) via the methodes) 
indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 - 13th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Halley 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Attorneys for AIA Services and AIA Insurance 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile - (208) 342-3829 
Signed this 29th day of May, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISB #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
AFFIDA VIT OF REED TAYLOR IN 
Case No.: CV 06-02855 
AFFIDA VIT OF REED TAYLOR IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' AlA 
SERVICES AND AlA INSURANCE'S 
12(b)(6) MOTION 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' OR I GIN l 
12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 ..• . .. . 
I, Reed Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to testify in court, and 
am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. This Affidavit is based upon my personal 
knowledge. 
2. Until December 2006, I was unaware that significant assets of AlA 
Insurance were being used to benefit other entities controlled or owned by John Taylor 
without AIA Insurance or AlA Services receiving appropriate ownership interest or 
compensation. 
3. Since filing my complaint against the Defendants in this action, I have 
continued to receive $7,500 two times each month from AlA Services. In addition, AlA 
Services has continued to pay the salaries for my ranch hand and pilot and pay other 
miscellaneous expenses for me as it has in the past as interest payments. 
4. Every year since I sold my shares in AlA Services, I have received a 1099 
from AlA Services for interest paid to me on my $6,000,000 promissory note. 
5. Prior to August 1, 2005, I had never exercised my right to accelerate 
payment of all principal and interest due under the $6,000,000 promissory note. 
6. At no time through the date of this Affidavit has AlA Insurance, AlA 
Services or any of the Defendants demanded that I release my uee Financing Statement 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State which was filed to protect my security interest in 
the commissions of AlA Services and AlA Insurance. 
7. At no time through the date of this Affidavit did any of the Defendants in 
this action advise me that they were no longer obligated to me under the terms of the 
AFFIDA VII OF REED TAYLOR IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
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$6,000,000 Promissory Note, the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, Amended 
and Restated Stock Pledge. Agreement or Amended and Restated Security Agreement 
because the statute of limitations had run (all of the foregoing agreements are Exhibits A, 
B, C, and E to the Hearing on Preliminary Injunction, respectively). 
8. At no time through the date of this Affidavit did any of the Defendants ask 
me or demand that I release my security interest in the shares pledged to me under the 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
9. Until my attorney Roderick Bond advised me in or about December 2006 
of AlA Insurance's purchase of the preferred shares of AIA Services for over $1,500,000, 
I had no knowledge of any specifics of the transaction or that this money had been 
inappropriately transferred to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. without my consent as 
the creditor with a perfected security interest in the funds. 
10. I relied on the financial statements provided to me over the years that the 
Defendants were lawfully operating AlA Services and AlA Insurance in accordance with 
legal requirements and duties. 
11. John Taylor falsely represented to me in a written letter dated February 27, 
2001, that Crop USA was developed by AlA Insurance. I learned shortly before filing 
my complaint in this action that neither AlA Insurance nor AlA Services has any 
ownership interest in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. I also expended significant time 
and assets assisting to develop Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. under the 
representation that it was part of AlA Insurance or AlA Services. Shortly before filing 
this lawsuit, I ascertained that my brother John Taylor and Connie Taylor owned almost 
40% of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. 
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Finally, John Taylor falsely represented to 
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me that he would be foregoing his salary from AlA Services during certain time periods. 
I found out in late December 2006 or early January 2007 that John Taylor had been paid 
significant compensation during the time in which he represented that he would not take a 
salary. 
12. John Taylor, personally and as Chairman and President of AlA Services 
and AlA Insurance, always represented to me that AlA Services and AlA Insurance were 
being operated properly. At no time did John Taylor or any of the other Defendants 
advise me that funds, assets, personnel, facilities and the like of AlA Insurance and/or 
AlA Services were being improperly utilized for the benefit of other entities which 
neither AlA Services nor AlA Insurance held no beneficial ownership or received no 
compensation. 
13. I relied on representations from John Taylor, Chairman and President of 
AlA Insurance and AlA Services, that Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. was being 
operated for the benefit of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance. Until the weeks prior to 
filing my complaint, I had no knowledge that AlA Insurance and AlA Services owned no 
interest in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. These representations were particularly 
important to me because of the significant sums of money owed to me. 
14. Shortly after October 7, 2005, my accountant, Ernie Dantini, forwarded an 
email to me that was sent to him from John Taylor. In the email sent on October 7, 2005, 
John Taylor discussed various aspects of obligations owed to me and possible events 
which could transpire if! put AlA Insurance into default. John Taylor's October 7, 2005, 
email is attached as Exhibit AI to the March 1, 2007, Affidavit of Ernie Dantini. I relied 
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on John Taylor's representations (personally and as Chairman and CEO of AlA Services 
and AlA Insurance) that my rights under the various agreements were intact. 
15. I relied on the fact AlA Services and AlA Insurance were paying interest 
payments to me that their obligations under the Promissory Note, Amended and Restated 
Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended and Restated Security Agreement, and Stock 
Redemption Restructure Agreement were intact and enforceable against them by the 
terms of the foregoing agreements. 
16. Global Travel was formerly a tenant of AlA Insurance in the Lewis-Clark 
Plaza Office Building. In the past few weeks, I noticed that Global Travel has now 
moved into a building owned by John Taylor. To my knowledge, there is not a new 
tenant to replace Global Travel and every dollar of rental income is important to AlA 
Insurance. At no point in time through the date of this Affidavit did any of the 
Defendants ask for my authorization or consent to transfer a paying tenant of AlA 
Insurance or AlA Services to a building owned by John Taylor. 
DATED: This 28th day of May, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of May, 2007. 
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j~<s~ 
Notary Public for the S1;ate of Idaho 
Residing at: Lew ~



























JONATHAN D. HALLY 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Idaho State Bar No. 4979 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 07-00208 
DEFENDANT CONNIE TAYLOR'S 
JOINDER IN MOTION TO DISMISS 
FILED BY AlA SERVICES 
CORPORATION AND AlA 
INSURANCE, INC. 
COMES NOW the defendant Connie Taylor, by and through her attorney of record, Jonathan 
Hally of the law firm of Clark and Feeney, and hereby joins in the Motion to Dismiss filed by AlA 
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. Further defendant Connie Taylor moves for dismissal 
DEFENDANT CONNIE TAYLOR'S JOINDER IN MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY AlA SERVICES 
26 CORPORATION AND AlA INSURANCE, INC.-1 
LA W OFFICEs OF 7// 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 



























DATED this 30th day of May, 2007. 
CLARK and FEENEY 
an D. Hally, an associate of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Connie W. Taylor 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of May, 2007, I caused to be served a true and 

























Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith and Cannon 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for Reed Taylor 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Ave., Ste. 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104 
Attorneys for Reed Taylor 
Michael McNichols 
Clements, Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
PO Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for R. John Taylor 
David A. Gittins 
Law Offices of David A. Gittins 
843 7th Street 
PO Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorneys for Duclos and Freeman 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise,ID 83701-1617 
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RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR, 
individually and the community property 
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN, 
a single person; and JOLEE DUCLOS, 
a single person, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor submits this Third Amended Complaint against the 
Defendants alleging as follows: 
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1 7J11 
ORIGIN l 
I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1.1 Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed") is a single person and a resident of 
Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
1.2 Defendant AlA Services Corporation ("AlA Services") is an Idaho 
corporation with its principal place of business located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
1.3 Defendant AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AlA Insurance") is an Idaho 
corporation with its principal place of business is located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. AlA Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary of AlA Services. 
1.4 Defendants R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor, were husband and wife 
during most of the relevant times (collectively "John") and are residents of Lewiston, 
Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
1.5 Defendant JoLee Duclos ("Duclos") IS a single person residing Il1 
Clarkston, Washington. 
1.6 Defendants Bryan Freeman ("Freeman") is a single person residing in 
Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
1.7 The District Court has jurisdiction over thi s matter under I.C. § 1-705. 
1.8 Venue is proper in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez 
Perce County pursuant to I.C. § 5-404. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 R. John Taylor is, and was at all relevant times, an officer and director of 
AIA Services and AlA Insurance. John is the majority shareholder in AIA Services. 
1/1 
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2.2 R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor were divorced through an Interlocutory 
Decree filed on December 16, 2005, under which only a portion of their community 
assets were divided and other property remains undivided. This action includes, but is 
not limited to, transactions, debts, claims, and/or causes of action which accrued prior to 
R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor's dissolution and property subject to their dissolution, 
and all community property subject to their dissolution. R. John Taylor's actions were 
taken on behalf of himself and his marital community. All references to "John" in this 
Complaint are for claims, acts, omissions and liabilities incurred by R. John Taylor on 
behalf of the marital community ofR. John Taylor and Connie Taylor, together with their 
community property, whether divided or not by the December 16, 2005, dissolution 
decree. Connie Taylor is named as a party in this action for her derivative liability by 
virtue of her marriage to R. John Taylor and her interest in the community property of the 
marriage all of which is subject to liability for the allegations in this Complaint of the 
acts, omissions, and conduct ofR. John Taylor. 
2.3 Duclos is, and was at all relevant times, an officer and director of AIA 
Services and AlA Insurance. Duclos is a shareholder in AlA Services. 
2.4 Freeman is, and was at all relevant times, a director of AlA Services and 
AlA Insurance. Freeman is a shareholder in AIA Services. 
2.5 Reed was the founder and majority shareholder of AlA Services. In 1995, 
John desired to redeem Reed's 613,494 shares of common stock in AIA Services through 
a stock redemption agreement. Upon the closing of the transaction of AlA Services' 
redemption of Reed's shares, John became the majority shareholder in AlA Services. 
III 
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2.6 AIA Insurance, a subsidiary of AIA Services, is wholly owned by AlA 
Services and where virtually all of AlA Services' revenues are derived. AlA Insurance is 
lessee of the office building located at III Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho. 
2.7 On or about July 22, 1995, AIA Services and Reed entered into a Stock 
Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement. Under the 
terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement and related agreements, AlA Services agreed 
to execute promissory note to timely pay Reed $1,500,000 Million in 90 days ("Down 
Payment Note") and $6,000,000, plus accrued interest due and payable monthly at the 
rate of 814% per annum ("Promissory Note"). 
2.8 The Promissory Note was executed by John on behalf of AlA Services on 
or about August 1, 1995. Under the terms of the Promissory Note, AlA Services was 
required to timely pay all accrued interest monthly to Reed and the principal amount of 
$6 Million was due and payable on or before August 1, 2005. 
2.9 Under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, AlA Services and 
AIA Insurance also agreed to contemporaneously execute a Security Agreement and 
Stock Pledge Agreement, among other agreements and documents. The Stock 
Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement were all 
either authorized by the Board of Directors of AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance and/or 
approved by a shareholder vote. 
2.10 When AIA Services was unable to comply with the Stock Redemption 
Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement, John (on behalf of AlA 
Services) entered into negotiations with Reed regarding restructuring the obligations. In 
1996, AIA Services, AlA Insurance and Reed agreed to modify the Stock Redemption 
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Agreement and executed the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement ("Restructure 
Agreement"). Contemporaneously with the execution of the Restructure Agreement, the 
parties executed an Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement") and an Amended and Restated Security Agreement ("Amended 
Security Agreement"). The Down Payment Note remained unpaid at this time and AIA 
Services was in default. 
2.11 Under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, the terms of the 
Promissory Note remained unchanged and were not modified (including the $6,000,000 
principal amount, due date, and required monthly interest payments). Under the terms of 
the Amended Security Agreement, Reed received a security interest in all of AIA 
Services and AlA Insurance's commissions and AIA Services and AlA Insurance were 
required to have a Lock Box for all commissions for the benefit of Reed. 
2.12 Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AlA Services 
pledged all the outstanding shares in AlA Insurance to Reed as partial security for AIA 
Services' indebtedness to Reed under the agreements. Under the terms of the Amended 
Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA Services' failure to timely pay Reed interest or principal 
under the Promissory Note or Down Payment Note constituted an Event of Default. In an 
Event of Default for failure to timely pay interest or principal under the Promissory Note, 
AlA Services' insolvency, or AlA Services' failure to maintain the required Lock Box 
(among other Events of Default), AlA Services right to vote the pledged shares of AlA 
Insurance ceased and terminated and vested exclusively in Reed. 
2.13 Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Reed was 
required to be a member of the board of directors of AlA Services until Reed was paid in 
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full or sufficient security was posted to ensure the payment of the Promissory Note. AlA 
Services never posted bonds or other security for the payment of the Promissory Note. In 
excess of six years, AlA Services, John, Duclos and/or Freeman have intentionally 
refused to appoint Reed to the Board as required. Despite Reed's demands and AlA 
Services' contractual obligations to keep Reed on the Board, AIA Services, John, Duclos 
and/or Freeman have refused to appoint Reed to the Board of Directors of AIA Services 
as required. Because Reed has not been on the Board as required, all actions taken by 
AIA Services' Board were not properly authorized and, therefore, not ratified by AIA 
Services; and such acts are the personal actions of John, Duclos and/or Freeman during 
their tenure on the Board of AlA Services. 
2.14 Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AlA Services agreed to not 
loan money to any affiliate other than a wholly owned subsidiary. AIA Services has 
loaned money to or provided other services or benefits to affiliates and other parties in 
violation of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and such loans or benefits were made 
during times in which John, Duclos and Freeman were Board members. 
2.15 During all relevant times, Reed was the largest and only significant 
creditor of AIA Services. Because AlA Services has failed to timely and properly pay 
Reed as required during all relevant times, John, Duclos and/or Freeman owe Reed 
special obligations because of his status as AlA Services' largest creditor. 
2.16 During all relevant times, the value of AlA Services was less than the 
aggregate amount of its debts, which constitutes AIA Services' insolvency. During all 
relevant times, AIA Services was in default of various provisions of the agreements with 
Reed, insolvent and/or unable to timely pay its debts to Reed. During all relevant times, 
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AIA Services has failed to comply with the terms of the Promissory Note. 
2.17 Instead of timely paying Reed as required, AIA Services, AlA Insurance, 
John, Duclos, and/or Freeman utilized funds that Reed had a security interest in to make 
investments in, transfer assets to, or loan money to, or provide services on behalf of John 
and/or entities operated and/or partially owned by John. 
2.18 On or about December 12, 2006, Reed provided AIA Services written 
notice of default under various provisions of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement, including, without limitation, 
AlA Services' failure to pay principal and interest due under the Promissory Note, failure 
to maintain the Lock Box, loaning money to non-wholly owned subsidiaries (including 
guaranteeing the $15 Million revolving line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency, 
Inc.), failure to provide and timely provide all required fmancial information, among 
other defaults. AIA Services and AIA Insurance have failed to timely cure the defaults 
and all applicable cure periods have expired. As of the date of this Second Amended 
Complaint, the principal owed to Reed under the Promissory Note of $6,000,000, plus 
accrued interest of over $2,000,000 had not been paid in full as required. 
2.19 Despite Reed's demands, AlA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Freeman, 
and/or Duclos have failed to comply with the terms of the Restructure Agreement, 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement. Under the 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, the right to vote all of AlA Insurance's shares ceased 
and terminated for AlA Services and became vested in Reed when AlA Services failed to 
timely pay the required monthly interest payments due under the Promissory Note and its 
subsequent failure to pay the $6,000,000 principal due under the Promissory Note on 
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August 1, 2005, as well as when AlA Services committed other Defaults under the 
various agreements. AlA Services was in default long before Reed demanded to exercise 
his right to hold a special shareholder meeting to vote the shares to appoint a new board 
of directors for AIA Insurance. 
2.20 On December 12, 2006, Reed timely provided notice of his demand for a 
special shareholder meeting of AIA Insurance for the purpose of removing and 
appointing new board members on December 26, 2006. AlA Services, AlA Insurance, 
John, Duclos and/or Freeman refused to comply with Reed's demand for a special 
shareholder meeting by representing that AlA Insurance's offices were closed on 
December 26, 2006. 
2.21 Through a letter dated January 3,2007, John stated "I fully recognize that 
[Reed] Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate, including calling a special 
shareholders meeting." 
2.22 On or about January 25, 2007, Reed hand delivered another demand for a 
special shareholder meeting for the removal and appointment of the board of directors for 
February 5, 2007, pursuant to his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
Through a letter from Duclos, AlA Insurance refused Reed's request and denied that he 
had the right to call a meeting to vote the AlA shares. Despite Reed's demands, AIA 
Insurance refused to hold a special shareholder meeting. 
2.23 Despite Reed's demands, AIA Services and AlA Insurance failed to cure 
the numerous Defaults under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement, among other obligations (as 
described above). Through the date of this Second Amended Complaint, AIA Services 
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and AIA Insurance's Defaults were not timely cured and they remained in Default. 
2.24 On February 22, 2007, Reed exercised his right to vote the pledged shares 
by executing a Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder Meeting of AlA Insurance 
removing John, Duclos and Freeman from the Board of Directors and appointed himself 
the sole Board Member, pursuant to his right to vote the pledged shares under the 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. Because AIA Services' right to vote the pledged 
shares had ceased and terminated when it became in Default and failed to cure such 
Defaults, the right to vote the pledged shares in AIA Insurance vested exclusively in 
Reed and he exercised his right to vote the pledged shares pursuant to the Amended 
Stock Pledge Agreement and the Articles of Incorporation of AIA Insurance. Because 
the shares pledged to Reed account for all the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance, Reed 
had the authority to waive the notice requirement, notice period, and the formality of 
holding a shareholder meeting. 
2.25 In the weeks leading up to the filing of this action, Reed discovered that 
more than one transfer of assets occurred during the time in which AlA Services had 
failed to service its debt to Reed. In 2004, AIA Insurance paid $1,510,693 to purchase 
Series C Preferred Shares in AIA Services from Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., an 
entity in which John was the single largest shareholder (John holds approximately 40% of 
the outstanding shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.). This transaction 
inappropriately and/or fraudulently transferred $1,510,693 of AIA Insurance's funds to 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. when such funds should have been tendered to Reed 
and/or used to pay the holder of the Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services. This 
$1,510,693 transfer occurred at a time in which AlA Services was insolvent and when it 
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was in Default on the monthly payments of interest due to Reed under the Promissory 
Note. This $1,510,693 transfer also occuned at the same time that AlA Services' 401(k) 
Plan (the "Plan") held over $750,000 in Prefened C Shares in AIA Services. No shares 
were purchased or redeemed from the Plan, even though John and Duclos were the Co-
Trustees of the Plan at the time of the transfer. 
2.26 Reed also discovered that John had purchased a parking lot and entered 
into a lease agreement with AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance to lease the parking lot 
from him for $1,250 per month. This transaction was also the transfer of funds to John, 
funds which should have been paid to Reed during a time in which AlA Services was 
unable to service its debt to Reed and was otherwise insolvent. The parking lot is not 
even utilized by AIA Insurance or AIA Services. There are other transfers and/or 
transactions which Reed will itemize and detail at trial. 
2.27 Based upon the above-referenced acts, transfers and transactions, together 
with transactions referenced in the foot notes to AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance's 
financial statements, there are other unauthorized and inappropriate transfers, loans, 
payments, advances and other actions which occuned during times AIA Services defaults 
and inability to timely pay Reed and at times in which AIA Services was insolvent. 
Upon information and belief, Reed believes that forensic accounting and further scrutiny 
of AIA Insurance and AlA Services books and records will reveal additional improper 
activities. 
2.28 John has used AIA Services and AlA as his personal source of funds 
and/or assets, including, without limitation, acts in which John has transfened assets to 
their name; taken advances that John never paid back; transfened assets and/or funds to 
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other entities partially owned or controlled by John; entered into transactions which 
constitute a violation of AIA Services' Articles of Incorporation; made transfers and/or 
entered into transactions which benefited John and/or anyone or more of the other 
Defendants; and provided services for entities partially owned by John and/or anyone or 
more of the other Defendants without such actions being arms-length transactions. The 
above acts occurred when John, Duclos, and Freeman were directors and/or officers of 
AIA Services and AIA Insurance. All of the above acts occurred during times in which 
AIA Services was not current with payments to Reed under the Promissory Note, in 
Default of other provisions, and insolvent. 
2.29 On February 22, 2007 (after executing the Consent in Lieu of Special 
Shareholder Meeting), Reed executed a Consent in Lieu of Board Meeting to terminate 
all officers, the employment of John, authorize the change of locks, and take such other 
actions deemed appropriate. When Reed attempted to take action in accordance with the 
Consents described above, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman 
refused to abide by the Consents. 
2.30 Donna Taylor, the holder of the Series A Preferred Shares in AlA 
Services, subordinated all of her rights to payment of the redemption of her shares in 
favor ofthe Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor. 
III. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACHES OF CONTRACT 
3.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
3.2 AlA Services, AIA Insurance and/or John's acts and/or omissions and 
failure to pay Reed the amounts owed and/or comply with the Promissory Note, 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and Restructure 
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Agreement constitute a breach of their contractual obligations owed to Reed. AIA 
Services, AlA Insurance, and/or John's acts and/or omissions constitute the breach of 
obligations owed to Reed under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement, Restructure Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and monies owed to 
Reed. 
3.3 As a result of AlA Services, AlA Insurance and/or John's acts and/or 
omissions which constitute numerous breaches of contractual obligations, Reed has 
suffered and is entitled to damages of $6,000,000, plus accrued interest in excess of 
$2,000,000, in an exact amount to be determined at trial to be allocated between the 
defendants as the evidence and claims show at trial. In addition, Reed is entitled to an 
award of attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-12l. 
IV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION-FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS 
4.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
4.2 The Defendants' actions constitute fraudulent transfers and/or 
conveyances under I.e. § 55-901, et seq. and/or the common Jaw doctrine of Fraudulent 
Conveyances. 
4.3 As a result of John, Duclos and/or Freeman's participation in the 
fraudulent transfers, John, Duclos and/or Freeman should be personally liable for all 
fraudulent transfers, plus accrued interest, in an amount to be proved at trial. All 
fraudulent transfers should be avoided and/or rescinded, and all assets placed III a 
constructive trust for the benefit of Reed. 
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V. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION-MISREPRESENTATIONS/FRAUD 
5.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
5.2 AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, and/or Duclos made 
statements of fact regarding pay, finances, transfer(s), loan guarantees, and/or services 
provided to other entities, transaction(s), payment of debts to Reed, and/or rights granted 
to Reed by AIA Services or AIA Insurance; such statements of fact were false; such false 
statements were material; AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman 
knew or should have known the falsity of such statements; AlA Services, AlA Insurance, 
John, Duclos and/or Freeman intended to induce reliance; Reed was ignorant to the 
falsity of such statements; and Reed relied on such statements; Reed had a right to rely on 
such false statements. 
5.3 As a result of AlA Services, AlA, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman's acts, 
false statements, and/or omissions, Reed was damaged as consequence or proximate 
result of such acts, false statements, and/or omissions. 
VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONVERSION 
6.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
6.2 AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman's conduct 
constitutes the willful interference with Reed's property and money which should have 
been paid to him, without lawful justification, which deprived Reed of the possession of 
such money and/or property. 
1// 
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6.3 As a result of the AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or 
Freeman's acts and/or conduct, Reed has been severely damaged and is entitled to 
damages proven at trial. 
VII. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ALTER EGO 
7.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
7.2 Because of the fraudulent, wrongful and/or inappropriate acts and/or 
omissions of John, Duclos, Freeman and/or other shareholders of AlA Services, the 
corporate veil of AlA Services should be pierced thereby holding John, Duclos, and/or 
Freeman and/or certain shareholders of AIA Services personally liable for all 
indebtedness to Reed as equity requires such action. 
VIII. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION-EQUITABLE INDEMNIFICATION 
8.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
8.2 Donna Taylor is the holder of Series A Preferred Shares in AlA Services, 
and such shares were issued to her as a result of a dissolution action between her and 
Reed. If not for AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman's 
fraudulent, wrongful and/or inappropriate acts, Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares 
would have been redeemed by AlA Services and/or AIA. As of the date of this Second 
Amended Complaint, over $500,000 must be paid to Donna Taylor to redeem her Series 
A Preferred Shares. 
8.3 Reed is entitled to be equitably indemnified by AIA Services, John, 
Duclos and/or Freeman for any sums owed to DOlma Taylor because of AlA Services' 
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failure to timely redeem her Series A Preferred Shares as required. 
IX. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ACCOUNT STATEDIMONIES DUE 
9.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
9.2 In or about 2002 or 2003, John owed AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance 
at least $307,271. In order to extinguish John's liabilities to AlA Services and/or AlA 
Insurance, John debited Reed's Promissory Note with a payment of at least $307,271 and 
credited John's indebtedness with a payment of at least $307,271. John did not obtain 
Reed's approval or consent to transfer funds between John's indebtedness and Reed's 
Promissory Note and John has not tendered payment of these funds to Reed. This debt 
constitutes a personal loan from Reed to John. This account stated andlor debt remains 
unpaid, along with any others which may have occurred but which Reed is unaware of at 
this time, the dates and exact amount of which will be proven at trial. 
9.3 Reed is entitled to the payment of all amounts owed by John as a result of 
all transfers between Reed's Promissory Note and John indebtedness from AlA Services 
and/or AlA Insurance. Reed is also entitled to pre-judgment interest on all amounts owed 
to him by John for all such accounts stated and/or debts from the date of such transfers 
until payment in full is made to Reed. 
9.4 As a direct and/or proximate result of John's acts and/or omissions, John 
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X. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
10.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
10.2 AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman have retained 
the benefit of their fraudulent, wrongful, improper and/or overreaching conduct and/or 
transfers. 
10.3 John and/or anyone or more of the other Defendants would be unjustly 
enriched if allowed to retain the benefit of the assets, securities, loans, advances and/or 
other services received through AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, all of which funds 
should have been paid to Reed. 
XI. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
11.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
11.2 Reed has a valid security interest in AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's 
commissions, among other security interests. AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos 
and/or Freeman fraudulently, wrongfully and/or improperly used funds, which should 
have been paid to Reed, for investments, personal use, inappropriate transactions, loans, 
advances, self-dealing, and/or other wrongful and/or inappropriate purposes. 
11.3 AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman's acts and/or 
omissions resulted in John, Duclos and/or Freeman's acquisition of money, securities 
and/or services which should have been paid to Reed but through their fraud, 
misrepresentation(s), bad faith, and/or overreaching activities; and AlA Services, John, 
Duclos, Freeman, and/or other entities' retention of the money, investments, securities 
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and property would be unjust. 
11.4 Reed requests the imposition of a constructive trust for his benefit to 
recover the proceeds of all such fraudulent, overreaching, improper, self-dealing, 
wrongful andJor inappropriate transfers, acts andJor omissions. 
XII. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION-DIRECTOR LIABILITY 
12.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
12.2 John, Duclos and Freeman should be held personally liable for all 
fraudulent, wrongful, improper, overreaching transactions, transfers, loans, advances, 
loan guarantees and fraudulent conveyances which occurred during their tenure as 
member of the Board of Directors and as officers of AlA Service and AIA Insurance. 
XIII. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS 
13.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
13.2 Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security 
Agreement, and Restructure Agreement, Reed is entitled to vote the pledged shares of 
AIA Insurance (and all ancillary rights, including, without limitation, to vote the shares to 
remove the board and take all actions related in any way to his right to vote the pledged 
shares), sell the shares of AlA Insurance at public or private sale, judicially sell the 
pledged shares in AIA Insurance, entitled to timely receive audited financial statements 
and financial information, andJor seize all of the AlA Insurance and AlA Services' 
commissions in the required Lock Box. When AlA Services became in Default, it lost its 
right to vote the pledged shares of AlA Insurance and the right vested exclusively in 
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT - 17 
730 
Reed. 
13.3 Despite Reed's demands for AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos 
andior Freeman to comply with the provisions in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, 
Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement, AlA Services, AIA Insurance, 
John, Duclos andior Freeman have refused to comply. Reed is entitled to the relief 
afforded to him or reasonably contemplated under the foregoing agreements and such 
other rights, remedies andior relief as may be available under Idaho Code, including, 
without limitation, any action or order authorized under I.e. § 30-1-701 et seq. andior 
Chapter 9 of Title 29 under Idaho Code. 
13.4 Reed is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred, at or 
before trial, in enforcing any provision of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, 
Amended Security Agreement, andior Restructure Agreement for relief sought before or 
at trial. 
XIV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Without waiving any claims, rights andior remedies under any of the above-
referenced agreements, Reed respectfully requests the following relief: 
14.1 For a judgment against AIA Services for the principal of $6,000,000, plus 
accrued pre-jUdgment interest in excess of $2,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at 
trial. 
14.2 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining any of the 
Defendants from preventing Reed from exercising his right under the Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement to vote the pledged shares in AlA Insurance and taking any ancillary 
actions which relate in any way to voting the pledged shares, including, without 
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limitation, removing the board of directors of AlA Insurance and appointing a revised 
board and such other actions he deems appropriate in his sole discretion as the exclusive 
person entitled to vote all the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance. 
14.3 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining any of the 
Defendants from interfering with the actions taken pursuant to the February 22, 2007, 
Consent in Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance and the actions 
taken pursuant to the February 22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Meeting of Board of 
Directors of AIA Insurance. 
14.4 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants and 
any entity owned, partially owned or operated by anyone or more of them from 
interfering with, disturbing, and transferring any of AlA insurance's customers, contracts, 
agreements and business. 
14.5 Until such time that Reed Taylor's vote of the pledged shares is honored 
and he is permitted to operate AlA Insurance, Reed Taylor requests a preliminary and 
permanent injunction against the Defendants as follows: 
(a) Enjoining the Defendants from utilizing, transferring or disposing of 
any funds, assets, labor, facilities or services of AIA Insurance for any 
other person, entity or business, unless such transactions are arms-
length and payment is received by AlA Insurance prior to providing 
such funds, assets, labor, facilities or services (e.g., no credit 
arrangements for such activities). 
(b) Enjoining the Defendants from disposing of, usmg, transferring or 
utilizing any of the funds received from the lawsuit entitled In re: 
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Universe Liquidator Grain Growers Trust, et a1. v. Idaho Department 
of Insurance aJkla GGMIT suit. All funds from the foregoing should 
be held in trust until further notice from the Court. 
(c) Enjoining the Defendants from negotiating or entering into any loans, 
credit arrangements, credit facilities, or borrowing any funds under 
any loan, line-of-credit, credit facility, open account and the like for 
which AlA Insurance is a guarantor or a signatory, unless utilized for 
the exclusive benefit of AlA Insurance to provide funding for AlA 
Insurance and approved by Reed Taylor or such other party appointed 
by Reed Taylor or the Court. 
(d) Enjoining the Defendants from destroying, altering, deleting, purging, 
and/or removing any documents (including drafts, proposals, 
electronic files, email, back-up media and the like), property, 
computers and the like from AIA Insurance's office. 
(e) Enjoining the Defendants from advancing or lending any funds, assets 
or services to R. John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie 
Taylor or AIA Services without first obtaining written consent from 
Reed Taylor or the Court. 
(f) Enjoining the Defendants from entering into or negotiating any 
substantive contracts or agreements without first obtaining approval 
from Reed Taylor or the Court. 
(g) Enjoining the Defendants from holding, calling or participating in any 
shareholder meetings, board meeting, and/or executing any Consents 
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III 
in Lieu of the foregoing without pennitting Reed Taylor to vote the 
pledged shares or take such other action pennitted to him as the holder 
of the right to vote all outstanding shares of AlA Insurance. 
(h) Enjoining the Defendants from using or transferring any funds, assets, 
or services of AlA Insurance for the purpose of providing any retainers 
or payments for the legal services for R. John Taylor, Bryan Freeman, 
JoLee Duclos, and Connie Taylor. 
(i) Enjoining R. John Taylor to only be entitled to reasonable 
compensation for work perfonned for AlA Insurance. R. John 
Taylor's time expended for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and any 
other entities partially owned by him shall be paid by the appropriate 
entity and not AlA Insurance or AIA Services. 
G) Enjoining the Defendants from not having AlA Insurance and AIA 
Services accurately and properly itemizing every employee's daily 
time sheet to reflect the number ofhour(s) perfonned for AlA Services 
and AlA Insurance and such other unrelated entities such as Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc. and Sound Insurance. 
(k) Enjoining the Defendants from such other actions as may be 
reasonably contemplated from this Second Amended Complaint, the 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, the Amended Security Agreement, 
the Restructure Agreement and/or which would otherwise protect Reed 
Taylor's interests. 
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14.6 For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants 
requiring them to timely and promptly provide Reed Taylor with all financial information 
required under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
14.7 For a preliminary and pennanent injunction enjoining John from entering 
the offices of AlA Insurance, ifnecessary. 
14.8 For such other relief or Court orders as Reed may request before or at trial 
to enforce his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security 
Agreement, and/or Restructure Agreement, including, without limitation, any action or 
order authorized under I.C. § 30-1-701 et seq. and/or Chapter 9 of Title 29 under Idaho 
Code. 
14.9 For the avoidance of the improper and/or fraudulent transfers of funds, 
assets and/or services from AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to John, entities partially 
owned by John, and/or any other party who received such transfers under I.C. § 55-916, 
et seq. and/or other applicable legal authority. 
14.10 For judgment against John for $307,271, plus accrued interest for the 
money he owed AlA Services which was improperly paid by transferring his 
indebtedness to Reed's Promissory Note. 
14.11 For judgment against Connie Taylor to the fullest extent of her derivative 
liability by virtue of her marriage to R. John Taylor and her interest in the community 
property in an amount to be proven at the time of trial. 
14.l2 For a judgment against John for all amounts, plus pre-jUdgment interest, in 
an amount to be proven at the time oftrial. 
14.13 For judgment against John, Duclos, and/or Freeman, jointly and severally, 
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for all funds, assets, services, property and/or any other benefit fraudulently transferred 
andJor fraudulently conveyed, and which such transferred may not be avoided, rescinded 
andJor paid to Reed. 
14.14 For judgment against John, Duclos and/or Freeman, jointly and severally, 
for amounts owed to Reed in an amount to be proven at the time of trial because AlA 
Services and AlA Insurance are alter egos of John, Duclos andlor Freeman. 
14.15 For the imposition of a construction trust for the benefit of Reed on all 
funds, investments, loans, advances, securities, property, transactions, services and/or 
self-dealing which were fraudulently, wrongfully andlor improperly made for the benefit 
of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Duclos, Freeman, John, andlor other parties or entities, 
which sums should have been paid to Reed. 
14.16 For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants from 
transferring, encumbering or otherwise disposing of any improperly and/or fraudulently 
obtained and/or transferred assets under I.e. § 55-916, et seq. andJor other applicable 
legal authority. 
14.17 For judgment and/or relief for all claims which conform to the evidence 
obtained through discovery and/or forensic accounting. 
14.18 For an award of Reed's attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory 
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14.19 For such other relief as Reed may request before or at the time of trial 
and/or that the Court may find just, equitable, or warranted before or at the time oftrial. 
DATED this 31 sl day of May, 2007. 
THlRD AMENDED COMPLAINT - 24 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
By: ___ ~,,--:~,,--______ _ 
Roderic 
Paul R. ressman, Jr. 
Ned A. Cannon 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Third Amended Complaint on the following party(s) via the 
methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 - l3 th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Halley 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Attorneys for AlA Services and AIA Insurance 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
eX) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
e ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile (208) 342-3829 
Signed this 31 st day of May, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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